Cited by 64IoT and Edge/Fog ComputingDigital Transformation in IndustrySmart Grid Security and Resilience

Securing IIoT using Defence-in-Depth: Towards an End-to-End secure Industry 4.0

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Mosteiro-Sanchez, Aintzane, Barcelo, Marc, Astorga, Jasone, Urbieta, Aitor·2020·Journal of Manufacturing Systems

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.jmsy.2020.10.011

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  • OT systems often contain legacy devices that either do not support security features such as authentication, encryption, and monitoring, do not have them, or are underpowered.

    “One of the biggest problems with applying security to OT systems is that they often contain legacy devices that either do not support security features such as authentication, encryption, and monitoring, do not have them, or are underpowered, according to Mosteiro-Sanchez et al. [62].”

    From Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards (2025) · cites this paper as [62]

    The Introduction (p. 2) identifies authentication problems in legacy OT devices, and the host-security discussion (p. 13) says host-based monitoring depends on a device’s capabilities. The encryption section (p. 14) says some IIoT nodes lack the processing power for advanced encryption, but does not specifically identify those nodes as legacy OT devices. The claim applies that limitation to legacy devices more specifically than the source does. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. [23]23. European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA): Good Practices for Security of Internet of Things in the context of Smart Manufacturing. Tech. Rep. November, ENISA (2018). https://doi.org/10.2824/851384 · DOI
  2. [53]53. Mattsson, J., Selander, G., Eriksson, G.A.: Object Security in Web of Things. In: W3C Workshop on the Web of Things: Enablers and services for an open Web of Devices. pp. 1-5. Berlin, Germany (6 2014), http://www.w3.org/2014/02/wot/ papers
  3. [58]58. Minerva, R., Biru, A., Rotondi, D.: Towards a definition of the Internet of Things (IoT). Tech. rep., IEEE (2015), https://iot.ieee.org/definition.html
  4. [88]88. Thomason, S.: Improving Network Security : Next Generation Devices. Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology 12 (13), 47-50 (2012), https:// computerresearch.org/index.php/computer/article/view/606/606

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Authors
Mosteiro-Sanchez, A., Barcelo, M., Astorga, J., & Urbieta, A.
Affiliations
  • Ikerlan (ES)
  • University of the Basque Country (ES)
Corresponding author
Mosteiro-Sanchez, Aintzane
Venue
Journal of Manufacturing Systems
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2020-10
Volume
57
Pages
367-378
ISSN
0278-6125 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3097580951
Cited by
64
References
88
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 11
FWCI
4.11
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Manufacturing Systems (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • Communities in ADDI (University of the Basque Country) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Hispana (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering › Digital Transformation in Industry
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Keywords
Industrial Internet of Things, Industry 4.0, defense-in-depth, end-to-end security, attribute-based encryption, OSCORE, object security, lightweight encryption, smart manufacturing, industrial network security, IT-OT convergence

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