The Role of Mechanism Beliefs in Causal Reasoning
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Introduction: Characterizing the Questions of causal reasoning This chapter describes the mechanism approach to the study of causal reasoning. We will first offer a characterization of the central issues in human causal reasoning, and will discuss how the mechanism approach addresses these issues. In the course of this presentation, we will frequently compare the mechanism approach with alternative accounts based on analyses of covariation, or what is often termed the regularity view. The aims of this chapter are the following: to explain why covariation and mechanism are different, to discuss why such a distinction is actually a useful tool for our understanding of causal reasoning, and to explicate the complementary nature of the two views. Before presenting these two approaches, it is necessary first to offer a description of the domain or problem itself : namely, what are these alternative approaches to? Although there are a number of different ways of characterizing the study of
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Cites
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Keil, F. C. (2006) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190100 · Cited by 1,350
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ahn, W.-K., & Kalish, C. W.
- Venue
- Explanation and Cognition
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2000-06-22
- Pages
- 199-226
- OpenAlex
- W3135346266
- Cited by
- 136
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 44.27
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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