Cited by 375Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationAmerican Constitutional Law and PoliticsPolitical Theory and Democracy

Causes and Consequences of Polarization

Barber, Michael J., McCarty, Nolan·2015·Solutions to Political Polarization in America

Abstract

Rarely these days does a news cycle pass without new stories of political dysfunction in Washington, D.C. Reports of stalemates, fiscal cliffs, and failed grand bargains have begun to erode the public confidence in the ability of our representative institutions to govern effectively. In May 2013, only one American in six approved of the way Congress has handled its job. Sadly, that level of support was a major improvement from the previous summer, when wrangling over the usually routine matter of raising the debt ceiling drove congressional approval down to 10%. The most common diagnoses of Washington's ailments center on the emergence of excessive partisanship and deep ideological divisions among political elites and officeholders. In short, “polarization” is to blame. Consequently, the reform-minded have taken up the mantle of reducing polarization or mitigating its effects. In recent years, proposals for electoral reform to change electoral districting, primary elections, and campaign finance have been presented as panaceas. Other reformers have focused on changing legislative procedures such as those related to the filibuster, appropriations, and confirmation process to limit the opportunities for polarization to undermine government. Although there has been intense public discussion about the causes of polarization, its consequences, and possible cures, social science research has only recently begun to help shape those discussions. The intent of this chapter is to provi…

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  • Ideological polarization may yield adverse effects on the legislative process, as large ideological distances between MPs or members of congress make compromises harder and may result in gridlocks.

    “Finally, ideological polarization may yield adverse effects on the legislative process, as large ideological distances between MPs or members of congress make compromises harder and may hence result in gridlocks (Barber & McCarty, 2015).”

    From Political polarization and corruption: A theoretical and empirical review (2024) · cites this paper as Barber & McCarty, 2015

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Authors
Barber, M. J., & McCarty, N.
Affiliations
  • Brigham Young University (US)
  • Princeton University (US)
Venue
Solutions to Political Polarization in America
Published
2015-04-27
Pages
15-58
OpenAlex
W2478674739
Cited by
375
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 56 · 2023: 34 · 2022: 48 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 55 · 2019: 47 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 1
FWCI
162.12
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › American Constitutional Law and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
Keywords
political polarization, partisanship, congressional voting, roll-call voting, party-line voting, legislative gridlock, electoral reform, filibusters, campaign finance reform, primary elections, public trust in government, ideological divisions

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