Hart, Oliver

Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure

Hart, O. (1995)

Corporate Finance and GovernanceLaw, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Cited by 4,672

Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation

Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics

Corporate Finance and GovernanceMerger and Competition Analysis

Cited by 3,098

One-share-one-vote and the market for corporate control

Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics

Corporate Finance and GovernanceCorporate Governance and Law

Cited by 1,342

Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value

Hart, O., & Zingales, L. (2017) · Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting

Corporate Finance and GovernanceFinancial Reporting and Valuation Research

Cited by 668

Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value

Hart, O., & Zingales, L. (2017) · Journal of Law Finance and Accounting

Corporate Finance and GovernanceFinancial Reporting and Valuation Research

Cited by 666

The Structure and Performance of the Money Management Industry

Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., Hart, O., & Perry, G. L. (1992) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics

Financial Markets and Investment StrategiesCorporate Finance and Governance

Cited by 572

An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm

Hart, O. (1989) · Columbia Law Review

Economic Theory and InstitutionsLaw, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Cited by 498

On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies

Hart, O. D. (1979) · Econometrica

Economic theories and modelsCorporate Finance and Governance

Cited by 142