What is the Mind‐Body Problem?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The mind-body problem exists because we naturally want to include the mental life of conscious organisms in a comprehensive scientific understanding of the world. On the one hand it seems obvious that everything that happens in the mind depends on, or is, something that happens in the brain. On the other hand the defining features of mental states and events, features like their intentionality, their subjectivity and their conscious experiential quality, seem not to be comprehensible simply in terms of the physical operation of the organism. This is not just because we have not yet accumulated enough empirical information: the problem is theoretical. We cannot at present imagine an explanation of colour perception, for example, which would do for that phenomenon what chemistry has done for combustion--an explanation which would tell us in physical terms, and without residue, what the experience of colour perception is. Philosophical analyses of the distinguishing features of the mental that are designed to get us over this hurdle generally involve implausible forms of reductionism, behaviouristic in inspiration. The question is whether there is another way of bringing mental phenomena into a unified conception of objective reality, without relying on a narrow standard of objectivity which excludes everything that makes them interesting.
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Self-citationLoar, B. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214188 · Cited by 341
Research works printed but not linked: 11
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- 10.2307/2024524 · DOI · Paper page
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- 10.2307/2183914 · DOI · Paper page
- Nagel T, 1986, The view from nowhere
- 10.1038/328645a0 · DOI
Cited by
An information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958
Inferring Causality from Noninvasive Brain Stimulation in Cognitive Neuroscience
Bergmann, T. O., & Hartwigsen, G. (2021) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_01591 · Cited by 264
A landscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications
Kuhn, R. L. (2024) · Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology · doi:10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2023.12.003 · Cited by 135
Metadata
- Authors
- Nagel, T.
- Venue
- Novartis Foundation Symposia
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-09-28
- Volume
- 174
- Pages
- 1-7
- ISSN
- 1528-2511 (ISSN-L)
- 1935-4657
- OpenAlex
- W1589612965
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 2
- Type
- other
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm)
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