The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Liaisons: philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences
Abstract
These essays by a major epistemologist reconfigure philosophical projects across a wide spectrum, from mind to metaphysics, from epistemology to social power. Several of Goldman's classic essays are included along with many newer writings. Together these trace and continue the development of the author's unique blend of naturalism and reliabilism. Part I defends the simulation approach to mentalistic ascription and explores the psychological mechanisms of ontological individuation. Part II shows why epistemology needs help from cognitive science - not only to evaluate cognitive agents but also to illuminate the practices of epistemic evaluators. Parts III and IV explain how philosophical projects can be reshaped through interchange with social science. An epistemological study of scientific activity exploits the economic paradigm, and philosophical tools are applied to analyze power in society. Contents Mind and Metaphysics * Interpretation Psychologized * Metaphysics, Mind, and Mental Science * Cognition and Modal Metaphysics * Individual Epistemology * A Causal Theory of Knowing * Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge * What Is justified Belief? Strong and Weak justification * Psychology and Philosophical Analysis * Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology * Social Epistemology * Foundations of Social Epistemics * Epistemic Paternalism: Communication and Control in Law and Society * An Economic Model of Scientific Activity and Truth Acquisition (with Moshe Shaked) * Social Power * Toward a Theory of Social Power * On the Measurement of Power
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism
Bergmann, M. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0199275742.001.0001 · Cited by 504
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
Berker, S. (2013) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2087645 · Cited by 336
Kornblith, H. (2016) · The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.8 · Cited by 331
Wilholt, T. (2013) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axs007 · Cited by 268
Social Justice: History, Theory, and Research
Jost, J. T., & Kay, A. C. (2010) · Handbook of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy002030 · Cited by 253
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 1992-07-01
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 29-6222-29-6222
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W2047636492
- Cited by
- 339
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Liaisons: philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5860/choice.29-6222
- The paper
- Liaisons: philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences. (1992). Choice Reviews Online. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.29-6222
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.