The DOI matches its Crossref record; 253 of the 253 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
Abstract
This second edition of the Oxford Handbook of Free Will is a sourcebook and guide to current work on free will and related subjects. Its focus is on writings of the past forty years, in which there has been a resurgence of interest in traditional issues about the freedom of the will in the light of new developments in the sciences, philosophy, and humanistic studies. Special attention is given to research on free will of the first decade of the twenty-first century since the publication of the first edition of the text. This edition contains new articles surveying topics that have become prominent in debates about free will recently, including new work on the relation of free will to physics, the neurosciences, cognitive science, psychology, and empirical philosophy, new versions of traditional views (compatibilist, incompatibilist, libertarian, etc.) and new views (e.g., revisionism) that have emerged. The twenty-eight articles cover a host of free-will related issues, such as moral agency and responsibility, accountability and blameworthiness in ethics, autonomy, coercion and control in social theory, criminal liability, responsibility and punishment in legal theory, issues about the relation of mind to body, consciousness and the nature of action in philosophy of mind and the cognitive and neurosciences, questions about divine foreknowledge, providence and human freedom in philosophy of religion, and general metaphysical questions about necessity and possibility, determinism, time and chance, quantum reality, and causation and explanation.
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Cites
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Cited by
Monroe, A. E., Dillon, K. D., & Malle, B. F. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.011 · Cited by 125
Making sense of agency: Belief in free will as a unique and important construct
Feldman, G. (2017) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12293 · Cited by 106
From Modal Collapse to Providential Collapse
Schmid, J. C. (2022) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-021-00438-z · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2011-07-27
- OpenAlex
- W4290960819
- Cited by
- 332
- References
- 253
- FWCI
- 4.89
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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