Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter outlines a dynamic theory of intentions and argues that several categories of intentions should be distinguished based on their different functional roles and the different types of contents they involve. It explains how understanding of the dynamic transitions among these different categories of intentions may elucidate the distinctive nature of actions and intentionality. It also claims that the experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner fail to provide conclusive evidence that mental causation is generally illusory. Drawing on the causal theory of action, it also examines the phenomenology of action and of the role of conscious thought in the production of action. The chapter describes future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions, motor intentions, and the general dynamics of intentions before concluding with a discussion of conscious agency.
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Cites
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364 · cited 2×
“Here I follow Wakefield and Dreyfus (1991) and distinguish between knowing what we are doing and knowing that we are acting.”
BackgroundComputational principles of movement neuroscience
Wolpert, D. M., & Ghahramani, Z. (2000) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/81497 · Cited by 2,122
Comparative analysis of actual and mental movement times in two graphic tasks
Decety, J., & Michel, F. (1989) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1016/0278-2626(89)90007-9 · Cited by 341
Cited by
Gallagher, S. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846345.001.0001 · Cited by 359
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
(2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001 · Cited by 332
Imagine there are no leaders: Reframing leadership as collaborative agency
Raelin, J. A. (2016) · Leadership · doi:10.1177/1742715014558076 · Cited by 313
Virtual Reality in Psychological, Medical and Pedagogical Applications
(2012) · doi:10.5772/2607 · Cited by 103
Emotion in action: A predictive processing perspective and theoretical synthesis
Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2017) · Emotion Review · doi:10.1177/1754073916661765 · Cited by 68
Metadata
- Authors
- Pacherie, E.
- Venue
- Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2006-02-24
- Pages
- 145-168
- OpenAlex
- W4236002476
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 3.33
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Pacherie, E. (2006). Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions. Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2477.003.0011
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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