The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The myth of the rational voter: why democracies choose bad policies
Abstract
In theory, democracy is a bulwark against socially harmful policies. In practice, however, democracies frequently adopt and maintain policies that are damaging. How can this paradox be explained? The influence of special interests and voter ignorance are two leading explanations. I offer an alternative story of how and why democracy fails. The central idea is that voters are worse than ignorant; they are, in a word, irrational -- and they vote accordingly. Despite their lack of knowledge, voters are not humble agnostics; instead, they confidently embrace a long list of misconceptions. Economic policy is the primary activity of the modern state. And if there is one thing that the public deeply misunderstands, it is economics. People do not grasp the "invisible hand" of the market, with its ability to harmonize private greed and the public interest. I call this anti-market bias. They underestimate the benefits of interaction with foreigners. I call this anti-foreign bias. They equate prosperity not with production, but with employment. I call this make-work bias. Finally, they are overly prone to think that economic conditions are bad and getting worse. I call this pessimistic bias. In the minds of many, Winston Churchill's famous aphorism cuts the conversation short: "Democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." But this saying overlooks the fact that governments vary in scope as well as form. In democracies the main alternative to majority rule is not dictatorship, but markets. A better understanding of voter irrationality advises us to rely less on democracy and more on the market.
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Cited by
The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About Politics
Flynn, D. J., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2017) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12394 · Cited by 1,183
Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy
HEALY, A., & MALHOTRA, N. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990104 · Cited by 931
Mindful Economics: The Production, Consumption, and Value of Beliefs
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2016) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.30.3.141 · Cited by 817
Breaking the filter bubble: democracy and design
Bozdag, E., & van den Hoven, J. (2015) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-015-9380-y · Cited by 375
Expressive behavior in economics and politics
Hillman, A. L. (2010) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.06.004 · Cited by 324
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2007-10-01
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 02
- Pages
- 45-0962-45-0962
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1504433434
- Cited by
- 925
- References
- 44
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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