Feminist interpretations of Aristotle
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Abstract
In contrast to many previous feminist interpretations of Aristotle, which found much to disparage and little to salvage in his philosophy, the contributors to this volume enter into new, creative, and subtle dimensions of inquiry about Aristotle. They look more deeply into his influence and question the possibility of escape from it. Feminists recognize that they too philosophize within the tradition founded by Plato and Aristotle and owe the Greeks a debt. Aristotle still influences our abstract thinking, search for principles, meditations on virtue, and reflections on nature, essence, and sexual difference. As critics of modernism and liberalism in our day, some feminists seek significant alternatives in the classical era while eschewing ancient sexism. From the essays in this volume, which are divided into two parts, Theoretical Sciences and Practical and Productive Sciences, reflecting the traditional structure of works in the Aristotelian corpus, we learn not only about Aristotle but about a new feminist methodology in approaching major contemporary issues such as surrogate motherhood and women in the military. We also find a new perspective on feminist debates over whether logic is gendered, the advantages of an ethics of care, feminist epistemology, and the nature of critical feminist spectatorship. Contributors are Angela Curran, Marguerite Deslauriers, Cynthia Freeland, Ruth Groenhout, Marjorie Hass, Linda Hirshman, Luce Irigaray, Barbara Koziak, Deborah Modrak, Martha Nussbaum, Carol Poster, and Charlotte Witt.
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Cited by
Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy: a dynamic reference work
Nodelman, U., Allen, C., & Zalta, E. N. (2002) · Proceedings of the 2nd ACM/IEEE-CS joint conference on Digital libraries · doi:10.1145/544220.544327 · Cited by 1,988
Principled and statistical connections in common sense conception
Prasada, S., & Dillingham, E. M. (2006) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2005.01.003 · Cited by 230
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 1999-01-01
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 05
- Pages
- 36-2691-36-2691
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W584433340
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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