The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 79 of the 79 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
People feel they understand complex phenomena with far greater precision, coherence, and depth than they really do; they are subject to an illusion—an illusion of explanatory depth. The illusion is far stronger for explanatory knowledge than many other kinds of knowledge, such as that for facts, procedures or narratives. The illusion for explanatory knowledge is most robust where the environment supports real‐time explanations with visible mechanisms. We demonstrate the illusion of depth with explanatory knowledge in Studies 1–6. Then we show differences in overconfidence about knowledge across different knowledge domains in Studies 7–10. Finally, we explore the mechanisms behind the initial confidence and behind overconfidence in Studies 11 and 12, and discuss the implications of our findings for the roles of intuitive theories in concepts and cognition.
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“For example, people tend to confidently overestimate how much they know about various phenomena - such as how a zip fastener works, how snow forms or how a helicopter takes flight - and become aware of their lack of knowledge only after failing to explain the phenomenon 61-64 .”
From Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility (2022) · cites this paper as [61]
In the citing paper
“When learners are asked to produce detailed explanations of such systems, this perceived understanding often collapses [24].”
From Fluency Illusion: A Review on Influence of ChatGPT in Classroom Settings (2026) · cites this paper as [24]
In the citing paper
“Similarly, humans are unreliable guides to their own inner workings: they are often overconfident in their explanatory knowledge (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002) and have little access to the mechanisms underlying some of their psychology (e.g., perception, see Firestone & Scholl, 2016).”
From Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning (2024) · cites this paper as Rozenblit & Keil, 2002
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Cited by
Keil, F. C. (2006) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190100 · Cited by 1,350
Self-citationThe Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Keil, Frank
- ORCID
- Keil, Frank
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-09
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 521-562
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- PMC
- PMC3062901
- OpenAlex
- W2140107468
- Cited by
- 1,032
- References
- 79
- Citations by year
- 2026: 130 · 2025: 65 · 2024: 71 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 91 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 72 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 39 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 30 · 2013: 24 · 2012: 22
- FWCI
- 6.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (R37HD023922, R01HD023922)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Education › Science Education and Pedagogy
- Keywords
- illusion of explanatory depth, folk science, overconfidence, explanatory knowledge, intuitive theories, knowledge confidence, mechanisms, folk psychology, folk physics, folk biology
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.