Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.1
Abstract
Version 1.1 of this Cybersecurity Framework refines, clarifies, and enhances Version 1.0, which was issued in February 2014.It incorporates comments received on the two drafts of Version 1.1.Version 1.1 is intended to be implemented by first-time and current Framework users.Current users should be able to implement Version 1.1 with minimal or no disruption; compatibility with Version 1.0 has been an explicit objective.The following table summarizes the changes made between Version 1.0 and Version 1.1.Table NTR-1 -Summary of changes between Framework Version 1.0 and Version 1.1. UpdateDescription of Update Clarified that terms like "compliance" can be confusing and mean something very different to various Framework stakeholders Added clarity that the Framework has utility as a structure and language for organizing and expressing compliance with an organization's own cybersecurity requirements.However, the variety of ways in which the Framework can be used by an organization means that phrases like "compliance with the Framework" can be confusing.A new section on selfassessment Added Section 4.0 Self-Assessing Cybersecurity Risk with the Framework to explain how the Framework can be used by organizations to understand and assess their cybersecurity risk, including the use of measurements.Greatly expanded explanation of using Framework for Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management purposes An expanded Section 3.3 Communicating Cybersecurity Requirements with Stakeholders helps users better understand Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM), while a new Section 3.4 Buying Decisions highlights use of the Framework in understanding risk associated with commercial off-the-shelf products and services.Additional Cyber SCRM criteria were added to the Implementation Tiers.Finally, a Supply Chain Risk Management Category, including multiple Subcategories, has been added to the Framework Core. Refinements to better account for authentication, authorization, and identity proofingThe language of the Access Control Category has been refined to better account for authentication, authorization, and identity proofing.This included adding one Subcategory each for Authentication and Identity Proofing.Also, the Category has been renamed to Identity Management and Access Control (PR.AC) to better represent the scope of the Category and corresponding Subcategories.Better explanation of the relationship between Implementation Tiers and Profiles Added language to Section 3.2 Establishing or Improving a Cybersecurity Program on using Framework Tiers in Framework implementation.Added language to Framework Tiers to reflect integration of Framework considerations within organizational risk management programs.The Framework Tier concepts were also refined.Updated Figure 2.0 to include actions from the Framework Tiers.
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NIST proposed a framework [46] to address and manage cybersecurity risks related to industrial control systems.
“In order to address and manage the cybersecurity risks related to industrial control systems, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) located in the United States of America has proposed a framework [46].”
From A Review of Cybersecurity Guidelines for Manufacturing Factories in Industry 4.0 (2021) · cites this paper as [46]
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Securing IIoT using Defence-in-Depth: Towards an End-to-End secure Industry 4.0
Mosteiro-Sanchez, A., Barcelo, M., Astorga, J., & Urbieta, A. (2020) · Journal of Manufacturing Systems · doi:10.1016/j.jmsy.2020.10.011 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
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- Authors
- National Institute of Standards and Technology
- Published
- 2018-04-16
- OpenAlex
- W4234388477
- Cited by
- 386
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 59 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 36 · 2023: 57 · 2022: 51 · 2021: 69 · 2020: 60 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 4
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Civil and Structural Engineering › Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
- Keywords
- critical infrastructure cybersecurity, NIST Cybersecurity Framework, cyber risk management, self-assessment, profiles, commercial off-the-shelf components, stakeholder communication, organizational risk management
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