The DOI matches its Crossref record; 171 of the 171 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives
Abstract
Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (2003) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226470993.001.0001 · Cited by 20,632
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics
Maddala, G. S. (1983) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810176 · Cited by 13,240
Robust Locally Weighted Regression and Smoothing Scatterplots
Cleveland, W. S. (1979) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1979.10481038 · Cited by 11,594
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1996) · Firms, Organizations and Contracts · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0005 · Cited by 9,565
The Theory of Industrial Organization
Jean Tirole, Z. (1988) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 8,651
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew
Page, B. I. (1975) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2148248 · Cited by 3,130
Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. L. (2000) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 2,798
Katz, R. S. (1982) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961197 · Cited by 2,468
Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America
Aldrich, J. H. (1995) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226012773.001.0001 · Cited by 2,372
Legislative leviathan: party government in the House
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-0579 · Cited by 2,313
Constituency Influence in Congress
Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1963) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1952717 · Cited by 2,293
The Theory of Political Coalitions
Brazil, B. R., & Riker, W. S. (1963) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/445870 · Cited by 2,106
The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development
(1995) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036861 · Cited by 2,069
Riker, W. H., Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2108773 · Cited by 2,059
Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961664 · Cited by 1,970
The logic of congressional action
(1991) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-4778 · Cited by 1,813
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
Friedman, J. W. (1971) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296617 · Cited by 1,778
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., & Johnsen, C. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260997 · Cited by 1,736
Information and Legislative Organization
Krehbiel, K. (1991) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.8850 · Cited by 1,718
Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, by Richard F. Fenno, Jr.
Leuthold, D. A. (1979) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2150167 · Cited by 1,601
Weingast, B. R., & Marshall, W. J. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261528 · Cited by 1,527
Sociotropic Politics: The American Case
Kinder, D. R., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1981) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400002544 · Cited by 1,519
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Shepsle, K. A. (1979) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110770 · Cited by 1,483
Weingast, B. R., & Moran, M. J. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261181 · Cited by 1,431
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Rohde, D. W. (1991) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226724058.001.0001 · Cited by 1,395
Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies
(1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625671 · Cited by 1,395
The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment
Gerber, A. S., & Green, D. P. (2000) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585837 · Cited by 1,380
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
McKelvey, R. D. (1976) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(76)90040-5 · Cited by 1,339
Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment
Ross, R. S., & Fiorina, M. P. (1977) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447661 · Cited by 1,228
Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996
Bartels, L. M. (2000) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669291 · Cited by 1,207
Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy
Alesina, A., & Rosenthal, H. (1995) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511720512 · Cited by 1,201
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H. (1978) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf03187594 · Cited by 1,160
Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe
(1991) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(91)90033-o · Cited by 966
Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics
Smith, V. L. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322156954 · Cited by 960
Price, D. E. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400268147 · Cited by 945
Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees
Hall, R. L., & Wayman, F. W. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962767 · Cited by 932
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
Congressmen's Voting Decisions
Haston, B. M., & Kingdon, J. W. (1974) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447700 · Cited by 890
An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups
Salisbury, R. H. (1969) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110212 · Cited by 822
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1981) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00133748 · Cited by 779
Patterns of Congressional Voting
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1991) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111445 · Cited by 777
White, J. (1992) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2152152 · Cited by 766
Representatives, roll calls, and constituencies
Fiorina, M. P. (1974) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 754
Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990.
Epstein, L. D., & Mayhew, D. R. (1992) · The Journal of American History · doi:10.2307/2080938 · Cited by 718
Unifying Political Methodology: The Likelihood Theory of Statistical Inference
King, G. (1989) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 710
A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
Weingast, B. R. (1979) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111001 · Cited by 666
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (2008) · The American Congress Reader · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511816406.042 · Cited by 651
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Riker, W. H. (1982) · Studies in Public Choice · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_1 · Cited by 646
Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting
Poole, K. T. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614644 · Cited by 635
The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96
Binder, S. A. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585572 · Cited by 621
The Demand and Supply of Public Goods
Wilde, J. A., & Buchanan, J. M. (1969) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1056053 · Cited by 610
Krehbiel, K. (1993) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400009741 · Cited by 608
Presidents, Parliaments, And Policy
Haggard, S. M., & McCubbins, M. D. (2001) · Cited by 603
Mughan, A. (1991) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963919 · Cited by 595
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-3564 · Cited by 589
The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority
Esch, K. H., & Lowi, T. J. (1969) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447054 · Cited by 580
Disjointed pluralism: institutional innovation and the development of the U.S. Congress
(2002) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.39-3088 · Cited by 542
An Informational Rationale for Political Parties
Snyder, J. M., & Ting, M. M. (2002) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/3088416 · Cited by 532
Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting
Snyder, J. M., & Groseclose, T. (2000) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669305 · Cited by 518
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous
Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1989) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111156 · Cited by 511
Williams, D. A. (1975) · Biometrics · doi:10.2307/2529820 · Cited by 510
Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking
Krehbiel, K. (1998) · Cited by 480
Private Power and American Democracy, by Grant McConnell
Kesselman, M. (1967) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2147249 · Cited by 480
Polarized politics: Congress and the president in a partisan era
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.38-2423 · Cited by 479
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure
Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T. J. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585484 · Cited by 469
The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies
Huber, J. D. (1996) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082884 · Cited by 463
Political Leadership and Collective Goods
Davis, D. H., Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J. A., & Young, O. R. (1971) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/446952 · Cited by 452
Berkson, J. (1953) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1953.10483494 · Cited by 441
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
(1995) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.23248 · Cited by 425
Stalemate: causes and consequences of legislative gridlock
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-1841 · Cited by 424
Congressional procedures and the policy process
(1996) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-4204 · Cited by 422
Veto bargaining: presidents and the politics of negative power
(2001) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.38-4145 · Cited by 410
The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress
McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2001) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055401003069 · Cited by 397
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature
Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111460 · Cited by 395
The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
McCubbins, M. D. (1985) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111178 · Cited by 388
A dynamical model of political equilibrium
Kramer, G. H. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90011-4 · Cited by 387
The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England
Rothblatt, S., & Cox, G. W. (1988) · Journal of Interdisciplinary History · doi:10.2307/204683 · Cited by 382
Penniman, H. R. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400260012 · Cited by 373
Constitutional Government in the United States
Wilson, W. (1908) · Columbia University Press eBooks · doi:10.7312/wils90008 · Cited by 370
Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions
Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110787 · Cited by 355
Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968
Reichard, G. W., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1975) · The Journal of American History · doi:10.2307/1901399 · Cited by 354
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
Hojnacki, M., & Kimball, D. C. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586303 · Cited by 353
The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience
Groseclose, T., & McCarty, N. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669362 · Cited by 351
Kalt, J. P., & Zupan, M. A. (1990) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467201 · Cited by 340
Bryce, J. (1973) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 332
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-1756 · Cited by 325
The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting
Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J. M., & III, C. S. (2001) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/440269 · Cited by 324
Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States
Sundquist, J. L. (1988) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2150899 · Cited by 320
The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It
Fiorina, M. P. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400259376 · Cited by 309
Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy
Ripley, R. B., & Franklin, G. A. (1984) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 307
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2001) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/440401 · Cited by 307
Choosing justice: an experimental approach to ethical theory
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-2607 · Cited by 301
Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn
Cooper, J., & Brady, D. W. (1981) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961374 · Cited by 299
Income redistribution and the realignment of American politics
McCarty, N. M., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. L. (1997) · Cited by 292
Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship
Krehbiel, K. (2000) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669306 · Cited by 292
Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues, by D. Roderick Kiewiet
Pierce, P. A. (1984) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2150431 · Cited by 269
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior
Denzau, A. T., & Mackay, R. J. (1983) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110891 · Cited by 269
Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945-94
Howell, W., Adler, S., Cameron, C., & Riemann, C. (2000) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/440372 · Cited by 267
Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey
Mitchell, W. C., & Munger, M. C. (1991) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111373 · Cited by 266
The Use of a Correlated Binomial Model for the Analysis of Certain Toxicological Experiments
Kupper, L. L., & Haseman, J. K. (1978) · Biometrics · doi:10.2307/2529589 · Cited by 252
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
Diermeier, D., & Myerson, R. B. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.5.1182 · Cited by 250
Analysis of Dichotomous Response Data from Certain Toxicological Experiments
Haseman, J. K., & Kupper, L. L. (1979) · Biometrics · doi:10.2307/2529950 · Cited by 242
Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States
Ansolabehere, S., Gerber, A., & Snyder, J. (2002) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055402000448 · Cited by 235
The Keys to Legislative Success in the U.S. House of Representatives
ANDERSON, W. D., BOX‐STEFFENSMEIER, J. M., & SINCLAIR‐CHAPMAN, V. (2003) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.3162/036298003x200926 · Cited by 225
Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting
Arrow, K. (1990) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511896606 · Cited by 200
Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting.
Rabinowitz, G., Enelow, J. M., & Hinich, M. J. (1991) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2072226 · Cited by 197
Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style
Denzau, A., Riker, W., & Shepsle, K. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956251 · Cited by 194
Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions
Kiewiet, D. R., & McCubbins, M. D. (1988) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111243 · Cited by 192
The Decline of Party in the U. S. House of Representatives, 1887-1968
Brady, D. W., Cooper, J., & Hurley, P. A. (1979) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/439581 · Cited by 192
Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z
Krehbiel, K. (1995) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111662 · Cited by 187
Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate
Smith, S. S. (1989) · Cited by 185
Agenda power in Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados , 1989 to 1999
Neto, O. A. (2002) · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) · Cited by 181
Kofmehl, K. (1982) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400187350 · Cited by 177
Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading
Schwartz, T. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400265209 · Cited by 172
The party's over;: The failure of politics in America
Broder, D. (1972) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 170
Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints
Stratmann, T. (2000) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585838 · Cited by 166
How Much Is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?
Cox, G. W., & Magar, E. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585397 · Cited by 162
Estimating Legislators' Preferred Points
Londregan, J. (1999) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a029804 · Cited by 159
When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?
Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. V. (1984) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130440 · Cited by 151
Wrighton, J. M. (1997) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2657714 · Cited by 148
Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules
Dion, D., & Huber, J. D. (1996) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2960347 · Cited by 144
The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1980, by Martin P. Wattenberg
Sorauf, F. J. (1984) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2150713 · Cited by 142
Banks, J. S., & Hanushek, E. A. (1995) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625725 · Cited by 141
Legislative entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives
Wawro, G. J. (2001) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.38-4159 · Cited by 141
Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House
Schickler, E., & Rich, A. (1997) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2960492 · Cited by 140
Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty: Party Defection and Roll-Call Behavior, 1947-97
Nokken, T. P. (2000) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/440414 · Cited by 137
On Measuring Partisanship in Roll Call Voting: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1999Preprint
Cox, G. W., & Poole, K. T. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1154125 · Cited by 135
Uncovering the Hidden Effect of Party
Binder, S. A., Lawrence, E., & Maltzman, F. (1999) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2647830 · Cited by 134
The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House
Cooper, J. (1970) · Rice Research Repository (Rice University) · Cited by 133
Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence, by R. Douglas Arnold
Ogul, M. S. (1980) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2149604 · Cited by 133
The Politics of Divided Government
Cox, G. W., & Kernell, S. (2019) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429313844 · Cited by 132
Restrictive Rules Reconsidered
Krehbiel, K. (1997) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111680 · Cited by 130
Alvarez, R. M., & Saving, J. L. (1997) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/106591299705000405 · Cited by 128
The Permanent Majority: The Conservative Coalition in the United States Congress
Fritz, H. W., & Shelley, M. (1985) · The History Teacher · doi:10.2307/493644 · Cited by 122
Schickler, E. (2000) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586012 · Cited by 120
The politics of finance : the House Committee on Ways and Means
Manley, J. F. (1970) · Little, Brown eBooks · Cited by 116
The Electoral Consequences of Party Switching by Incumbent Members of Congress, 1947–2000
Grose, C. R., & Yoshinaka, A. (2003) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.3162/036298003x200809 · Cited by 108
How to vote, whether to vote: Strategies for voting and abstaining on congressional roll calls
Cohen, L. R., & Noll, R. G. (1991) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/bf00992292 · Cited by 106
Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection
Kiewiet, D. R., & McCubbins, M. D. (1985) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2131066 · Cited by 106
Sense and Sensibility: The Role of Rules
Dion, D., & Huber, J. D. (1997) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111681 · Cited by 104
Minority Rights and Majority Power: Theoretical Consequences of the Motion to Recommit
Krehbiel, K., & Meirowitz, A. (2002) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/3598528 · Cited by 93
Roberts, J. M. (2005) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.3162/036298005x201527 · Cited by 93
Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Commentary
Ranney, A. (1951) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1951475 · Cited by 92
Davidson, R. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962570 · Cited by 91
KING, D. C., & Zeckhauser, R. (2003) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.3162/036298003x200935 · Cited by 89
The Responsible Party Government Model in House and Senate Elections
Jones, D. R. H., & McDermott, M. L. (2003) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/1519893 · Cited by 87
Snyder, J. M., & Groseclose, T. (2001) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055401003070 · Cited by 86
Responsible partisanship?: the evolution of American political parties since 1950
Green, J. C. (2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-1227 · Cited by 75
Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: New Perspectives on the History of Congress
Malsberger, J. W. (2003) · History Reviews of New Books · doi:10.1080/03612759.2003.10527888 · Cited by 75
Crotty, W. J., & Clark, J. S. (1964) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/444894 · Cited by 74
The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules, and Procedures
Froman, L. A. (1967) · Cited by 72
A spatial model of legislative voting with perceptual error
Ladha, K. K. (1991) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00173825 · Cited by 60
Agenda Power in Brazil's Câmara Dos Deputados, 1989–98
Neto, O. A., Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2003) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2003.0023 · Cited by 58
History and Procedure of the House of Representatives, by De Alva Stanwood Alexander
Sait, E. M. (1916) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2141641 · Cited by 56
Candidate Attributes and Pac Contributions
Grenzke, J. (1989) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.1177/106591298904200205 · Cited by 56
The 1994 House Elections in Perspective
Jacobson, G. C. (2019) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429040177-1 · Cited by 56
Positive Theories of Congressional Parties
Smith, S. S. (2000) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/440368 · Cited by 55
The Geometry of Multidimensional Quadratic Utility in Models of Parliamentary Roll Call Voting
Poole, K. T. (2001) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/polana/9.3.211 · Cited by 53
Committee Power, Leadership, and the Median Voter: Evidence from the Smoking Ban
Krehbiel, K. (1996) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023359 · Cited by 52
The Coefficient of Party Influence
Krehbiel, K. (2003) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/11.1.95 · Cited by 47
The Party Effect from A to Z and Beyond
Krehbiel, K. (1999) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2647831 · Cited by 46
Robinson, J. A. (1963) · Cited by 42
Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform House
Marshall, B. W. (2002) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/3598519 · Cited by 39
Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions
Banks, J. S., & Hanushek, E. A. (1995) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · Cited by 36
Covington, C. R., & Bargen, A. (2004) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1111/j.0022-3816.2004.00290.x · Cited by 36
Cited by
Political Polarization in the American Public
Fiorina, M. P., & Abrams, S. J. (2008) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836 · Cited by 1,881
Polarized America: the dance of ideology and unequal riches
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-3551 · Cited by 1,795
Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting
Carey, J. M. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00239.x · Cited by 701
Party Polarization in Congress
Theriault, S. M. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790652 · Cited by 656
Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting
Poole, K. T. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614644 · Cited by 635
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2006-03-01
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 07
- Pages
- 43-4315-43-4315
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1536322546
- Cited by
- 910
- References
- 171
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.