Guide to Operational Technology (OT) security
Open accessAbstract
This document provides guidance on how to secure operational technology (OT) while addressing their unique performance, reliability, and safety requirements. OT encompasses a broad range of programmable systems and devices that interact with the physical environment (or manage devices that interact with the physical environment). These systems and devices detect or cause a direct change through the monitoring and/or control of devices, processes, and events. Examples include industrial control systems, building automation systems, transportation systems, physical access control systems, physical environment monitoring systems, and physical environment measurement systems. The document provides an overview of OT and typical system topologies, identifies common threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks.
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- Premisenone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and Guidance
OT systems often incorporate non-digital mechanisms to provide fault tolerance and prevent the OT from acting outside of acceptable parameters.
“OT systems often incorporate non-digital mechanisms to provide fault tolerance and prevent the OT from acting outside of acceptable parameters.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ OT Cybersecurity Program Content
Information security programs do not necessarily address all of the specific security and operational needs of an OT environment.
“Information security programs do not necessarily address all of the specific security and operational needs of an OT environment, which instead prioritizes safety, followed by availability, integrity, and confidentiality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and Guidance
Non-digital mechanisms may help reduce the negative impacts that a digital incident on the OT might have.
“These non-digital mechanisms may help reduce the negative impacts that a digital incident on the OT might have and should be incorporated into the risk assessment process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and Guidance
OT often have non-digital control mechanisms that can prevent it from operating outside of a safe boundary and thereby limit the impact of an attack.
“For example, OT often have non-digital control mechanisms that can prevent it from operating outside of a safe boundary and thereby limit the impact of an attack (e.g., a mechanical relief pressure valve).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ OT-Specific Recommendations and Guidance
Both IT and OT environments may fall within critical infrastructure sectors based on CISA guidance.
“Based on guidance from CISA, organizations may find that both IT and OT environments fall within the critical infrastructure sectors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites CISA
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2.3.4. Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA)
As a result, boundary protection devices between zones do not mitigate lateral movement risks within a zone.
“As a result, boundary protection devices between zones do not mitigate lateral movement risks within a zone.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Conventional network security focuses on segmentation and perimeter defenses.
- Interpretationreasoning§ OT Cybersecurity Architecture
Using the corporate network for OT communication protocols could expose OT components to cyber attacks such as DoS, adversary-in-the-middle, or other network-based attacks.
“Additionally, using the corporate network for OT communication protocols could expose the OT components to cyber attacks (e.g., DoS, adversary-in-the-middle or other network-based attacks).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ OT Cybersecurity Architecture
A connection between OT and corporate or other IT networks represents additional risk.
“This connection represents additional risk, and organizations may want to minimize these connections and consider additional security controls for them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and Guidance
Network isolation devices may not protect against all network-based risks.
“Network isolation devices may not protect against all network-based risks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Additional information
Spoofed reporting messages can make defenders and operators think other errors are occurring to distract them from the actual source of the problem (alarm floods).
“The adversary could make the defenders and operators think that other errors are occurring in order to distract them from the actual source of the problem (i.e., alarm floods).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites ATTACK-ICS
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 182
- May combine two claims. 46
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Premisecitation§ 2.3.3. Distributed Control SystemsA DCS uses a centralized supervisory control loop to mediate a group of localized controllers that share the overall tasks of carrying out an entire production process.
“A DCS uses a centralized supervisory control loop to mediate a group of localized controllers that share the overall tasks of carrying out an entire production process [Erickson].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Erickson
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Comparing OT and IT System SecurityThis integration supports new IT capabilities but provides significantly less isolation for OT from the outside world than predecessor systems, creating a greater need to secure them.
“This integration supports new IT capabilities but provides significantly less isolation for OT from the outside world than predecessor systems, creating a greater need to secure them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ Components LocationThe operational and risk differences between IT and OT systems create the need for increased sophistication in applying cybersecurity and operational strategies.
“In summary, the operational and risk differences between IT and OT systems create the need for increased sophistication in applying cybersecurity and operational strategies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 2.3.3. Distributed Control SystemsBy modularizing the production system, a DCS reduces the impact of a single fault on the overall system.
“By modularizing the production system, a DCS reduces the impact of a single fault on the overall system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 2.3.3. Distributed Control SystemsStandard industrial communication protocols designed by industry groups such as Modbus and Fieldbus are often used on control networks and fieldbus networks.
“Standard industrial communication protocols designed by industry groups such as Modbus and Fieldbus [Berge] are often used on control networks and fieldbus networks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Berge
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Comparing OT and IT System SecurityWidely available and low-cost Ethernet, Internet Protocol (IP), and wireless devices are now replacing older proprietary technologies, which increases the likelihood of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and incidents.
“Widely available and low-cost Ethernet, Internet Protocol (IP), and wireless devices are now replacing older proprietary technologies, which increases the likelihood of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and incidents.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 2.3.8. Industrial Internet of ThingsThe IIoT consists of sensors, instruments, machines, and other devices that are networked together and use internet connectivity to enhance industrial and manufacturing business processes and applications.
“The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) consists of sensors, instruments, machines, and other devices that are networked together and use internet connectivity to enhance industrial and manufacturing business processes and applications [Berge].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Berge
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 2.3.7. Safety SystemsWhile an ICSS combines the functionality of both control and safety systems, the SIS must still comply with the requirements outlined in IEC61511.
“While an ICSS combines the functionality of both control and safety systems, the SIS must still comply with the requirements outlined in [IEC61511].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites IEC61511
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 2.3.7. Safety SystemsAn SIS is specifically designed in accordance with IEC61511.
“Although numerous other terms are associated with safety systems, the SIS is specifically designed in accordance with [IEC61511].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites IEC61511
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 2.3.3. Distributed Control SystemsA fieldbus allows for greater functionality beyond control, including field device diagnostics, and can accomplish control algorithms within the fieldbus, thereby avoiding signal routing back to the PLC for every control operation.
“Additionally, a fieldbus allows for greater functionality beyond control, including field device diagnostics, and can accomplish control algorithms within the fieldbus, thereby avoiding signal routing back to the PLC for every control operation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 2.3.8. Industrial Internet of ThingsThe Industry IoT Consortium proposes a three-tier system architecture model for representing IIoT systems: the edge tier, platform tier, and enterprise tier.
“The Industry IoT Consortium proposes a three-tier system architecture model for representing IIoT systems [IIRA19]: the edge tier, platform tier, and enterprise tier.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites IIRA19
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 3.2.4. Presenting the OT Cybersecurity Business Case to LeadershipOT systems tend to prioritize availability and safety over other factors like confidentiality.
“For example, OT systems tend to prioritize availability and safety over other factors like confidentiality.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceFor an OT system, available risk responses may be constrained by system requirements, potential adverse impacts on operations, or regulatory compliance regimes.
“For an OT system, available risk responses may be constrained by system requirements, potential adverse impacts on operations, or even regulatory compliance regimes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ • Improving OT system efficiencyA strong OT cybersecurity program is fundamental to a sustainable business operation and can potentially enhance system reliability and availability.
“A strong OT cybersecurity program is fundamental to a sustainable business operation and can potentially enhance system reliability and availability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ Analog control systemsAnalog control systems may prevent the physical process from entering an undesired state when the digital OT system is unavailable or corrupted.
“These may prevent the physical process from entering an undesired state when the digital OT system is unavailable or corrupted.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 4.1.2. Assessing Risk in an OT EnvironmentAssessing risk requires identifying threats and vulnerabilities, the harm that such threats and vulnerabilities may cause, and the likelihood that adverse events may arise from those threats and vulnerabilities.
“Regardless of which risk management level the risk assessment is conducted at, assessing risk requires identifying threats and vulnerabilities, the harm that such threats and vulnerabilities may cause, and the likelihood that adverse events may arise from those threats and vulnerabilities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ Manual control mechanismsManual control mechanisms ensure that an actuator can be controlled even if the OT system is unavailable or compromised.
“This ensures that an actuator can be controlled even if the OT system is unavailable or compromised.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Establish a Charter for the OT Cybersecurity ProgramA cybersecurity program that has commitment from senior management is more likely to achieve the mission and business goals of the organization.
“A cybersecurity program that has commitment from senior management is more likely to achieve the mission and business goals of the organization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 4.1.4. Monitoring Risk in an OT EnvironmentThe activities in the monitoring component impact all of the other components of risk management.
“The activities in the monitoring component impact all of the other components.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 3.3.2. Build and Train a Cross-Functional Team to Implement the OT Cybersecurity ProgramThe cultures of control engineering and IT are often significantly different.
“As the cultures of control engineering and IT are often significantly different”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceNon-digital control mechanisms may require additional time and human involvement.
“For example, non-digital control mechanisms may require additional time and human involvement, such as operators travelling to a remote site to perform certain control functions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Business Case for the OT Cybersecurity ProgramAs OT systems are increasingly being connected to IT networks, relying on traditional measures (e.g., air gaps) is not enough to protect such systems from cyber attacks.
“As OT systems are increasingly being connected to IT networks, relying on traditional measures (e.g., air gaps) is not enough to protect such systems from cyber attacks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ Special Areas for ConsiderationSupply chain risk management and risk management for safety are critical aspects of OT cybersecurity risk management.
“Supply chain risk management and risk management for safety are critical aspects of OT cybersecurity risk management.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceNIST PRAM is a tool that applies the risk model from NIST IR 8062 and helps organizations analyze, assess, and prioritize privacy risks.
“The NIST Privacy Risk Assessment Methodology (PRAM) is a tool that applies the risk model from NIST IR 8062 [IR8062] and helps organizations analyze, assess, and prioritize privacy risks to determine how to respond and select appropriate solutions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites IR8062
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisereasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceRisk assessments require reviewing the digital and non-digital mechanisms that are implemented to minimize adverse event impacts.
“Risk assessments also require reviewing the digital and non-digital mechanisms that are implemented to minimize adverse event impacts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 3.2.4. Presenting the OT Cybersecurity Business Case to LeadershipOT systems operate under different environments and requirements than IT systems.
“OT systems operate under different environments and requirements than IT systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 3.3.2. Build and Train a Cross-Functional Team to Implement the OT Cybersecurity ProgramCybersecurity is another threat to the safety and reliability of industrial processes.
“Cybersecurity is another threat to the safety and reliability of industrial processes”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 3.2.4. Presenting the OT Cybersecurity Business Case to LeadershipIT programs or tools may not be suitable or effective for OT systems.
“IT programs or tools may not be suitable or effective for OT systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidancePassive monitoring may not always capture all modifications to the system.
“However, this may not always capture all modifications to the system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ Analog control systemsAnalog control systems use non-digital sensors and actuators to monitor and control a physical process.
“Analog control systems use non-digital sensors and actuators to monitor and control a physical process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 4.1.2. Assessing Risk in an OT EnvironmentRisk assessments occur at all risk management levels and can be used to inform risk assessments at other levels.
“Risk assessments occur at all risk management levels (i.e., organization, mission and business function, and system) and can be used to inform risk assessments at other levels.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 3.2.4. Presenting the OT Cybersecurity Business Case to LeadershipA cybersecurity incident on an OT system may have catastrophic consequences that affect human life and the environment.
“Protecting OT systems is critical, and a cybersecurity incident on an OT system may have catastrophic consequences that affect human life and the environment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone given§ OT Cybersecurity Program ContentAn OT environment prioritizes safety, followed by availability, integrity, and confidentiality.
“which instead prioritizes safety, followed by availability, integrity, and confidentiality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceThreat information as it relates to the OT environment is evolving, and the availability and accuracy of this threat information is early in its development.
“Threat information as it relates to the OT environment is evolving, and the availability and accuracy of this threat information is early in its development.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 3.3.2. Build and Train a Cross-Functional Team to Implement the OT Cybersecurity ProgramIT often has years of cybersecurity experience, much of which is applicable to OT.
“IT often has years of cybersecurity experience, much of which is applicable to OT.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceFor other-than-adversarial threat events, the likelihood of occurrence is estimated using historical evidence, empirical data, and other factors.
“For other-than-adversarial threat events, the likelihood of occurrence is estimated using historical evidence, empirical data, and other factors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceRisk assessments are typically point-in-time reports.
“Risk assessments are typically point-in-time reports.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Business Case for the OT Cybersecurity ProgramCybersecurity events could potentially impact the organization's mission and objectives, the environment, regulatory compliance, and even human safety.
“Cybersecurity events could potentially impact the organization's mission and objectives, the environment, regulatory compliance, and even human safety.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3.2. Build and Train a Cross-Functional Team to Implement the OT Cybersecurity ProgramIncluding safety experts as part of the cybersecurity team will be beneficial in identifying potential impact areas due to cyber vulnerabilities.
“including safety experts as part of the cybersecurity team will be beneficial in identifying potential impact areas due to cyber vulnerabilities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ Business Case for the OT Cybersecurity ProgramTherefore, security measures tailored to the OT system are required to protect the organization.
“Therefore, security measures tailored to the OT system are required to protect the organization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ OT Cybersecurity Program ContentRisk to operations exists because of the potential of threat actors exploiting the vulnerabilities in the applications and infrastructures.
“Risk to operations exists because of the potential of threat actors exploiting the vulnerabilities in the applications and infrastructures.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3.2. Build and Train a Cross-Functional Team to Implement the OT Cybersecurity ProgramControl engineers will not be able to secure OT without collaboration and support from both the IT department and management.
“While the control engineers will play a large role in securing OT, they will not be able to do so without collaboration and support from both the IT department and management.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceFor adversarial threats, an assessment of likelihood of occurrence is typically based on adversary intent, capability, and targeting.
“For adversarial threats, an assessment of likelihood of occurrence is typically based on adversary intent, capability, and targeting.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceIn OT contexts, the potential for damage to equipment, human safety, the natural environment, and other critical infrastructures is part of risk considerations.
“In the context of OT, the potential for damage to equipment, human safety, the natural environment, and other critical infrastructures is part of these considerations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisereasoning§ OT Cybersecurity Program ContentThe primary purpose of investing in a cybersecurity program is risk management.
“The primary purpose of investing in a cybersecurity program is risk management.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ OT Cybersecurity Program DevelopmentSince new OT systems are designed and deployed less frequently than IT systems, it is much more common to improve, expand, or update an existing OT system than to design a new one.
“Since new OT systems are designed and deployed less frequently than IT systems, it is much more common to improve, expand, or update an existing OT system than to design a new one.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4.1.2. Assessing Risk in an OT EnvironmentThe impact of a cyber incident on an OT may include both physical and digital effects.
“For example, the impact of a cyber incident on an OT may include both physical and digital effects.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ OT Cybersecurity Program ContentThe most appropriate decision regarding what to include in the scope of a cybersecurity program can be made if investments are viewed through the lens of corporate risk management.
“Therefore, the most appropriate decision regarding what to include in the scope of a cybersecurity program can be made if investments are viewed through the lens of corporate risk management.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceOften OT systems are implemented with an undefined frequency for monitoring cyber activities.
“Often OT systems are implemented with an undefined frequency for monitoring cyber activities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ OT Cybersecurity Program DevelopmentDeploying systems to the field based on the assumption that these systems will be secured later introduces significant risks to the systems and the organization.
“Deploying systems to the field based on the assumption that these systems will be secured later introduces significant risks to the systems and the organization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceNIST FIPS 199 specifies that systems are categorized as low impact, moderate impact, or high impact for the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
“One approach is based on NIST FIPS 199 [FIPS199], which specifies that systems are categorized as low impact, moderate impact, or high impact for the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites FIPS199
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceAnalog mechanisms can be used to observe the physical system state and provide operators with reliable data if digital readings are unavailable or corrupted.
“Analog mechanisms (e.g., meters, alarms) can also be used to observe the physical system state and provide operators with reliable data if digital readings are unavailable or corrupted.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ • Product contaminationSafety and security incidents can have negative impacts that last longer than other types of incidents on all stakeholders, including employees, shareholders, customers, and the communities in which an organization operates.
“Safety and security incidents can have negative impacts that last longer than other types of incidents on all stakeholders, including employees, shareholders, customers, and the communities in which an organization operates.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ OT Cybersecurity Program ContentIn a demanding OT environment, situations may arise that require a temporary deviation from the security policy in order to maintain the mission or goal of the OT system.
“In a demanding OT environment, situations may arise that require a temporary deviation from the security policy in order to maintain the mission or goal of the OT system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT Cybersecurity Program DevelopmentIf there are not enough time and resources to properly secure the system before deployment, it is unlikely that security will be addressed at a later time.
“If there are not enough time and resources to properly secure the system before deployment, it is unlikely that security will be addressed at a later time.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 4.1.2. Assessing Risk in an OT EnvironmentWhen an organization conducts a risk assessment that includes OT systems, there may be additional considerations that do not exist when assessing the risks of traditional IT systems.
“When the organization conducts a risk assessment that includes OT systems, there may be additional considerations that do not exist when assessing the risks of traditional IT systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceISA 62443-3-2 provides example definitions for determining a system categorization utilizing OT impacts.
“Another approach that is based on ISA 62443-3-2 [ISA62443] provides example definitions for determining a system categorization utilizing OT impacts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites ISA62443
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceSecurity countermeasures are typically developed for IT environments.
“Since security countermeasures are typically developed for IT environments, organizations should consider how deploying security technologies into OT environments may negatively impact operations or safety.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceNIST SP 800-30, Rev. 1 provides guidance for organizations to develop likelihood weighted risk factors.
“NIST SP 800-30, Rev. 1 [SP800-30r1] provides guidance for organizations to develop likelihood weighted risk factors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites SP800-30r1
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceOT systems often have specific environmental requirements or are tied to their physical environment for operations.
“OT systems often have specific environmental requirements (e.g., a manufacturing process may require a precise temperature), or they may be tied to their physical environment for operations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceNon-digital control mechanisms may depend on human response times, which may be slower than automated controls.
“Such mechanisms may also depend on human response times, which may be slower than automated controls.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceModern monitoring platforms that leverage native protocol communications to access more system information may improve awareness, but the limitations of these OT systems must be understood.
“Modern monitoring platforms that leverage native protocol communications to access more system information may improve awareness, but the limitations of these OT systems must be understood.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3.2. Build and Train a Cross-Functional Team to Implement the OT Cybersecurity ProgramThe integration of control engineering and IT cultures will be essential for the development of a collaborative security design and operation.
“their integration will be essential for the development of a collaborative security design and operation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceMany OT system monitoring capabilities leverage passive monitoring techniques to detect system changes.
“Many OT system monitoring capabilities leverage passive monitoring techniques to detect system changes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT Cybersecurity Program ContentThe effectiveness of an OT cybersecurity program is often enhanced through coordination or integration with the organization's processes and information security program.
“The effectiveness of an OT cybersecurity program is often enhanced through coordination or integration with the organization's processes and information security program.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 3.2.4. Presenting the OT Cybersecurity Business Case to LeadershipCompensatory measures may be an effective solution to securing an OT system without affecting system performance.
“Compensatory measures may be an effective solution to securing an OT system without affecting system performance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone given§ OT Cybersecurity Program ContentInformation security programs typically focus on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability in that order for the entire organization.
“Information security programs typically focus on the confidentiality, integrity, and availabilityin that order -of information for the entire organization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceThreats may be difficult to accurately predict, even with historical data.
“By their nature, threats may be difficult to accurately predict, even with historical data.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 3.3.2. Build and Train a Cross-Functional Team to Implement the OT Cybersecurity ProgramMajor accident hazards and the loss of containment due to equipment failure or operator mistakes can have serious consequences.
“From a safety perspective, major accident hazards and the loss of containment due to equipment failure or operator mistakes can have serious consequences.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Business Case for the OT Cybersecurity ProgramOT systems can also be used as an entry point to organizational IT systems and other enterprise systems.
“OT systems can also be used as an entry point to organizational IT systems and other enterprise systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ Manual control mechanismsManual control mechanisms allow operators to manually control an actuator without relying on the digital OT system.
“Manual control mechanisms (e.g., manual valve controls, physical breaker switches) allow operators to manually control an actuator without relying on the digital OT system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceThe adoption of a cybersecurity strategy can assist an organization in understanding the life cycle of its OT systems and adjusting its approaches to maintaining security.
“The adoption of a cybersecurity strategy can assist an organization in understanding the life cycle of its OT systems and adjusting its approaches to maintaining security.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: OT assets often have long life cycles and reflect massive investments in operational, reliability, and safety testing.
- Rests on an assumption: It is sometimes neither economically nor technically feasible to replace existing OT equipment and applications wholesale with newer alternatives in the short- or medium-term.
- Rests on an assumption: OT equipment without the latest security features and updates is at greater risk of attacks than equipment with the latest versions.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceThe principles of defense in depth are flexible and can be applied to a wide range of OT environments, including ICS, SCADA, IoT, IIoT, and hybrid environments.
“Additionally, the principles of defense in depth are flexible and can be applied to a wide range of OT environments, including ICS, SCADA, Internet of Things (IoT), IIoT, and hybrid environments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ OT Cybersecurity ArchitectureUtilizing separate networks allows for greater flexibility to address security and performance requirements between the two environments.
“Utilizing separate networks allows for greater flexibility to address security and performance requirements between the two environments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceAllowing outbound connections from lower levels, tiers, or zones could represent a significant risk if unmanaged.
“Allowing outbound connections from lower levels, tiers, or zones could represent a significant risk if unmanaged.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ 4.3.4. ImplementThe control selection process can be applied to OT from two perspectives: new development and legacy.
“The control selection process described in this section can be applied to OT from two perspectives: new development and legacy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.1.1. Impacts of Choosing a Cybersecurity StrategyAs a result, the organization can ensure that cybersecurity goals are realized in its systems.
“As a result, the organization can ensure that cybersecurity goals are realized in its systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone given§ 4.2.1. Supply Chain Risk ManagementSupply-side organizations perform critical roles and functions, including manufacturing and provisioning technology products, providing software upgrades and patches, performing integration services, or otherwise supporting the day-to-day operations and maintenance of OT systems, components, and operational environments.
“These supply-side organizations perform critical roles and functions, including manufacturing and provisioning technology products, providing software upgrades and patches, performing integration services, or otherwise supporting the day-to-day operations and maintenance of OT systems, components, and operational environments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4.2.1. Supply Chain Risk ManagementIdentifying, assessing, and effectively responding to cybersecurity risks in supply chains is best accomplished by incorporating cybersecurity supply chain risk management (C-SCRM) considerations into organizational policies, plans, and practices.
“Identifying, assessing, and effectively responding to cybersecurity risks in supply chains is best accomplished by incorporating cybersecurity supply chain risk management (C-SCRM) considerations into organizational policies, plans, and practices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 4.2.2. Safety SystemsIn an OT environment, the physical and the digital are intertwined, and significant overlap may occur.
“However, in an OT environment, the physical and the digital are intertwined, and significant overlap may occur.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 5.1.3. Other Cybersecurity Strategy ConsiderationsExisting systems may already support some or most of the security architecture strategy, so building on these existing capabilities could accelerate the strategy implementation.
“Organizations may also find that existing systems already support some or most of the security architecture strategy, so building on these existing capabilities could accelerate the strategy implementation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 5.1.3. Other Cybersecurity Strategy ConsiderationsNew OT environments provide an opportunity to evaluate cyber risk early on and build cybersecurity into the design.
“Additionally, new OT environments provide an opportunity to evaluate cyber risk early on and build cybersecurity into the design.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisereasoning§ 4.3.4. ImplementSince the systems already exist, organizations have likely completed the security categorization and security control selection processes, resulting in the establishment of previously agreed-upon controls in the respective security plans and the implementation of those controls within the systems.
“Since the systems already exist, organizations have likely completed the security categorization and security control selection processes, resulting in the establishment of previously agreed-upon controls in the respective security plans and the implementation of those controls within the systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ 4.3.4. ImplementThe controls included in the security plans for the systems serve as security specifications and are expected to be incorporated into the systems during the development and implementation phases of the system development life cycle.
“The controls included in the security plans for the systems serve as security specifications and are expected to be incorporated into the systems during the development and implementation phases of the system development life cycle.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone given§ 4.2.1. Supply Chain Risk ManagementCybersecurity risks can arise from the products or services acquired to support OT needs.
“Cybersecurity risks can arise from the products or services acquired to support OT needs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Cybersecurity StrategyThe adoption of a cybersecurity strategy can result in a more systematic implementation of risk decisions into system development and operation.
“The adoption of a cybersecurity strategy can result in a more systematic implementation of risk decisions into system development and operation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceA defense-in-depth strategy is particularly useful in OT environments because it can focus attention and defensive mechanisms on critical functions.
“A defense-in-depth strategy is particularly useful in OT environments because it can focus attention and defensive mechanisms on critical functions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 4.3.4. ImplementIn some cases, it may not be feasible to immediately mitigate the risk due to scheduling issues.
“In some cases, it may not be feasible to immediately mitigate the risk due to scheduling issues.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceChanging the data collection point to capture network traffic before or after encryption could help improve monitoring capabilities when encrypted communication is expected.
“Changing the data collection point to capture network traffic before or after encryption (e.g., using host-based network monitoring tools) could help improve monitoring capabilities when encrypted communication is expected.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceCritical infrastructure standards and requirements are typically designed to protect critical cyber assets to support reliability and may carry additional legal obligations.
“These standards and requirements are typically designed to protect critical cyber assets to support reliability and may carry additional legal obligations for the organization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.1.1. Impacts of Choosing a Cybersecurity StrategyThe existence of an architecture informed by a cybersecurity strategy increases the likelihood that high-level cybersecurity goals will be reflected in the cybersecurity of individual systems.
“The existence of an architecture informed by a cybersecurity strategy increases the likelihood that high-level cybersecurity goals will be reflected in the cybersecurity of individual systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ OT Cybersecurity ArchitectureInternet access, email, and remote access are typically permitted on corporate networks but not allowed on OT networks.
“For example, internet access, email, and remote access are typically permitted on the corporate network but not allowed on OT networks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ Applying the Risk Management Framework to OT SystemsThe RMF steps, while shown sequentially, can be implemented in a different order to be consistent with established management and system development life cycle processes.
“The RMF steps in Fig. 15, while shown sequentially, can be implemented in a different order to be consistent with established management and system development life cycle processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 4.2.1. Supply Chain Risk ManagementThese risks have the potential to compromise the availability and integrity of critical OT systems and components, as well as the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the data utilized by the OT, thereby causing harms that range from minor disruptions to impacts on life and safety.
“Whether they are malicious, natural, or unintentional, these risks have the potential to compromise the availability and integrity of critical OT systems and components, as well as the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the data utilized by the OT, thereby causing harms that range from minor disruptions to impacts on life and safety.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2.1. Layer 1 -Security ManagementProgrammatic and organizational decisions will guide and impact the decisions made for the other defense-in-depth layers.
“These programmatic and organizational decisions will guide and impact the decisions made for the other defense-in-depth layers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceA unidirectional gateway deployed between Layers 2 and 3 may protect Layer 0, 1, and 2 devices from a cybersecurity event that occurs at Layers 3, 4, or 5.
“For example, a unidirectional gateway deployed between Layers 2 and 3 may protect Layer 0, 1, and 2 devices from a cybersecurity event that occurs at Layers 3, 4, or 5.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.1.1. Impacts of Choosing a Cybersecurity StrategyThe strategy provides a document and reminder of cybersecurity goals when decisions are being made at the system level.
“The strategy provides a document and reminder of those goals when decisions are being made at the system level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 4.2.2. Safety SystemsThe culture of safety and safety assessments is well established within much of the OT user community.
“The culture of safety and safety assessments is well established within much of the OT user community.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceGrouping components into levels, tiers, or zones is a precursor activity before organizations can consider applying isolation devices to protect and monitor communications between levels, tiers, or zones.
“Whether using a risk-based approach, functional model, or other organizing principle, grouping components into levels, tiers, or zones is a precursor activity before organizations can consider applying isolation devices to protect and monitor communications between levels, tiers, or zones.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ 4.3.4. ImplementFor new development systems, the control selection process is applied from a requirements definition perspective since the systems do not yet exist and organizations are conducting initial security categorizations.
“For new development systems, the control selection process is applied from a requirements definition perspective since the systems do not yet exist and organizations are conducting initial security categorizations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.2.3.3. Network MonitoringTools and capabilities that support BAD, SIEM, IDS, and IPS can assist organizations with monitoring traffic throughout the network and generate alerts when they identify anomalous or suspicious traffic.
“Tools and capabilities that support behavior anomaly detection (BAD), security information and event management (SIEM), intrusion detection systems (IDS), and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) can assist organizations with monitoring traffic throughout the network and generate alerts when they identify anomalous or suspicious traffic.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ Defense-in-Depth Architecture CapabilitiesAs a result, adversaries may find it increasingly difficult to penetrate the environment without detection.
“As a result, adversaries may find it increasingly difficult to penetrate the environment without detection.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 4.2.2. Safety SystemsSafety systems may reduce the impact of a cyber incident on the OT and are often deployed to perform specific monitoring and control functions to ensure the safety of people, the environment, processes, and assets.
“Safety systems may reduce the impact of a cyber incident on the OT and are often deployed to perform specific monitoring and control functions to ensure the safety of people, the environment, processes, and assets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ 4.3.3. SelectOverlays are intended to reduce the need for ad hoc tailoring of baselines by organizations through the selection of a set of controls and control enhancements that more closely correspond to common circumstances, situations, and/or conditions.
“In general, overlays are intended to reduce the need for ad hoc tailoring of baselines by organizations through the selection of a set of controls and control enhancements that more closely correspond to common circumstances, situations, and/or conditions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ Applying the Risk Management Framework to OT SystemsThe NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) applies the risk management process and concepts to systems and organizations.
“The NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) applies the risk management process and concepts (i.e., framing risk, assessing risk, responding to risk, and monitoring risk) to systems and organizations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ 4.3.1. PrepareThe Prepare step leverages activities that are already being conducted within cybersecurity programs to emphasize the importance of having organization-wide governance and resources in place to support risk management.
“The Prepare step leverages activities that are already being conducted within cybersecurity programs to emphasize the importance of having organization-wide governance and resources in place to support risk management.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 4.3.5. AssessNIST SP 800-53A provides guidance for assessing selected controls from NIST SP 800-53 to ensure that they are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements of the system.
“NIST SP 800-53A [SP800-53Ar5] provides guidance for assessing selected controls from NIST SP 800-53 to ensure that they are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements of the system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites SP800-53Ar5
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ Cybersecurity StrategyA comprehensive and accepted cybersecurity strategy can assist an organization with consistently maintaining acceptable risk management throughout the life cycle of an OT system.
“A comprehensive and accepted cybersecurity strategy can assist an organization with consistently maintaining acceptable risk management throughout the life cycle of an OT system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.2.3.2. Centralized LoggingA centralized log management platform can assist organizations with supporting log retention, monitoring, and analysis efforts.
“A centralized log management platform can assist organizations with supporting log retention, monitoring, and analysis efforts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 4.3.3. SelectNIST SP 800-53B identifies the recommended control baselines for federal systems and information.
“NIST SP 800-53B [SP800-53B] identifies the recommended control baselines for federal systems and information.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites SP800-53B
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ 4.3.3. SelectThe use of overlays does not preclude organizations from performing further tailoring.
“The use of overlays does not in any way preclude organizations from performing further tailoring (i.e., overlays can also be subject to tailoring) to reflect organization-specific needs, assumptions, or constraints.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 4.2.1. Supply Chain Risk ManagementWith few exceptions, organizations that are responsible for OT rely upon suppliers, other third-party providers, and their extended supply chains for a range of needs.
“With few exceptions, organizations that are responsible for OT rely upon suppliers, other thirdparty providers, and their extended supply chains for a range of needs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceCybersecurity defenses are not static and require changes and updates as risks change for the environment.
“Additionally, cybersecurity defenses are not static and require changes and updates as risks change for the environment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 5.2.3.1. Network ArchitectureImplementing network segmentation utilizing levels, tiers, or zones allows organizations to control access to sensitive information and components while also considering operational performance and safety.
“Implementing network segmentation utilizing levels, tiers, or zones allows organizations to control access to sensitive information and components while also considering operational performance and safety.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.1.1. Impacts of Choosing a Cybersecurity StrategyThe strategy provides a framework for incorporating desired system characteristics into the final systems.
“The strategy provides a framework for incorporating those characteristics into the final systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4.3.3. SelectAn OT-specific continuous monitoring strategy to measure control effectiveness may be necessary due to unique operational, environmental, and/or availability constraints.
“An OT-specific continuous monitoring strategy to measure control effectiveness may be necessary due to unique operational, environmental, and/or availability constraints.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4.3.2. CategorizeOf the three security objectives, availability is generally the greatest concern for an OT.
“Of the three security objectives, availability is generally the greatest concern for an OT.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceA BAD system or IDS may be unable to determine whether encrypted network communication is malicious and could generate false positive or negative alerts for the traffic.
“For example, a BAD system or IDS may be unable to determine whether encrypted network communication is malicious and could generate false positive or negative alerts for the traffic.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ 4.3.4. ImplementFor legacy systems, the security control selection process is applied from a gap analysis perspective when organizations anticipate significant changes to the systems.
“In contrast, the security control selection process for legacy systems is applied from a gap analysis perspective when organizations anticipate significant changes to the systems (e.g., during major upgrades, modifications, or outsourcing).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 4.2.2. Safety SystemsCombining control and safety could allow a sophisticated attacker access to both control and safety systems if the OT were compromised.
“Combining control and safety could allow a sophisticated attacker access to both control and safety systems if the OT were compromised.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceThe use of unidirectional gateways may provide additional protections associated with system compromises at higher levels or tiers within the environment.
“The use of unidirectional gateways may provide additional protections associated with system compromises at higher levels or tiers within the environment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Defense-in-Depth Architecture CapabilitiesUtilizing the principles of a defense-in-depth architecture to systematically layer security controls can help organizations strengthen their overall cybersecurity defenses.
“Utilizing the principles of a defense-in-depth architecture to systematically layer security controls -including people, processes, and technology -can help organizations strengthen their overall cybersecurity defenses.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone given§ OT Cybersecurity ArchitectureThe nature of network traffic on corporate and OT networks is different.
“The nature of network traffic on these two network types is different.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 4.2.2. Safety SystemsSafety assessments are primarily concerned with the physical world, while information security risk assessments consider the digital world.
“Safety assessments are primarily concerned with the physical world, while information security risk assessments consider the digital world.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Cybersecurity StrategySystem security is optimized by engineering design based on a proactive loss prevention strategy.
“System security is optimized by engineering design that is based on a proactive loss prevention strategy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 4.2.2. Safety SystemsWhile safety systems are traditionally implemented to be fully redundant and independent from the primary OT, some architectures combine control and safety functions, components, or networks.
“While these systems are traditionally implemented to be fully redundant and independent from the primary OT, some architectures combine control and safety functions, components, or networks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceDefense in depth requires an integration of people, processes, and technology to be effective.
“Defense in depth requires an integration of people, processes, and technology to be effective.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 4.3.2. CategorizeThe standards and guidance for the categorization process can be found in FIPS 199 and NIST SP 800-60.
“The standards and guidance for this categorization process can be found in FIPS 199 [FIPS199] and NIST SP 800-60 [SP800-60v1r1][SP800-60v2r1], respectively.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites FIPS199
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites SP800-60v1r1
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites SP800-60v2r1
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 4.3.3. SelectThe control baselines are the starting point for the control selection process and are chosen based on the security category and associated impact level of the systems identified in the Categorize step.
“The control baselines are the starting point for the control selection process and are chosen based on the security category and associated impact level of the systems identified in the Categorize step.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.1.3. Other Cybersecurity Strategy ConsiderationsThe adoption of a security architecture strategy may be impacted by the current state of existing OT environments.
“As a result, the adoption of a security architecture strategy may be impacted by the current state of existing OT environments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceWhen properly configured, network architectures support segmentation and isolation by enforcing security policies and controlling network communications.
“When properly configured, network architectures support segmentation and isolation by enforcing security policies and controlling network communications.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4.2.1. Supply Chain Risk ManagementThese risks can be introduced anywhere in the supply chain and at any stage in the life cycle.
“These risks can be introduced anywhere in the supply chain and at any stage in the life cycle.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.1.1. Impacts of Choosing a Cybersecurity StrategyBy consciously choosing to develop and implement a cybersecurity strategy, an organization establishes a disciplined approach that considers all aspects of the system life cycle with cybersecurity in mind.
“By consciously choosing to develop and implement a cybersecurity strategy, an organization establishes a disciplined approach that considers all aspects of the system life cycle -from procurement to decommissioning -with cybersecurity in mind.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2.5.4. Configuration ManagementKnowing the advantages and disadvantages of encryption can help organizations make an informed decision on where to include encryption in the defense-in-depth strategy.
“Knowing the advantages and disadvantages of encryption can help organizations make an informed decision on where to include encryption in the defense-in-depth strategy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 6.2.1.2. Physical Access Controls (PR.AC-2)Some regulations, such as NERC CIP-006-5 or from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), may determine the strength and quantity of barriers used for the physical protection of a facility.
“Some regulations, such as NERC CIP-006-5 (Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems) or from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), may also determine the strength and quantity of barriers used for the physical protection of a facility.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites NERC CIP-006-5
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites NRC
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2.5.4. Configuration ManagementBecause encryption and decryption use algorithms to create ciphers, encryption adds latency and may not be suitable for all OT devices.
“Because encryption and the subsequent decryption process use algorithms to create ciphers, encryption adds latency and may not be suitable for all OT devices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceCorrelating events across multiple OT devices can be difficult if the event timestamps generated by the devices were not informed by a shared time source.
“Correlating events across multiple OT devices can be difficult if the event timestamps generated by the devices were not informed by a shared time source.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceCritical data may include personally identifiable information and sensitive, proprietary, or trade secret information (e.g., PLC program code, robot programs, CAD/CAM files, operating manuals and documentation, electrical diagrams, network diagrams, historical production data).
“This may include personally identifiable information and sensitive, proprietary, or trade secret information (e.g., PLC program code, robot programs, computer-aided drafting [CAD] or computer-aided manufacturing [CAM] files, operating manuals and documentation, electrical diagrams, network diagrams, historical production data [IR8183A]).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites IR8183A
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2.5.2. PatchingOther tools, such as bump-in-the-wire security devices, can be installed in line with devices that cannot be updated or are using obsolete operating systems.
“Other tools, such as bump-in-the-wire security devices, can be installed in line with devices that cannot be updated or are using obsolete operating systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceIf a device or system clock is inaccurate, the timestamps generated by the clock for event and log entries will also be inaccurate, as well as any other functions that utilize the clock.
“If a device or system clock is inaccurate, the timestamps generated by the clock for event and log entries will also be inaccurate, as well as any other functions that utilize the clock.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 6.2.3. Data Security (PR.DS)Federal organizations are required to comply with FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).
“Federal organizations are required to comply with FIPS 140-3 [FIPS140-3] and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites FIPS140-3
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ AcknowledgementsOne regional Amtrak train from Richmond, Virginia, to Washington and New York was delayed for more than two hours.
“one regional Amtrak train from Richmond, Virginia, to Washington and New York was delayed for more than two hours.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=13100807
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ AcknowledgementsLong-distance trains were also delayed between four and six hours.
“Long-distance trains were also delayed between four and six hours.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=13100807
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Additional informationIn the spring of 2000, a former employee of an Australian manufacturing software organization used a radio transmitter on as many as 46 occasions over two months to remotely break into the controls of a sewage treatment system, altered electronic data for sewerage pumping stations, caused malfunctions, and released about 264,000 gallons of raw sewage into nearby rivers and parks.
“Over a two-month period, the disgruntled employee reportedly used a radio transmitter on as many as 46 occasions to remotely break into the controls of a sewage treatment system.He altered electronic data for particular sewerage pumping stations and caused malfunctions in their operations, ultimately releasing about 264,000 gallons of raw sewage into nearby rivers and parks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [11] 11. Building an OT Cybersecurity Business Case .........................................................35
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceAnomalous behavior on shared accounts may be more difficult to determine.
“Anomalous behavior on shared accounts may be more difficult to determine”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Shared credentials are often used on OT systems.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Additional informationMcAfee reported a series of attacks designed to steal sensitive data from global oil, energy, and petrochemical industries, in which adversaries exfiltrated proprietary operations data and project financing information regarding oil and gas field bids and operations.
“McAfee reported a series of attacks that were designed to steal sensitive data from global oil, energy, and petrochemical industries.Adversaries exfiltrated proprietary operations data and project financing information with regard to oil and gas field bids and operations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McAfee
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Additional informationThe capability to disconnect or disable remote access is critical to managing risk and may be required to provide stable and safe operations.
“Rationale for adding AC-17 ( 9) to LOW, MOD, and HIGH baselines: As more OT systems become accessible remotely, the capability to disconnect or disable remote access is critical to managing risk and may be required to provide stable and safe operations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: More OT systems are becoming accessible remotely.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceISA 62443-3-2 provides guidance on how to assess cyber risk in an environment with these potential consequences.
“ISA 62443-3-2 provides guidance on how to assess cyber risk in an environment with these potential consequences.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites ISA 62443-3-2
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Additional informationUsing a diverse set of suppliers in the OT environment can improve reliability by reducing common cause failures.
“Using a diverse set of suppliers in the OT environment can improve reliability by reducing common cause failures.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.3.1. Cyber-Related Safety ConsiderationsSafety considerations may require that an organization use physical separation as opposed to logical separation.
“For example, safety considerations may require that an organization use physical separation as opposed to logical separation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Additional informationOT functionality is generally defined in advance and does not change often.
“Rationale for adding SC-41 to LOW, MOD, and HIGH baselines: OT functionality is generally defined in advance and does not change often.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Additional informationShutting down and restarting the OT (or ICS) may not always be feasible upon the identification of an anomaly.
“Shutting down and restarting the OT may not always be feasible upon the identification of an anomaly.”
- Also stated in: § Additional information · hedged
“Shutting down and restarting the ICS may not always be feasible upon identification of an anomaly.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § Additional information · hedged
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Additional informationThe energy sector was targeted during a multiyear cyber-espionage campaign that primarily used Havex malware; Havex was a remote access Trojan that used the Open Platform Communications (OPC) standard to gather information about connected ICS devices on a network; the campaigns were exploratory.
“The energy sector was targeted during a multiyear cyber-espionage campaign that primarily used Havex malware.Havex was a remote access Trojan that used the Open Platform Communications (OPC) standard to gather information about connected ICS devices on a network.The campaigns were exploratory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [17] 17. Define the OT Cybersecurity Strategy .....................................................................39
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ AcknowledgementsTrains between Pittsburgh, PA, and Florence, South Carolina, were halted because of dark signals.
“Trains between Pittsburgh, PA, and Florence, South Carolina, were halted because of dark signals”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=13100807
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Additional informationThe loss of availability, integrity, and confidentiality of certain types of information that reside on a high-impact OT system may result in severe or catastrophic adverse effects on operations, assets, or individuals, including severe degradation or loss of mission capability, major damage to organizational assets, or harm to individuals involving the loss of life or life-threatening injuries.
“The loss of availability, integrity, and confidentiality of certain types of information that reside on a high-impact OT system may result in severe or catastrophic adverse effects on operations, assets, or individuals, including severe degradation or loss of mission capability, major damage to organizational assets, or harm to individuals involving the loss of life or life-threatening injuries.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2.5.3. Secure Code DevelopmentOrganizations can help industries move toward more secure products by requesting secure code development practices in their service-level agreements and procurement actions.
“Organizations can help industries move toward more secure products by requesting these practices in their service-level agreements and procurement actions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ Additional informationIn 2014, hackers manipulated and disrupted control systems to such a degree that a blast furnace could not be properly shut down, resulting in unspecified 'massive' damage.
“In 2014, hackers manipulated and disrupted control systems to such a degree that a blast furnace could not be properly shut down, resulting in unspecified”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [14] 14. OT Cybersecurity Program Content ...........................................................................37
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Additional informationCode authentication provides assurance that the software and firmware have not been tampered with.
“Code authentication provides assurance that the software and firmware have not been tampered with.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Additional informationStuxnet was a Microsoft Windows computer worm discovered in July 2010 that specifically targeted industrial software and equipment; it initially spread indiscriminately but included a highly specialized malware payload designed to only target particular SCADA systems configured to control and monitor specific industrial processes.
“Stuxnet was a Microsoft Windows computer worm discovered in July 2010 that specifically targeted industrial software and equipment.The worm initially spread indiscriminately but included a highly specialized malware payload that was designed to only target particular SCADA systems that were configured to control and monitor specific industrial processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [13] 13. Presenting the OT Cybersecurity Business Case to Leadership ..............................36
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceThe relatively static nature of OT environments presents an opportunity for organizations to include application allowlisting as part of their defense-in-depth strategy and is a recommended best practice by DHS.
“The relatively static nature of OT environments presents an opportunity for organizations to include application allowlisting as part of their defense-in-depth strategy and is a recommended best practice by DHS.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites DHS
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ AcknowledgementsThe Sobig virus infected the computer system at CSX Corp.'s Jacksonville, Florida, headquarters and shut down signaling, dispatching, and other systems.
“The virus infected the computer system at CSX Corp.'s Jacksonville, Florida, headquarters and shut down signaling, dispatching, and other systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=13100807
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceEncryption can negatively impact other defense tools, such as network monitoring.
“Organizations must also consider that encryption can negatively impact other defense tools, such as network monitoring.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2.5.2. PatchingPatch management is a defense-in-depth capability that supports vulnerability management as part of an organizational risk management strategy.
“As a result, patch management is a defense-in-depth capability that supports vulnerability management as part of an organizational risk management strategy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Patches have two main purposes: to address vulnerabilities and to enhance functionality.
- Rests on an assumption: In the context of defense-in-depth software security, patching is associated with reducing vulnerabilities.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ Additional informationUnauthorized or accidental access to the OT environment could affect the physical process.
“Rationale for adding IA-12 (1) to HIGH baseline: A supervisor or sponsor should be made aware of any access that an employee has to the OT environment since unauthorized or accidental access could affect the physical process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceUtilizing multiple time sources can benefit OT devices by reducing clock error and providing backup time sources if the primary time source is lost or if the time quality of a primary time source has degraded.
“Utilizing multiple time sources can benefit OT devices by reducing clock error and providing backup time sources if the primary time source is lost or if the time quality of a primary time source has degraded.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Additional informationMany OT systems use legacy components that cannot meet modern supply chain expectations.
“Many OT systems use legacy components that cannot meet modern supply chain expectations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationnone given§ Additional informationThe ability to authenticate remote commands is important to prevent unauthorized commands that may have immediate or serious consequences, such as injury, death, property damage, the loss of high-value assets, the failure of mission or business functions, or compromise of sensitive information.
“Rationale for adding AC-17 (10) to MOD and HIGH baselines: The ability to authenticate remote commands is important to prevent unauthorized commands that may have immediate or serious consequences, such as injury, death, property damage, the loss of high-value assets, the failure of mission or business functions, or compromise of sensitive information.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceAs a result, a ZTA implementation might not be practical for some OT devices.
“As a result, a ZTA implementation might not be practical for some OT devices.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Some OT components may not support the technologies or protocols required to fully integrate with a ZTA implementation.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceAn IDS might not be able to determine whether an encrypted packet is malicious, resulting in either false-positive or false-negative alerts.
“For example, an IDS might not be able to determine whether an encrypted packet is malicious, resulting in either false-positive or false-negative alerts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Additional informationAdversaries may steal operational information for personal gain or to inform future operations.
“Adversaries may steal operational information for personal gain or to inform future operations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites ATTACK-ICS
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Additional informationCISA serves as a centralized location where operational elements involved in cybersecurity and communications reliance are coordinated and integrated.
“CISA serves as a centralized location where operational elements involved in cybersecurity and communications reliance are coordinated and integrated.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceDepending on the frequency of events being logged, the log size may grow quickly and result in increasing space utilization.
“Depending on the frequency of events being logged, the log size may grow quickly and result in increasing space utilization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ OT-Specific Recommendations and GuidanceIf the site has an emergency generator, the UPS battery life may only need to last for a few seconds; if the site relies on external power, the UPS battery life may need to last for hours.
“If the site has an emergency generator, the UPS battery life may only need to last for a few seconds.However, if the site relies on external power, the UPS battery life may need to last for hours.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Additional informationIn 2013, an Iranian computer security company obtained remote access to a computer that controlled the SCADA system for the Bowman Dam in Rye, New York; the adversary viewed water levels, temperature, and the status of the sluice gate; the sluice gate control was disconnected for maintenance at the time, so the dam could not be remotely controlled.
“In 2013, an Iranian computer security company obtained remote access to a computer that controlled the SCADA system for the Bowman Dam located in Rye, New York.The adversary was able to view water levels, temperature, and the status of the sluice gate.The sluice gate control was disconnected for maintenance at the time of adversarial remote access, so the dam could not be remotely controlled.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [16] 16. Build and Train a Cross-Functional Team to Implement the OT Cybersecurity Program ..................................................................................................................38
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 6.2.3. Data Security (PR.DS)Encryption, digital signatures, hashing, and other cryptographic functions are available to prevent unauthorized access or the modification of data at rest and in transit.
“Encryption, digital signatures, hashing, and other cryptographic functions are available to prevent unauthorized access or the modification of data at rest and in transit [RFC4949].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites RFC4949
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ AcknowledgementsAccording to Amtrak spokesman Dan Stessel, 10 Amtrak trains were affected in the morning.
“According to Amtrak spokesman Dan Stessel, 10 Amtrak trains were affected in the morning.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=13100807
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ Additional informationThe PM-17 control applies to federal agencies and other organizations that support the Government and process controlled unclassified information (CUI).
“This control applies to federal agencies and other organizations that support the Government and process controlled unclassified information (CUI).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.2.5.1. Application AllowlistingWhen properly configured, non-authorized applications will not execute on the host environment.
“When properly configured, non-authorized applications will not execute on the host environment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Additional informationMany OT systems use information diversity in their design to achieve reliability requirements.
“Many OT systems use information diversity in their design to achieve reliability requirements.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.3.6. Field I/O (Purdue Level 0) Security ConsiderationsWithout authentication, there is the potential to replay, modify, or spoof data.
“Without authentication, there is the potential to replay, modify, or spoof data.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Many of the devices and the communication protocols at the Field I/O level (Purdue Level 0) cannot be authenticated.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 5.3.4. Regulatory RequirementsNERC Standard CIP-005 provides cybersecurity architecture requirements for bulk electric systems.
“For example, NERC Standard CIP-005 (see Appendix D.1.9)provides cybersecurity architecture requirements for bulk electric systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Appendix D.1.9
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2.5.2. PatchingSome tools, such as WAF and IPS, could be configured to provide additional protection to detect or prevent attacks against unpatched vulnerabilities while the organization waits for an opportunity to apply the updates.
“Some tools, such as web application firewalls (WAF) and IPS, could be configured to provide additional protection to detect or prevent attacks against unpatched vulnerabilities while the organization waits for an opportunity to apply the updates.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ AcknowledgementsIn August 2003, the Sobig computer virus was blamed for shutting down train signaling systems throughout the East Coast of the U.S.
“In August 2003, the Sobig computer virus was blamed for shutting down train signaling systems throughout the East Coast of the U.S.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=13100807
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 6.2.1.3. Network Segmentation and Isolation (PR.AC-5)A common architecture for supporting a defense-in-depth cybersecurity approach involves the use of network segmentation or zoning to organize devices by location or function.
“As discussed in Section 5, a common architecture for supporting a defense-in-depth cybersecurity approach involves the use of network segmentation or zoning to organize devices by location or function.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Section 5
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Additional informationIn 2012, Saudi Aramco experienced a malware attack that targeted their refineries and overwrote the attacked systems' master boot records (MBRs), partition tables, and other data files, causing the systems to become unusable.
“In 2012, Saudi Aramco experienced a malware attack that targeted their refineries and overwrote the attacked systems' master boot records (MBRs), partition tables, and other data files.This caused the systems to become unusable.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [15] 15. Establish OT Cybersecurity Governance .................................................................38
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
The paper relies on this without support.
OT has many characteristics that differ from traditional IT systems, including different risks and priorities.
“OT has many characteristics that differ from traditional IT systems, including different risks and priorities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Initially, OT systems had little resemblance to IT systems because they were isolated and ran proprietary control protocols using specialized hardware and software.
“Initially, OT systems had little resemblance to IT systems because they were isolated and ran proprietary control protocols using specialized hardware and software.”
The paper relies on this without support.
OT are increasingly resembling IT systems as they adopt IT technologies to promote corporate connectivity and remote access capabilities.
“OT are increasingly resembling IT systems as they adopt IT technologies to promote corporate connectivity and remote access capabilities (e.g., using industry standard computers, OSs, and network protocols).”
The paper relies on this without support.
Some of the OSs and applications that run on OT may not operate correctly with commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) IT cybersecurity solutions because of their unique requirements.
“Moreover, some of the OSs and applications that run on OT may not operate correctly with commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) IT cybersecurity solutions because of their unique requirements.”
The paper relies on this without support.
OT systems are generally time-critical, with the criterion for acceptable levels of delay and jitter dictated by the individual installation.
“OT systems are generally time-critical, with the criterion for acceptable levels of delay and jitter dictated by the individual installation.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many OT processes are continuous in nature.
“Many OT processes are continuous in nature.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Unexpected outages of systems that control industrial processes are unacceptable.
“Unexpected outages of systems that control industrial processes are unacceptable.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In a typical IT system, primary concerns include data confidentiality and integrity.
“In a typical IT system, primary concerns include data confidentiality and integrity.”
The paper relies on this without support.
For OT, primary concerns include safety, fault tolerance to prevent the loss of life or endangerment of public health or confidence, regulatory compliance, loss of equipment, loss of intellectual property, or lost or damaged products.
“For OT, primary concerns include safety, fault tolerance to prevent the loss of life or endangerment of public health or confidence, regulatory compliance, loss of equipment, loss of intellectual property, or lost or damaged products.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Field devices (e.g., PLCs, operator stations, DCS controllers) are directly responsible for controlling physical processes.
“Field devices (e.g., PLCs, operator stations, DCS controllers) are directly responsible for controlling physical processes.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The lifespan of an OT system can exceed 20 years.
“The lifespan of an OT system can exceed 20 years.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many legacy systems may contain hardware and software that are no longer supported by vendors and cannot be patched or updated to protect against new vulnerabilities.
“many legacy systems may contain hardware and software that are no longer supported by vendors and cannot be patched or updated to protect against new vulnerabilities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Anti-malware software may not be available for systems such as PLCs and DCS.
“anti-malware software may not be available for systems such as PLCs and DCS”
The paper relies on this without support.
Organizations can customize OT impact categories to their specific industry or business requirements.
“Table 3 provides possible example categories and impact levels that organizations may customize to meet their specific industry or business requirements.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Information security risk assessments and safety assessments can complement each other in OT environments.
“Information security risk assessments should complement such assessments, though they may use different approaches and cover different areas.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Threats can be meaningfully categorized by likelihood of occurrence and potential consequences.
“Organizations should categorize threats based on the likelihood of occurrence and their potential consequences.”
The paper relies on this without support.
OT assets often have long life cycles and reflect massive investments in operational, reliability, and safety testing.
“OT assets often have long life cycles and reflect massive investments in operational, reliability, and safety testing.”
The paper relies on this without support.
It is sometimes neither economically nor technically feasible to replace existing OT equipment and applications wholesale with newer alternatives in the short- or medium-term.
“It is sometimes neither economically nor technically feasible to replace existing equipment and applications wholesale with newer alternatives in the short-or mediumterm.”
The paper relies on this without support.
OT equipment without the latest security features and updates is at greater risk of attacks than equipment with the latest versions.
“Such equipment is at greater risk of attacks than equipment with the latest versions of security features and security updates.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Conventional network security focuses on segmentation and perimeter defenses.
“Conventional network security focuses on segmentation and perimeter defenses.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Some OT components may not support the technologies or protocols required to fully integrate with a ZTA implementation.
“Some OT components (e.g., PLCs, controllers, HMI) may not support the technologies or protocols required to fully integrate with a ZTA implementation.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Patches have two main purposes: to address vulnerabilities and to enhance functionality.
“Patches have two main purposes: to address vulnerabilities and to enhance functionality.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In the context of defense-in-depth software security, patching is associated with reducing vulnerabilities.
“In the context of defense-in-depth software security, patching is associated with reducing vulnerabilities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many of the devices and the communication protocols at the Field I/O level (Purdue Level 0) cannot be authenticated.
“Many of the devices and the communication protocols at the Field I/O level (Purdue Level 0) (e.g., sensors, actuators) cannot be authenticated.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The monitoring and controls systems for the power system are vulnerable to cyber attacks.
“The monitoring and controls systems for the power system are vulnerable to cyber attacks, so appropriate cybersecurity practices should be implemented.”
The paper relies on this without support.
These monitoring and controls systems are also vulnerable to cyber attacks and can affect the OT systems.
“These monitoring and controls systems are also vulnerable to cyber attacks and can affect the OT systems, so appropriate cybersecurity practices should be implemented to protect them.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The introduction of IIoT to OT environments can increase connectivity and information exchanges with enterprise systems and cloud-based systems.
“The introduction of IIoT to OT environments can increase connectivity and information exchanges with enterprise systems and cloud-based systems, which may require additional considerations for the security architecture.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Compute resources vary among IIoT devices.
“Compute resources -including processing, memory, and storage -vary among IIoT devices.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Some IIoT devices may have constrained resources, while others may have unused capabilities.
“Some IIoT devices may have constrained resources, while others may have unused capabilities, both of which have implications for cybersecurity.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many critical infrastructure industries have sites that are geographically distributed.
“Many critical infrastructure industries have sites that are geographically distributed.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Industrial facilities typically have monitoring and controls systems that manage uninterruptable power supplies (UPSs), generators, HVAC, fire alarm systems, boilers, cooling water plant, steam, compressed air, and other critical functions.
“Industrial facilities typically have monitoring and controls systems that manage uninterruptable power supplies (UPSs), generators, HVAC, fire alarm systems, boilers, cooling water plant, steam, compressed air, and other critical functions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many public and private-sector organizations have adopted the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) to guide cybersecurity activities and consider cybersecurity risks.
“Many public and private-sector organizations have adopted the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) [CSF] to guide cybersecurity activities and consider cybersecurity risks.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Data flow diagrams help a manufacturer understand the flow of data between networked components.
“Data flow diagrams help a manufacturer understand the flow of data between networked components.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Documenting data flows enables organizations to understand the expected behavior of their networks.
“Documenting data flows enables organizations to understand the expected behavior of their networks.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Network architecture documentation tools help a manufacturer identify, document, and diagram the interconnections between networked devices, corporate networks, and other external connections.
“Network architecture documentation tools help a manufacturer identify, document, and diagram the interconnections between networked devices, corporate networks, and other external connections.”
The paper relies on this without support.
A comprehensive understanding of the interconnections within the environment is critical for the successful deployment of cybersecurity controls.
“A comprehensive understanding of the interconnections within the environment is critical for the successful deployment of cybersecurity controls.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In OT environments, risks and impacts may be related to safety, health, and the environment, in addition to business and financial impacts.
“In OT environments, risks and impacts may be related to safety, health, and the environment, in addition to business and financial impacts.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Maintaining an accurate inventory of the IT and OT assets facilitates the identification, tracking, and remediation of vulnerabilities.
“Maintaining an accurate inventory of the IT and OT assets within the environment of operation -including the product vendor, model numbers, firmware, OSs, and software versions installed on the assets -facilitates the identification, tracking, and remediation of vulnerabilities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
These risks include the insertion of counterfeits, unauthorized production, malicious insiders, tampering, theft, and the insertion of malicious software and hardware, as well as poor manufacturing and development practices in the cyber supply chain.
“These risks include the insertion of counterfeits, unauthorized production, malicious insiders, tampering, theft, and the insertion of malicious software and hardware, as well as poor manufacturing and development practices in the cyber supply chain.”
The paper relies on this without support.
SBOM information can identify software components and their relationships or dependencies on other components.
“SBOM information can identify software components and their relationships or dependencies on other components.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Having this information available can help an organization determine whether a device is affected by reported software vulnerabilities.
“Having this information available can help an organization determine whether a device is affected by reported software vulnerabilities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many OT components and devices utilize open-source libraries to support their functional capabilities.
“Many OT components and devices utilize open-source libraries to support their functional capabilities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
A unique challenge in OT is the need for immediate access to an HMI in emergency situations.
“A unique challenge in OT is the need for immediate access to an HMI in emergency situations.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The time needed to enter a user's credentials may impede response or intervention by the operator, resulting in negative consequences to safety, health, or the environment.
“The time needed to enter a user's credentials may impede response or intervention by the operator, resulting in negative consequences to safety, health, or the environment.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The organization has already addressed Layer 1 and Layer 2.
“In Fig. 18, the assumption is that the organization has already addressed Layer 1 and Layer 2.”
The paper relies on this without support.
RBAC has the potential to reduce the complexity and cost of security administration in networks with large numbers of intelligent devices.
“RBAC is a technology that has the potential to reduce the complexity and cost of security administration in networks with large numbers of intelligent devices.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Physical access controls are often applied to the OT environment as compensating controls when legacy systems do not support modern IT logical access controls.
“Physical access controls are often applied to the OT environment as compensating controls when legacy systems do not support modern IT logical access controls (e.g., an asset could be locked in a cabinet when the USB port or power button cannot be logically disabled).”
The paper relies on this without support.
Some IT protocols and many industrial communications protocols have known security vulnerabilities that might be exploitable through network isolation devices.
“Additionally, some IT protocols and many industrial communications protocols have known security vulnerabilities that might be exploitable through network isolation devices.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many OT systems do not offer password recovery mechanisms.
“Many OT systems do not offer password recovery mechanisms, so the secure and reliable handling of passwords is critical to maintaining continuous operation.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Some OT OSs make setting secure passwords difficult if the password size is smaller than current password standards and the system allows only group passwords at each level of access rather than individual passwords.
“Some OT OSs make setting secure passwords difficult if the password size is smaller than current password standards and the system allows only group passwords at each level of access rather than individual passwords.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Some industrial (and internet) protocols transmit passwords in plaintext, making them susceptible to interception.
“Some industrial (and internet) protocols transmit passwords in plaintext, making them susceptible to interception.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Without an exclusion list based on machine identification (ID), non-operator login can result in policies such as auto-logoff timeout and administrator password replacement being pushed down, which can be detrimental to the operation of the OT system.
“Without an exclusion list based on machine identification (ID), non-operator login can result in policies such as auto-logoff timeout and administrator password replacement being pushed down, which can be detrimental to the operation of the OT system.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Security awareness is a critical part of OT incident prevention, particularly when it comes to social engineering threats.
“Security awareness is a critical part of OT incident prevention, particularly when it comes to social engineering threats.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Encryption provides a mechanism for ensuring confidentiality and integrity for data in transit.
“Encryption provides a mechanism for ensuring confidentiality and integrity for data in transit.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The use of encryption within an OT environment could introduce communications latency due to the additional time and computing resources required to encrypt, decrypt, and authenticate each message.
“The use of encryption within an OT environment could introduce communications latency due to the additional time and computing resources required to encrypt, decrypt, and authenticate each message.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Encryption may also cause performance degradation of the end device or system.
“Encryption may also cause performance degradation of the end device or system.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Anomaly detection tools that support OT environments may be unable to read encrypted data.
“Additionally, while encryption provides confidentiality between encryption and decryption devices, anomaly detection tools that support OT environments may be unable to read encrypted data.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Cryptography may introduce key management issues.
“Organizations should also consider that cryptography may introduce key management issues.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Site visits to change or manage keys can be costly and slow.
“Because site visits to change or manage keys can be costly and slow, organizations should consider whether cryptographic protection with remote key management may be beneficial, such as when the protected units become so numerous or geographically dispersed that managing keys is difficult or expensive.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Systems and devices in the OT environment include many functions and services that are unnecessary for their proper operation, some of which may be enabled by default and without the organization's knowledge.
“Systems and devices in the OT environment include many functions and services that are unnecessary for their proper operation, some of which may be enabled by default and without the organization's knowledge.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Configuration management helps ensure that systems are deployed and maintained in a secure and consistent state to reduce risks from outages due to configuration issues and security breaches through improved visibility and tracking of changes to the system.
“Configuration management helps ensure that systems are deployed and maintained in a secure and consistent state to reduce risks from outages due to configuration issues and security breaches through improved visibility and tracking of changes to the system.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many changes to OT can be made only during scheduled maintenance downtimes to minimize impacts.
“Many changes to OT can be made only during scheduled maintenance downtimes to minimize impacts.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In some cases, automated configuration management tools transfer numerous types and potentially large amounts of data over the manufacturing system network.
“In some cases, these tools transfer numerous types and potentially large amounts of data over the manufacturing system network.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Some automated configuration management tools may impact OT system operations by attempting to change device configurations or manipulating active files.
“Additionally, some tools may also have the potential to impact OT system operations by attempting to change device configurations or manipulating active files.”
The paper relies on this without support.
An outage can take days, weeks, or months to recover from a natural disaster or minutes or hours to recover from a malware infection or a mechanical or electrical failure.
“An outage can take days, weeks, or months to recover from a natural disaster or minutes or hours to recover from a malware infection or a mechanical or electrical failure.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Any maintenance performed on an OT device can inadvertently modify its configuration and result in an increased attack surface.
“Any maintenance performed on an OT device can inadvertently modify its configuration and result in an increased attack surface.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Devices may contain wireless radios and other communications devices that may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks or may allow simultaneous connections between networks (i.e., dual-homed).
“Devices may contain wireless radios and other communications devices that may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks or may allow simultaneous connections between networks (i.e., dual-homed).”
The paper relies on this without support.
These technologies alone may not be sufficient to sustain security capabilities as threats evolve and change.
“These technologies alone may not be sufficient to sustain security capabilities as threats evolve and change.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The collection and event forwarding functions may impact the performance of the OT device.
“The collection and event forwarding functions may impact the performance of the OT device.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Disk space and memory are limited on most OT devices.
“Disk space and memory are limited on most OT devices”
The paper relies on this without support.
Gaining access to media that contains OT data could provide a malicious actor with valuable information for launching an attack.
“Gaining access to media that contains OT data could provide a malicious actor with valuable information for launching an attack.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Attackers typically use directional antennas to extend the effective range of a wireless network beyond the standard range.
“Attackers typically use directional antennas to extend the effective range of a wireless network beyond the standard range.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Mesh networks can provide fault tolerance through alternate route selection and preemptive fail-over of the network.
“Mesh networks can provide fault tolerance through alternate route selection and preemptive fail-over of the network.”
The paper relies on this without support.
When roaming between access points, devices may experience temporary communication loss.
“For example, when roaming between access points, devices may experience temporary communication loss.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most wireless field networks are inherently less reliable than their wired counterparts due to their susceptibility to signal jamming, distance limitations, and line-of-sight requirements.
“Most wireless field networks are inherently less reliable than their wired counterparts due to their susceptibility to signal jamming, distance limitations, and line-of-sight requirements.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many OT security architectures are designed with multiple levels, such as in the Purdue model, which can significantly limit access and minimize accidental or unauthorized disruptions to operations.
“Many OT security architectures are designed with multiple levels, such as in the Purdue model.This can significantly limit access, which can minimize accidental or unauthorized disruptions to operations.”
The paper relies on this without support.
It is not uncommon for patches to have an adverse impact on other software.
“It is not uncommon for patches to have an adverse impact on other software.”
The paper relies on this without support.
A patch may remove a vulnerability, but it can also introduce a greater risk from a production or safety perspective.
“A patch may remove a vulnerability, but it can also introduce a greater risk from a production or safety perspective.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Patching the vulnerability may also change the way the OS or application works with control applications, causing the control application to lose some of its functionality.
“Patching the vulnerability may also change the way the OS or application works with control applications, causing the control application to lose some of its functionality.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many OT systems utilize older versions of OSs that are no longer supported by the vendor, so patches may not be available.
“Many OT systems utilize older versions of OSs that are no longer supported by the vendor, so patches may not be available.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many OT vulnerabilities are published to CISA as advisories, but not all vendors report known vulnerabilities to CISA.
“Many OT vulnerabilities are published to CISA as advisories.However, not all vendors report known vulnerabilities to CISA.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Non-authenticated NTP is susceptible to spoofing.
“Non-authenticated NTP is susceptible to spoofing and should be located behind the firewall.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Within any environment, numerous non-malicious and potentially malicious events and anomalies occur almost continuously.
“Within any environment, numerous non-malicious and potentially malicious events and anomalies occur almost continuously.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most vendor default passwords are easy to discover within vendor product manuals, which are also available to adversaries.
“Most vendor default passwords are easy to discover within vendor product manuals, which are also available to adversaries.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Using the default password can drastically increase OT vulnerability.
“Using the default password can drastically increase OT vulnerability.”
The paper relies on this without support.
A lack of properly configured firewalls could permit unnecessary data to pass between networks, such as control and corporate networks, thus allowing attacks and malware to spread between networks, making sensitive data susceptible to monitoring/eavesdropping, and providing individuals with unauthorized access to systems.
“A lack of properly configured firewalls could permit unnecessary data to pass between networks, such as control and corporate networks, thus allowing attacks and malware to spread between networks, making sensitive data susceptible to monitoring/eavesdropping, and providing individuals with unauthorized access to systems.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Without proper and accurate logs, it might be impossible to determine what caused a security incident to occur.
“Without proper and accurate logs, it might be impossible to determine what caused a security incident to occur.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Shared credentials are often used on OT systems.
“Shared credentials are often used on OT systems.”
The paper relies on this without support.
A third party that aggregates continuous monitoring information from multiple organizations may be a desirable target for adversaries.
“A third party that aggregates continuous monitoring information from multiple organizations may be a desirable target for adversaries.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Continuous monitoring can be achieved using automated tools, through passive scanning, or with manual monitoring performed at a frequency deemed commensurate with the risk.
“Continuous monitoring can be achieved using automated tools, through passive scanning, or with manual monitoring performed at a frequency deemed commensurate with the risk.”
The paper relies on this without support.
A passive network monitor might be able to detect vulnerable network services without having to scan the devices.
“Alternatively, a passive network monitor might be able to detect vulnerable network services without having to scan the devices.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Tools and capabilities that support behavior anomaly detection (BAD), security information and event management (SIEM), intrusion detection systems (IDS), and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) can assist organizations with monitoring traffic throughout the network and generate alarms when they identify anomalous or suspicious traffic.
“Tools and capabilities that support behavior anomaly detection (BAD), security information and event management (SIEM), intrusion detection systems (IDS), and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) can assist organizations with monitoring traffic throughout the network and generate alarms when they identify anomalous or suspicious traffic.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Organizational response activities are improved by incorporating lessons learned from current and previous detection and response activities.
“Organizational response activities are improved by incorporating lessons learned from current and previous detection and response activities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Capturing execution details may help organizations during the post-incident review process to determine whether any gaps or potential opportunities for improvement in the recovery plan should be considered.
“Capturing execution details may help organizations during the post-incident review process to determine whether any gaps or potential opportunities for improvement in the recovery plan should be considered.”
The paper relies on this without support.
These lessons can be used to improve recovery plans and processes.
“These lessons can be used to improve recovery plans and processes.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In addition to operational recovery, an organization may need to manage public relations and repair its reputation.
“In addition to operational recovery, an organization may need to manage public relations and repair its reputation.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Some tools and alerts for behaviors or events that could indicate an intrusion may be normal behaviors and events within the OT environment.
“Organizations should also note that some tools and alerts for behaviors or events that could indicate an intrusion may be normal behaviors and events within the OT environment.”
The paper relies on this without support.
OT components are often physically remote and not continually staffed.
“Additionally, OT components are often physically remote and not continually staffed.”
The paper relies on this without support.
This integration can provide additional context to an event (e.g., where the system is located, which firmware version it runs, what the criticality of the system is) to help an organization determine the event impact.
“This integration can provide additional context to an event (e.g., where the system is located, which firmware version it runs, what the criticality of the system is) to help an organization determine the event impact.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Data flow controls based on data characteristics can prevent the exfiltration of information and illegal operations.
“These controls can prevent the exfiltration of information and illegal operations.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Organizations may find that automation within OT environments may not be possible due to the sensitivity of the systems or the resources required to support the automation.
“Organizations may find that automation within OT environments may not be possible due to the sensitivity of the systems or the resources required to support the automation.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Physical access to sensors and final elements allows for direct manipulation of the physical process.
“Physical access to sensors and final elements allows for direct manipulation of the physical process.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many devices are configured on a fieldbus such that physical access to the sensor network allows for manipulation of controlling parameters.
“Many devices are configured on a fieldbus such that physical access to the sensor network allows for manipulation of controlling parameters.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Unauthorized wireless access to sensors or final elements allows for direct manipulation of the physical process.
“Wireless access to sensors and final elements allows for direct manipulation of the physical process.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many smart devices allow for wireless configuration (e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WirelessHART).
“Many smart devices allow for wireless configuration (e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WirelessHART).”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most architectures are designed for PLCs, RTUs, DCS, and SCADA controllers to manipulate the process and for asset management systems to monitor the assets connected to the controllers.
“Most architectures are designed for PLCs, RTUs, DCS, and SCADA controllers to manipulate the process and for asset management systems to monitor the assets connected to the controllers.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many asset management systems also have the technical ability to modify the configuration of sensors and final elements, although modification may not be their primary function.
“Many asset management systems also have the technical ability to modify the configuration of sensors and final elements, although modification may not be their primary function.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The properties of OT may present unique threat events, such as how threat events can manipulate OT processes to cause physical damage.
“The properties of OT may also present unique threat events, such as how the threat events can manipulate OT processes to cause physical damage.”
The paper relies on this without support.
OT access by vendors and maintenance staff can occur over a large facility footprint or geographic area and into unobserved spaces, such as mechanical or electrical rooms, ceilings, floors, field substations, switch and valve vaults, and pump stations.
“OT access by vendors and maintenance staff can occur over a large facility footprint or geographic area and into unobserved spaces, such as mechanical or electrical rooms, ceilings, floors, field substations, switch and valve vaults, and pump stations.”
The paper relies on this without support.
OT devices often lack the ability to support modern encryption.
“While OT devices often lack the ability to support modern encryption, additional devices (e.g., VPNs) can be added to support these features.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Additional devices (e.g., VPNs) can be added to support encryption features.
“While OT devices often lack the ability to support modern encryption, additional devices (e.g., VPNs) can be added to support these features.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The automated mechanisms used to support the tracking of security incidents are typically not part of or connected to the OT.
“The automated mechanisms used to support the tracking of security incidents are typically not part of or connected to the OT.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The automated mechanisms used to support the incident reporting process are not necessarily part of or connected to the OT.
“The automated mechanisms used to support the incident reporting process are not necessarily part of or connected to the OT.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The automated mechanisms used to schedule, conduct, and document maintenance and repairs are not necessarily part of or connected to the OT.
“The automated mechanisms used to schedule, conduct, and document maintenance and repairs are not necessarily part of or connected to the OT.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Availability and interference for wireless signals may be a concern within OT environments.
“Availability and interference for wireless signals may be a concern within OT environments.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The implementation of authentication and encryption is driven by the OT environment.
“The implementation of authentication and encryption is driven by the OT environment.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Antennas and power levels can be designed to minimize signal exposure outside of the facility.
“Where confidentiality is concerned, antennas and power levels can also be designed to minimize signal exposure outside of the facility.”
The paper relies on this without support.
More OT systems are becoming accessible remotely.
“As more OT systems become accessible remotely”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The physical isolation model of OT security has eroded rapidly.
“This model has eroded rapidly.[5], [29]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [5]
The 'Comparing OT and IT System Security' passage says OT systems were initially isolated but now have significantly less isolation as they adopt connectivity and remote access. It supports erosion of the isolation model, but does not establish that the erosion was rapid. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA) defined hierarchical security zones between OT and IT systems, provides a useful conceptual model but was designed for unidirectional information flows and was not architected for the bidirectional, high-frequency data exchanges that digital twin systems and AI analytics engines require.
“The Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA), which defined hierarchical security zones between OT and IT systems, provides a useful conceptual model but was designed for unidirectional information flows and was not architected for the bidirectional, high-frequency data exchanges that digital twin systems and AI analytics engines require.[5]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [5]
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredCertificate rotation is managed automatically by the Identity Management Service, with certificate lifetimes calibrated to balance security against operational continuity.
“Certificate rotation is managed automatically by the Identity Management Service, with certificate lifetimes calibrated to balance security against operational continuity.[5]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [5]
The OT-Specific Recommendations and Guidance section recommends managing the lifecycle of OT credentials, including updates, and considering centralized identity management. It does not say that an Identity Management Service automatically rotates certificates or that certificate lifetimes are calibrated to balance security and operational continuity. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe private keys bound to device identity certificates never leave the secure element in plaintext, ensuring that certificate-based identity cannot be extracted and replicated by an adversary with transient access to the device.
“The private keys bound to device identity certificates never leave the secure element in plaintext, ensuring that certificate-based identity cannot be extracted and replicated by an adversary with transient access to the device.[4], [5]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [5]
Section 6.2.1.4.3 says smart cards provide tamper-resistant storage for private keys, and §6.2.1.4.1 says physical tokens resist duplication without special equipment. Neither passage establishes that device-certificate private keys never leave a secure element in plaintext or that transient access cannot enable extraction and replication. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredMany existing OT devices lack the computational resources to implement TPM-based attestation or mutual TLS, and many communicate using legacy fieldbus protocols that do not natively support authentication or encryption.
“Many existing OT devices lack the computational resources to implement TPM-based attestation or mutual TLS, and many communicate using legacy fieldbus protocols Modbus RTU, DNP3, PROFIBUS DP that do not natively support authentication or encryption.[5], [12]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [5]
“Comparing OT and IT System Security” says many legacy OT systems lack computing resources to retrofit current security capabilities, and §5.3.6 says many field-level devices and communication protocols cannot be authenticated. The cited passages do not establish that devices specifically cannot implement TPM-based attestation or mutual TLS, or that Modbus RTU, DNP3, and PROFIBUS DP each lack native authentication and encryption. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
The detection mechanisms are similar in all environments (IT, IoT, OT, IIoT), but the concepts of using a dedicated SOC in combination with SIEMs and EDRs are more advanced in an IT environment.
“Based on this research, it can be concluded that the detection mechanisms are similar in all environments, but the concepts of using a dedicated SOC in combination with SIEMs and EDRs are more advanced in an IT environment.”
From Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards (2025) · cites this paper as [20]
The OT-Specific Recommendations and Guidance say that security countermeasures are typically developed for IT and may need adaptation for OT; they also discuss monitoring and SOC arrangements for OT. The passages do not establish that detection mechanisms are similar across IT, IoT, OT, and IIoT, or that a dedicated SOC combined with SIEM and EDR is more advanced in IT. No page number is provided for these passages. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the language of NIST SP 800-82, the practical effect is that the OT environment can no longer be considered isolated, and traditional perimeter-based controls are no longer sufficient.
“In the language of NIST SP 800-82 [2], the practical effect is that the OT environment can no longer be considered isolated, and traditional perimeter-based controls are no longer sufficient.”
NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 provides the canonical OT security guidance.
“In the United States, NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 [2] provides the canonical OT security guidance”
The proposed architecture's revocation design ensures that revocation enforcement degrades conservatively rather than failing open.
“This design ensures that revocation enforcement degrades conservatively rather than failing open.[5], [28]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [5]
The OT-Specific Recommendations and Guidance section advises managing credential revocation, and the NIST SP 800-82r3 passage discusses graceful degradation of OT operations. Neither describes the proposed architecture or says that revocation enforcement degrades conservatively rather than failing open. Searches for revocation and fail-open/fail-closed behavior did not establish that claim in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.72)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
DCS device count changes within the same description
MinorThe passage names three field devices in total. After describing the machine controller, it refers to "the other three," which would require four devices in total.
“The field control devices shown include a machine controller, a PLC, and a process controller.”
“The machine controller interfaces with sensors and actuators using point-to-point wiring, while the other three field devices incorporate fieldbus networks to interface with process sensors and actuators.”
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IT security for industrial control systems
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Self-citationSecurity guide for interconnecting information technology systems
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SCADA - Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
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Assessing security and privacy controls in information systems and organizations
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Infrastructure Interdependencies: Overview of Concepts and Terminology
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Guide to Application Whitelisting
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Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification
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Control Baselines for Information Systems and Organizations
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The Automation, Systems, and Instrumentation Dictionary
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The Industrial Internet of Things
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A Survey on Industrial Control System Digital Forensics: Challenges, Advances and Future Directions
Cook, M. M., Marnerides, A. K., Johnson, C., & Pezaros, D. P. (2023) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2023.3264680 · Cited by 68 · see citing works
“ICS is often considered to be a subset of technologies that are included within the wider OT domain [23], [24], [25].”
BackgroundAslam, M. M., Tufail, A., Apong, R. A. A. H. M., Silva, L. C. D., & Raza, M. T. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3394848 · Cited by 54 · see citing works
“The authors in [100] tried to cover the basic aspects of OT security and presented a guide to OT security.”
BackgroundCybersecurity in Industry 5.0: Open Challenges and Future Directions
Santos, B., Costa, R. L. D. C., & Santos, L. (2024) · Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust · doi:10.1109/pst62714.2024.10788065 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
“With the increase in attack surface from all the new technologies, the implementation of Industry 5.0 needs to be secure.”
InfluentialSmart Grid Protection, Automation and Control: Challenges and Opportunities
Rubio, S., Bogarra, S., Nunes, M., & Gomez, X. (2025) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app15063186 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Lakhal, H., Zegrari, M., & Bahnasse, A. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3623834 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
“Critical infrastructures are frequently referred to as a ‘‘system of systems’’ because of the connections and interdependencies among business partners and different industrial sectors [30].”
Kok, A., Martinetti, A., & Braaksma, J. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3442443 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“Stouffer et al. [69] underline this by calling for a proactive collaboration between operators, OT engineers and management.”
BackgroundSTRIDE-based Methodologies for Threat Modeling of Industrial Control Systems: A Review
Saßnick, O., Rosenstatter, T., Schäfer, C., et al. (2024) · IEEE International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) · doi:10.1109/icps59941.2024.10639949 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“NIST also started to investigate cyber securtiy for OT systems and published the NIST 800-82r3 [1], A Guide to Operational Technology (OT), Security .”
BackgroundInfluentialDigital-Twin-Driven Deception Platform: Vision and Way Forward
Suhail, S., Iqbal, M., & McLaughlin, K. (2024) · IEEE Internet Computing · doi:10.1109/mic.2024.3406188 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
“In ICSs, Safety Instrumented Systems (SISs) are designed for detecting violations against predefined safe state conditions and triggering isolation or shutdown of the device(s)/process(es) [12].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialJiang, Y., Jeusfeld, M. A., Mosaad, M., & Oo, N. (2024) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2024.100700 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
Bhole, M., Sauter, T., & Kästner, W. (2025) · IEEE Open Journal of the Industrial Electronics Society · doi:10.1109/ojies.2025.3527585 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
“Actually, they are covered by multiple standards and frameworks, such as ISA/IEC 62443 [50], NIST 800-53 [51], NIST 800-82r3 [52], the ISO 27000 Series [53], CIS Critical Security Controls [54], NERC CIP [55], the NIS Directives [56], the MITRE ATT&CK ICS Framework [57], NISTIR 8374 [58], the…”
Pourmadadkar, M., Lezzi, M., & Corallo, A. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management · doi:10.1109/tem.2024.3489273 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
“Since the modern CPS structure revolves around the physical operational technology (OT) and cyber information technology (IT) levels [16], the answer to this question can be rooted in the inherent differences between IT and OT systems [17].”
Rojas, L., Hernandez, B., & García, J. (2025) · International Journal of Intelligent Systems · doi:10.1155/int/9953223 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
“Best-practice guidance recommends aligning deployments with NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 controls for OTsegmentation, asset inventory, patch management, and incident response tailored to industrial control systems [107].”
Mann, S., Pennekamp, J., Ay, M., Behery, M., Oster, L. E., Ebert, B., Sharma, R., Abel, D., Lakemeyer, G., Reisgen, U., et al. (2025) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-025-15250-y · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“Ultimately, a secure WAAM environment should capitalize on standards, such as IEC 62443 50 , ISO/IEC 27001 30 , and NIST SP 800-82 49 , to implement a secure environment.”
Legacy ICS Cybersecurity Assessment Using Hybrid Threat Modeling—An Oil and Gas Sector Case Study
Badawy, M., Sherief, N. H., & Abdel-Hamid, A. (2024) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app14188398 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
An Analysis of Critical Cybersecurity Controls for Industrial Control Systems
Sekonya, N., & Sithungu, S. P. (2023) · European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security · doi:10.34190/eccws.22.1.1157 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“According to Stouffer et al. (2022), another problem impeding OT system security is reliance on a single OT provider.”
BackgroundInfluentialAI-Based Detection and Simulation of Hardware Trojan Attacks in Industrial Applications
Massaro, A. S., Epicoco, N., Loseto, G., et al. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3552112 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“Moreover, cybersecurity frameworks and standards, such as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework [11], provide guidelines for companies to systematically assess and manage their cybersecurity risks [12], [13].”
WebShield 5.0: Harnessing AI and NLP to combat web threats in Industry 5.0
Verma, P., O’Shea, D., Newe, T., Vidyarthi, A., Gupta, D., Ali, J., Aldawsari, H. A. H., & Breslin, J. G. (2025) · Alexandria Engineering Journal · doi:10.1016/j.aej.2025.05.018 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Cao, Z., Zhao, H., Wang, Y., et al. (2025) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app15158285 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Schroeder, A. K., McClure, P., & Thulasiraman, P. (2024) · IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) · doi:10.1109/csr61664.2024.10679485 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Review of Fuzzy Methods Application in IIoT Security—Challenges and Perspectives
Krzysztoń, E., Mikołajewski, D., & Prokopowicz, P. (2025) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics14173475 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Systematic review and characterisation of malicious industrial network traffic datasets
Dobler, M., Hellwig, M., Lopes, N., Oakley, K., & Winterburn, M. (2025) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-025-01126-9 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Casaril, F., & Galletta, L. (2025) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2025.100805 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
SecuriDN: A Modeling Tool Supporting the Early Detection of Cyberattacks to Smart Energy Systems
Cerotti, D., Codetta‐Raiteri, D., Dondossola, G., et al. (2024) · Energies · doi:10.3390/en17163882 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Bhosale, P., Kästner, W., & Sauter, T. (2024) · IEEE International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA) · doi:10.1109/etfa61755.2024.10710893 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“Vulnerability assessment is a crucial component of any effective security strategy, allowing organizations to identify, prioritize, and mitigate potential security weaknesses in their systems and networks [15].”
BackgroundJeong, D., Kim, Y., & Shin, D. (2025) · IEEE Embedded Systems Letters · doi:10.1109/les.2025.3538013 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“The paramount importance of CI necessitates a strong focus on anomaly detection over preventative measures, as availability in these systems is crucial [4].”
Effects of RF Signal Eventization Encoding on Device Classification Performance
Smith, M. J., Temple, M. A., & Dean, J. W. (2024) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics13112020 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Towards the Design of Grid Cyber-Physical Integrated Security Operations Center Visualizations
Reyna, A., Collins, T., Hossain‐McKenzie, S., et al. (2024) · IEEE Kansas Power and Energy Conference (KPEC) · doi:10.1109/kpec61529.2024.10676242 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Enhancing OT Threat Modelling: An Effective Rule-Based Approach for Attack Graph Generation
Sunder, G., Colletto, A. S., Raimondi, S., et al. (2024) · Intelligent Cybersecurity Conference (ICSC) · doi:10.1109/icsc63108.2024.10895716 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
A Sustainability Assessment of a Blockchain-Secured Solar Energy Logger for Edge IoT Environments
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Extending The Update Framework (TUF) for Industrial Control System Applications
Romansky, B., Mazzuchi, T. A., & Sarkani, S. (2024) · IEEE SoutheastCon · doi:10.1109/southeastcon52093.2024.10500028 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Best practices defined by NIST and IEC recommend that patches and updates be tested in an environment that is a close approximation to the target operating environment prior to releasing the update [6] [7].”
BackgroundMassaoudi, M. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3548517 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Additionally, employing federated learning mechanisms could enable collaborative intelligence across multiple substations without exposing sensitive data, following guidelines such as NIST SP 800-82 [26].”
Host-Based Intrusion Detection for Industrial Control Systems
Alla, O., & Mocanu, S. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft) · doi:10.1109/netsoft64993.2025.11080639 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Layered Security Guidance for Data Asset Management in Additive Manufacturing
Milaat, F. A., & Lubell, J. (2023) · Journal of Computing and Information Science in Engineering · doi:10.1115/1.4064128 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Paralyzed or Compromised: A Case Study of Decisions in Cyber-Physical Systems
Ofte, H. J., & Katsikas, S. K. (2024) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-61382-1_9 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
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“ICSs consist of hardware and software components, such as supervisory control and data acquisitions, human–machine interface, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and field devices (sensors and actuators) [1].”
BackgroundSoK: Autonomic Computing Based Mehods for ICS/SCADA and IIoT Security
Rouff, C., & Tekeoglu, A. (2024) · IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) · doi:10.1109/csr61664.2024.10679424 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Like CPSs, Operational Technologies (OT) are programmable systems and devices that interact with a physical environment [3].”
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Exposing the Gaps: The State of Supply Chain Coverage in Current Security Standards
Mexis, N., Lill, B., Doleh, Y., & Katzenbeisser, S. (2025) · IFIP advances in information and communication technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-94924-1_14 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Power networks SCADA communication cybersecurity, a Qiskit implementation
Biswas, H. (2025) · The Journal of Supercomputing · doi:10.1007/s11227-025-07758-x · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Applications of Deep Learning Approaches to Detect Advanced Cyber Attacks
Vaddadi, R. V. S. A. (2023) · International Journal on Recent and Innovation Trends in Computing and Communication · doi:10.17762/ijritcc.v11i9s.9493 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Safety-security convergence: Automation of IEC 62443-3-2
Silva, M. D., Mocanu, S., Puys, M., & Thevenon, P.-H. (2025) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2025.104477 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Alarm-Budgeted Event-Level Evaluation Of Ics Anomaly Detection: Lessons From Swat And Wadi
Heydari, V., & Nyarko, K. (2026) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2026.3659034 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“ICS security guidance similarly highlights risk-based monitoring and response constraints [4].”
Houache, M., Boubiche, D. E., Toral-Cruz, H., Martínez-Peláez, R., & Sánchez‐Lara, R. (2026) · AI · doi:10.3390/ai7050179 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
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“The primary performance objective is high detection at extremely low false-alarm rates, consistent with operational constraints in substations [3].”
InfluentialCyber Resilience in OT: Characteristics and Security Challenges
Cotiga, M., Pedersen, J. M., & Dushku, E. (2024) · IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) · doi:10.1109/csr61664.2024.10679463 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“First, upon International Society of Automation (ISA) recommendation, level 3.5 DMZ was introduced as an extra security layer for separation between the IT domain (level 4) and OT domain (levels 0-3), gaining more traction when advocated by IEC/ISO 62443 and mentioned by NIST [27].”
InfluentialUsage of Cybersecurity Standards in Operational Technology Systems
Kannelønning, K., & Katsikas, S. K. (2025) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-82349-7_28 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Cyber-Physical WebAssembly: Secure Hardware Interfaces and Pluggable Drivers
Kenhove, M. V., Seidler, M. L., Vandenberghe, F., et al. (2025) · IEEE Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS) · doi:10.1109/noms57970.2025.11073737 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“In parallel, Industrial Internet of Things systems often feature devices with operational lifespans of more than 30 years [8], [9].”
The Impact of Operational Technology Requirements in Maritime Industries
Simola, J., Paavola, J., Satopää, P., et al. (2024) · European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security · doi:10.34190/eccws.23.1.2357 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The ICS-SEC KG: An Integrated Cybersecurity Resource for Industrial Control Systems
Kurniawan, K., Kiesling, E., Winkler, D., & Ekelhart, A. (2024) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-77847-6_9 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Applying AI in Supporting Additive Manufacturing Machine Maintenance
Durão, L. F. C. S., Schmitt, F., Paz, J. C. R. A., Silva, D. D., Zancul, E. D. S., & Kirchner, E. (2025) · Zeitschrift für wirtschaftlichen Fabrikbetrieb · doi:10.1515/zwf-2024-0169 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Viticchié, A., Colletto, A. S., Sunder, G., et al. (2025) · Cluster Computing · doi:10.1007/s10586-025-05288-y · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“While some studies have attempted to bridge this gap by incorporating OT-specific rules into attack graph frameworks [37, 38], scalability challenges and limited practical validation remain key obstacles [6].”
InfluentialTrungadi, F., Fabiano, M., Aloisio, D., Brunaccini, G., Sergi, F., Merlino, G., & Longo, F. (2025) · Journal of Information Security and Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104199 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Okano, M. T., Lopes, W. A. C., Fong, C. K., Fernandes, J. C. L., & Ruggero, S. M. (2025) · IFIP advances in information and communication technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-03538-7_3 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Investigating operational technology attacks as code
Callegati, F., Giallorenzo, S., Melis, A., Melloni, S., Prandini, M., & Vannini, A. (2025) · Empirical Software Engineering · doi:10.1007/s10664-025-10713-2 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“However, this intercon-nectedness introduces significant challenges, particularly in ensuring robust and compre - hensive security measures (Stouffer et al. 2023).”
Lo, C., Win, T. Y., Rezaeifar, Z., Khan, Z., & Legg, P. (2026) · Future Generation Computer Systems · doi:10.1016/j.future.2026.108382 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Segovia‐Hernández, J. G., Juárez-García, M., Núñez-López, J. M., Cossio-Vargas, E., & Sánchez‐Ramírez, E. (2026) · Chemical Engineering and Processing - Process Intensification · doi:10.1016/j.cep.2026.110841 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Cleanroom environmental control systems: review of research landscape and control strategies
Guo, M., O’Neill, Z. D., Yang, Z., Wen, J., & Sun, W. (2026) · Energy and Buildings · doi:10.1016/j.enbuild.2026.117639 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Etxezarreta, X., Garitano, I., Iturbe, M., & Zurutuza, U. (2024) · Wireless Networks · doi:10.1007/s11276-023-03647-4 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“…various types of control systems, including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA), Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other control systems such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) that are commonly found in industrial sectors and Critical Infras-tructures (CIs) [1].”
CYBERSECURITY RISKS MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS: A REVIEW
Shikhaliyev, R. (2024) · Problems of Information Technology · doi:10.25045/jpit.v15.i1.05 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
StructuredFuzzer: Fuzzing Structured Text-Based Control Logic Applications
Koffi, K. A., Kampourakis, V., Song, J., et al. (2024) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics13132475 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Dumb Devices/Smart Adversaries: Real Threats in Critical Infrastructure
Sewall, A. (2024) · Signals and communication technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-61117-9_5 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Winning the battle with cyber risk identification tools in industrial control systems: A review
Rotibi, A. O., Saxena, N., & Burnap, P. (2024) · IET Cyber-Physical Systems Theory & Applications · doi:10.1049/cps2.12105 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Anomaly Detection in Shipboard Operational Technology Systems Using Cyber Analytics
Smith, P. F., Thulasiraman, P., Oriti, G., et al. (2024) · IEEE International Conference on Recent Advances in Systems Science and Engineering (RASSE) · doi:10.1109/rasse64357.2024.10773693 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“OT systems continuously collect diverse data points like sensor readings, control signals, and system states [5].”
Kareem, K., Naik, N., Jenkins, P., et al. (2024) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-74443-3_35 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Enhancing Industrial Cybersecurity with Virtual Lab Simulations
Hmiddouch, H., Villafranca, A., Castro, R., et al. (2025) · International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications · doi:10.14569/ijacsa.2025.0160505 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“When aligned with recognized frameworks like IEC 62443 [3] and NIST SP 800-82 [4] or architectural segmentation models like the Purdue model [5], virtual labs help practitioners replicate ICS complexities at minimal cost and risk to live operations.”
A Forensic Analysis Framework for Industrial Control Systems
Karagiozidis, A., & Gergeleit, M. (2025) · ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems (e-Energy) · doi:10.1145/3679240.3734646 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
ShieldFlow: a novel framework for OT cybersecurity in the context of industry 4.0
Ghoson, N. H., Benfriha, K., Meyrueis, V., Guiltat, T., & Zant, C. E. (2025) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-025-01083-3 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“The NIST SP800-82rev3 [10] standard categorizes vulnerabilities into policy and procedure, architecture and design, configuration and maintenance, physical, software development, communication and network configuration, and sensor and final element and asset management.”
InfluentialTowards Agnostic Operational Technology (OT) Honeypot Fingerprinting
Cordeiro, A., & Vasilomanolakis, E. (2025) · Network Traffic Measurement and Analysis Conference (TMA) · doi:10.23919/tma66427.2025.11097018 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Our contributions include the identification of protocol-level discrepancies, the definition of agnostic detection features, and the development of a reproducible framework aimed at enhancing the reliability of cyber-deception in critical OT infrastructure [3], [20].”
Rushing, B., Xu, S., & Fairman, A. (2025) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2025.100787 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
David Echeverría López, A., Amor Pinilla, M., & Carvajal Mora, H. R. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3609252 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“In particular, NIST SP 800-82 offers a comprehensive framework for securing ICS, focusing on internal policies, architectural segmentation, risk management processes, and defense-in-depth strategies [88].”
The ghost in the building: Non-invasive spoofing and covert attacks on automated buildings
Bengtsson, J. (2025) · Forensic Science International Digital Investigation · doi:10.1016/j.fsidi.2025.301880 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Intrusion Detection in OT/SCADA Cyber Security and Tabular Generative Adversarial Networks
Biswas, H., Kumar, M. M., & Kumar, P. (2024) · International Conference on Developments in eSystems Engineering (DeSE) · doi:10.1109/dese63988.2024.10911912 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Elmarkez, A., Mesli-Kesraoui, S., Berruet, P., & Oquendo, F. (2025) · Machines · doi:10.3390/machines13070538 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Medical Device Safety: An Analytical International Survey of AI/ML-Enabled Medical Devices
Finn, O. O. (2025) · IEEE Conference on Artificial Intelligence (CAI) · doi:10.1109/cai64502.2025.00108 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
A Secure and Scalable Architecture for Virtual Power Plants Inspired by VPN Principles
Sawilam, M., Kizilkaya, B., Flynn, D., et al. (2025) · Global Power, Energy and Communication Conference · doi:10.1109/gpecom65896.2025.11061942 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Tsuji, D., Fujita, J., Doenhoff, J., et al. (2025) · SICE Journal of Control Measurement and System Integration · doi:10.1080/18824889.2025.2555075 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“To protect ICS from cyber threats, an effective approach is to conduct risk assessment as recommended by international standards and guidelines for ICS cybersecurity (e.g. IEC 62443 part 2-1 [6] and NIST SP800-82 Rev. 3 [7]).”
Leveraging Large Language Models for OT Network Configuration Analysis
Colletto, A. S., Todaro, M., Viticchié, A., et al. (2025) · doi:10.1109/rtsi64020.2025.11212403 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
From Theory to Practice: Leveraging VR and CTF Competitions for Advanced Cybersecurity Education
Muulmann, T., Lugo, R. G., & Ottis, R. (2026) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-12660-3_9 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Digitalization and Cybersecurity
Möller, D. P. F. (2026) · Advances in information security · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-99790-7_1 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System for Ethernet/Industrial Protocol (ENIP)
Grijalva, C., & Hariri, S. (2025) · IEEE/ACS International Conference on Computer Systems and Applications (AICCSA) · doi:10.1109/aiccsa66935.2025.11315222 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
REx86: A Local Large Language Model for Assisting in x86 Assembly Reverse Engineering
Lea, D. M., Ghawaly, J., Richard, G. G., Ali-Gombe, A., & Case, A. (2025) · Annual Computer Security Applications Conference · doi:10.1109/acsac67867.2025.00024 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“…connectivity-restricted enclaves where third-party APIs are unavailable or prohibited (e.g., SCIFs governed by ICD/ICS-705 [14]; DoD enclaves requiring DISA SRG IL5/IL6 [15]; OT/ICS incident response zones aligned with NIST SP 800-82 [16]; organizations handling CUI under NIST SP 800-171 [17]).”
Eacuello, S. S., Prasad, R., & Sodhi, M. S. (2026) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s26082405 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Mrabet, M., & Sliti, M. (2026) · Urban Science · doi:10.3390/urbansci10050251 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Boșcoianu, M., Samburschii, V., Goga, A.-S., & Posa, M.-V. (2026) · Systems · doi:10.3390/systems14060606 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Anttila, L. (2026) · ACM Symposium on Applied Computing · doi:10.1145/3748522.3779715 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Socio-technical challenges in improving cybersecurity in operational technology organizations
Kannelønning, K., & Katsikas, S. K. (2026) · Information and Computer Security · doi:10.1108/ics-01-2025-0018 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Naqvi, S. S. A., Zhou, C., Saeed, A., Xu, P., Li, Y., Uzair, M., & Arshad, F. M. (2026) · Neurocomputing · doi:10.1016/j.neucom.2026.134416 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Yu, R., Wang, M., Yun, J., Du, J., Wang, L., & Suo, Y. (2026) · International Conference on Computing, Networks and Internet of Things (CNIOT) · doi:10.1109/cniot69547.2026.11582255 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Industrial control systems continuously generate multivariate sensor and actuator streams that support process monitoring and abnormal condition detection [1].”
Ward, D. D. (2026) · International Journal of Soft Computing and Engineering · doi:10.35940/ijsce.c3723.16030726 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Sederholm, T., Jääskeläinen, P., Lonka, M., & Huhtinen, A. (2023) · European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security · doi:10.34190/eccws.22.1.1128 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“According to Stouffer et al. (2022), another problem impeding OT system security is reliance on a single OT provider.”
BackgroundInfluentialSCADA Systems and Threats to Critical Infrastructures
Weitoish, T., & Burrell, D. N. (2023) · Advances in business information systems and analytics book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-3693-1970-3.ch004 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Bodsworth, C., Blewitt, W., & Blundell, J. (2024) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-60731-8_12 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
On the Cybersecurity of Logistics in the Age of Artificial Intelligence
Kiviharju, M. (2024) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-57452-8_9 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
The role of generative AI in cyber security
Curran, K. J., Curran, E., Killen, J., et al. (2024) · Metaverse · doi:10.54517/m2796 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Digital Twin in Industrial Networks: A Cost-benefit Analysis in Operational Technology
Koke, F., Senn, T., & Rahadi, R. A. (2024) · Asian journal of mathematics and computer research · doi:10.56557/ajomcor/2024/v31i49004 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Gupta, H. K., D’Agati, L., Longo, F., Puliafito, A., & Merlino, G. (2024) · International Conference on Security of Information and Networks (SIN) · doi:10.1109/sin63213.2024.10871534 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Burlacu, M. (2025) · NATO science for peace and security series. C, Environmental security · doi:10.1007/978-94-024-2300-6_8 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Cybersecurity of IoT Devices and Sensors in Industry 4.0
Krško, J., Peniak, P., Michálik, M., et al. (2025) · International Carpathian Control Conference · doi:10.1109/iccc65605.2025.11022905 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“However, the adoption of IT capabilities in OT, such as Ethernet and remote access, has blurred these boundaries, paving the way for IT-OT convergence in Industry 4.0 [7] [8] [12].”
InfluentialMaccarone, L., Buede, D. M., Bowman, S. T., et al. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2025.3607241 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
- Authors
- Stouffer, K., Pease, M., Tang, C., Zimmerman, T., Pillitteri, V., Lightman, S., Hahn, A., Saravia, S., Sherule, A., & Thompson, M.
- Affiliations
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (US)
- ORCID
- Published
- 2023-09-28
- OpenAlex
- W4386881452
- Cited by
- 315
- References
- 51
- Citations by year
- 2026: 173 · 2025: 82 · 2024: 51 · 2023: 9
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Funders
- National Institute of Standards and Technology
- Information Technology Laboratory
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Keywords
- operational technology security, industrial control systems, programmable logic controller, building automation, transport systems, system topology, security threats, vulnerability (computer security), security countermeasures, risk mitigation
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-11.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-11.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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