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The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth

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Rozenblit, Leonid, Keil, Frank · 2002 · Cognitive Science

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 79 of the 79 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

People feel they understand complex phenomena with far greater precision, coherence, and depth than they really do; they are subject to an illusion—an illusion of explanatory depth. The illusion is far stronger for explanatory knowledge than many other kinds of knowledge, such as that for facts, procedures or narratives. The illusion for explanatory knowledge is most robust where the environment supports real‐time explanations with visible mechanisms. We demonstrate the illusion of depth with explanatory knowledge in Studies 1–6. Then we show differences in overconfidence about knowledge across different knowledge domains in Studies 7–10. Finally, we explore the mechanisms behind the initial confidence and behind overconfidence in Studies 11 and 12, and discuss the implications of our findings for the roles of intuitive theories in concepts and cognition.

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Crossref · 10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1

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79 of 79 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 79 references

Research works printed but not linked: 11

  1. Boyd R., 1991, The philosophy of science, 195
  2. 10.1037/0033-295X.103.3.592 · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.3.592 · Paper page
  3. 10.1037/0278-7393.11.1-4.702 · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.11.1-4.702 · Paper page
  4. 10.1037/0278-7393.27.1.34 · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.27.1.34 · Paper page
  5. 10.2307/1128929 · doi:10.2307/1128929 · Paper page
  6. 10.1037/0278-7393.19.4.851 · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.19.4.851 · Paper page
  7. 10.1037/0278-7393.20.4.904 · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.20.4.904 · Paper page
  8. 10.1037/0033-295X.92.3.289 · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.92.3.289 · Paper page
  9. Simon H. A., 1996, The sciences of the artificial
  10. 10.1207/s15516709cog2202_2 · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2202_2 · Paper page
  11. 10.1037/0033-295X.99.4.605 · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.99.4.605 · Paper page

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F.
Affiliations
Yale University (US)
Corresponding author
Keil, Frank
Venue
Cognitive Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2002-09
Volume
26
Issue
5
Pages
521-562
ISSN
  • 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
  • 1551-6709
OpenAlex
W2140107468
Cited by
1,032
References
79
Citations by year
2026: 130 · 2025: 65 · 2024: 71 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 91 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 72 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 39 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 30 · 2013: 24 · 2012: 22
FWCI
6.42
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
Funders
Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (R37HD023922, R01HD023922)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Education › Science Education and Pedagogy
Keywords
illusion of explanatory depth, folk science, overconfidence, explanatory knowledge, intuitive theories, knowledge confidence, mechanisms, folk psychology, folk physics, folk biology

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1
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Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F. (2002). The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth. Cognitive Science. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.