One-share-one-vote and the market for corporate control
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The research on ownership patterns originates in the work of Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988), who examine the optimal allocation of voting and cash flow rights in a firm.
“The research in this area originates in the work of Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988), who examine the optimal allocation of voting and cash flow rights in a firm.”
From Investor protection and corporate governance (2000) · cites this paper as Grossman and Hart (1988)
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Research works printed but not linked: 20
- Baron, D.P.,, 1983, Tender offers and management resistance, Journal of Finance 38, May, 331—43.
- Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A. and A. Wolinsky, 1986, The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling, The Rand Journal of Economics, 17(2), (Summer) 176—188.
- DeAngelo, Harry, Linda DeAngelo and Edward H. Rice, 1984, Going private: Minority freezeouts and stockholder wealth, Journal of Law and Econoics 27(2), 367—401.
- DeAngelo, Harry and Linda DeAngelo, 1985, Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock Journal of Financial Economics 14(1), 33—69.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1983, The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm, Journal of Law and Economics 26(2), 375—390.
- Dodd, Peter and Jerold B. Warner, 1983, On corporate governance: A study of proxy contests, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 401—438.
- Easterbrook, Frank H. and Daniel R. Fischel, 1982, Corporate control transactions, Yale Law Journal 91, 698—737.
- Easterbrook, Frank H. and Daniel R. Fischel, 1983, Voting in corporate law Journal of Law and Economics 26(2), 395—428.
- Fischel, Daniel R., 1963, Appraisal remedy in corporate law, American Bar Foundation Research Journal 4, 875—902.
- Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D.Hart, 1980, Takeover bids, the free—rider problem, and the theory of corporation, Bell Journal of Economics 11, (Spring) 42—64.
- Grossman, Sanford 3.,, and Oliver D. Hart, 1981, The allocational role of takeover bids in situations of asymmetric information, Journal of Finance 36 (May), 253—270.
- Grossman, Sanford 3., and Oliver D. Hart, 1986, The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration, Journal of Political Economy 94(4), 691—719.
- Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305—360.
- Jensen, Michael and Richard Ruback, 1983, The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence, Journal of Financial Economics, April, 5—50.
- Lease, Ronald C., John 3. McConnell and Wayne H. Mikkelson, 1984, The market value of differential voting rights in closely held corporations, Journal of Business 57(4), 443—467.
- Levy, Haim, 1983, Economic evaluation of voting power of common stock, Journal of Finance 38, 79—93.
- Nanne, Henry G., 1965, Mergers and the market for corporate control, Journal of Political Economy (April) 110—120.
- Marris, Robin, 1964, The economic theory of managerial capitalism, Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Mayers, D. and C. Smith, Jr., 1986, Ownership structure and control: The mutualizatjon of stock life insurance companies, Journal of Financial Economics (May) 73—98.
- Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert V. Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of Political Economy 94(3), 461—488.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025 · see citing works
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · see citing works
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848 · see citing works
The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience
Zingales, L. (1994) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/7.1.125 · Cited by 970 · see citing works
An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm
Hart, O. (1989) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1122818 · Cited by 498 · see citing works
Self-citationHow Does Corporate Governance Affect Equity Volatility? Worldwide Evidence and Theory
Gagnon, L., & Jeanneret, A. (2025) · The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfad002 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
- Authors
- Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- ORCID
- Hart, Oliver D.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1988-01
- Volume
- 20
- Pages
- 175-202
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121886422
- Cited by
- 1,342
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 36 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 32 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 40 · 2017: 43 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 50 · 2014: 60 · 2013: 62 · 2012: 62
- FWCI
- 44.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Keywords
- one share one vote, corporate control, takeover bids, private benefits of control, corporate governance
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