Cited by 230Categorization, perception, and languageLanguage, Metaphor, and CognitionLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Principled and statistical connections in common sense conception

Prasada, Sandeep, Dillingham, Elaine M.·2006·Cognition

Abstract

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. We report six experiments that investigate the nature of the relations we represent between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and its other properties. The experiments provide evidence that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g. DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g. having four legs for dogs), but not other properties (t-properties; e.g. being brown for dogs). Principled connections are different from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections, (i) license the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess the k-property, (ii) license explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is, and (iii) license normative expectations concerning the presence of the k-property in tokens of the type. The experiments provide evidence for all three of these aspects of principled connections. The experiments also demonstrate that principled connections must be distinguished from merely strong statistical connections. We suggest that principled connections are one of the fundamental types of relations (in addition to logical, statistical, and causal relations) in terms of which our conceptual knowledge is structured. We argue that principled connections reveal a formal mode of understanding and explanation. This mode of understanding complements other modes of understanding that have been studied within the theory-based approach to conceptual representation. Finally, we suggest that kind representations are distinguished from representations of mere types by the representation of principled connections to k-properties.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.cognition.2005.01.003

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  • Generics may imply that a statement is normatively correct or ideal.

    “Generics may also imply that a statement is normatively correct or ideal (39,40,42,43).”

    From Generic language in scientific communication (2019) · cites this paper as [39]

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Authors
Prasada, S., & Dillingham, E. M.
Affiliations
City University of New York (US)
Corresponding author
Prasada, Sandeep
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2006-02
Volume
99
Issue
1
Pages
73-112
ISSN
0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1994655610
Cited by
230
References
73
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 13
FWCI
6.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Language, Metaphor, and Cognition
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
Keywords
type tokens, causal relationship, logical connections, conceptual representation, theory-based approach, explanation, normative expectations
MeSH terms
Analysis of Variance, Cognition, Concept Formation, Humans, Judgment, Linguistics, Psychological Theory, Knowledge

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