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Lay epistemics and human knowledge: cognitive and motivational bases
Abstract
In this ambitious and far-reaching work, Kruglanski lays out a cognitive theory of knowledge that not only synthesizes wide-ranging contributions to cognitive psychology, but also extends their implications across the landscape of social psychology. Kruglanski's vision is earmarked by the high degree of flexibility attributed to the cognitive system. Rather than presuming a fixed set of essential processes, he sees the individual as harboring the potential for multiple configurations of thought, and thus being capable of generating an enormous array of understandings. Particular configurations emerge within social interaction, as attention is directed to one or another sector of the cognitive field. In generating and testing hypotheses, the individual is also guided by what Kruglanski calls "epistemic motives," i.e., motives to gain (or avoid) closure regarding more or less specific domains of concern. Knowledge generation thus proceeds within relatively arbitrary and circumscribed contexts in which a local validity is achieved. Thus, the scientist's knowledge is not superior to the layperson's, only different in content. After the somewhat ironic inclusion of supporting research, the theoretical orientation is creatively applied to a variety of central problems in social psychology and to the process of psychotherapy. A landmark volume for social psychologists, but accessible only to advanced undergraduates and above.
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Citations
Cited by
Toward a hierarchical model of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Vallerand, R. J. (1997) · Advances in experimental social psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60019-2 · Cited by 3,198
Kruglanski, A. W., Shah, J. Y., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Chun, W. Y., & Sleeth-Keppler, D. (2002) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(02)80008-9 · Cited by 1,386
Hogg, M. A. (2007) · Advances in experimental social psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(06)39002-8 · Cited by 990
Uncertainty management by means of fairness judgments
van den Bos, K., & Lind, E. A. (2002) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(02)80003-x · Cited by 913
PERSECUTORY DELUSIONS: A REVIEW AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION
Bentall, R. P., Corcoran, R., Howard, R., Blackwood, N., & Kinderman, P. (2001) · Clinical Psychology Review · doi:10.1016/s0272-7358(01)00106-4 · Cited by 876
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 1990-03-01
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 07
- Pages
- 27-4159-27-4159
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W2582624286
- Cited by
- 241
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Lay epistemics and human knowledge: cognitive and motivational bases. (1990). Choice Reviews Online. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.27-4159
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