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PreprintCited by 2Corporate Social Responsibility ReportingCorporate Finance and GovernancePolitical Influence and Corporate Strategies

Coordinated Engagements

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Dimson, Elroy, Karakaş, Oğuzhan, Li, Xi·2021
DOI 10.67929/ecgi-fin-721-2021

Preprint — published as 10.2139/ssrn.3209072 · Paper page

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Abstract

We study coordinated engagements by a prominent international network of long-term shareholders cooperating to influence firms on environmental and social issues. We find leadership is decisive in collaborative engagements: a two-tier engagement strategy, combining lead investors with supporting investors, is effective in successfully achieving engagement goals, and is followed by improved target performance and increased investor fund flows. An investor is more likely to lead collaboration when it has higher stakes in and exposure to the target, formal engagement processes, and broader participation in collaborative initiatives. Success rates are elevated when lead investors have superior information and a credible reputation.

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Authors
Dimson, E., Karakaş, O., & Li, X.
Affiliations
University of Cambridge (GB)
ORCID
Publisher
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Published
2021-01-07
DOI
10.67929/ecgi-fin-721-2021
OpenAlex
W7213244421
Cited by
1
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 1
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Funders
  • Ohio State University
  • London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Inquire Europe
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Keywords
long-term shareholders, lead investors, collaborative engagement, ESG engagement, target firm performance, investor reputation, stakeholder networks

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