The DOI matches its Crossref record; 74 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 60 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
An information integration theory of consciousness
Open accessAbstract
BACKGROUND: Consciousness poses two main problems. The first is understanding the conditions that determine to what extent a system has conscious experience. For instance, why is our consciousness generated by certain parts of our brain, such as the thalamocortical system, and not by other parts, such as the cerebellum? And why are we conscious during wakefulness and much less so during dreamless sleep? The second problem is understanding the conditions that determine what kind of consciousness a system has. For example, why do specific parts of the brain contribute specific qualities to our conscious experience, such as vision and audition? PRESENTATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS: This paper presents a theory about what consciousness is and how it can be measured. According to the theory, consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate information. This claim is motivated by two key phenomenological properties of consciousness: differentiation - the availability of a very large number of conscious experiences; and integration - the unity of each such experience. The theory states that the quantity of consciousness available to a system can be measured as the Phi value of a complex of elements. Phi is the amount of causally effective information that can be integrated across the informational weakest link of a subset of elements. A complex is a subset of elements with Phi>0 that is not part of a subset of higher Phi. The theory also claims that the quality of consciousness is determined by the informational relationships among the elements of a complex, which are specified by the values of effective information among them. Finally, each particular conscious experience is specified by the value, at any given time, of the variables mediating informational interactions among the elements of a complex. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS: The information integration theory accounts, in a principled manner, for several neurobiological observations concerning consciousness. As shown here, these include the association of consciousness with certain neural systems rather than with others; the fact that neural processes underlying consciousness can influence or be influenced by neural processes that remain unconscious; the reduction of consciousness during dreamless sleep and generalized seizures; and the time requirements on neural interactions that support consciousness. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HYPOTHESIS: The theory entails that consciousness is a fundamental quantity, that it is graded, that it is present in infants and animals, and that it should be possible to build conscious artifacts.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Tononi proposes that consciousness corresponds to a system’s capacity to integrate information, measured as the Φ value of a complex. The theory links the quantity of consciousness to integrated information and its quality to the effective information matrix among a complex’s elements.
Key findings
- Consciousness is identified with information integration: quantity is given by Φ, the effective information across a complex’s minimum information bipartition; a complex is a subset with Φ>0 not included in a larger subset of higher Φ.
- Simulations illustrate the theory: optimized connection matrices with functional specialization and integration yield Φ = 74 bits; a strongly modular network yields Φ = 20 bits for each of three modules; joining supramodal, visual, and auditory subsets yields a main complex with Φ = 61 bits, which changes to 57 bits when the auditory subset is functionally disconnected.
- The theory accounts for why thalamocortical systems contribute to consciousness while cerebellum, reticular formation, sensory afferents, motor efferents, and cortico-subcortical loops may influence it without directly contributing; split-brain sectioning replaces one main complex with two smaller complexes.
- Time requirements: fully formed sensory experience takes up to 100–200 ms, a single conscious moment does not extend beyond 2–3 seconds, direct cortical stimulation may need up to 500 ms for conscious sensation, and modeled visual areas require at least 80 ms for constructive interactions.
Methods
- Theoretical hypothesis paper using phenomenological thought experiments (photodiode, camera, split-brain) and formal information-theoretic definitions: entropy, mutual information, effective information, Φ, complexes, and qualia space.
- No new human or animal empirical sample is reported; the paper draws on existing neurobiological observations and simplified computer models/simulations to illustrate predictions.
- Main analysis is conceptual derivation plus illustrative simulation results; no statistical inference or direct experimental measurement of Φ in brains is presented.
Limitations
- Stated: the framework’s validity rests on its ability to account coherently for phenomenological and brain facts; stringent tests require concurrent broad-region stimulation/recording and realistic large-scale anatomical models; better cortical neuroanatomy is needed; it is hard to say which cortical circuits are informationally insulated; measuring Φ accurately in infants, animals, coma/vegetative states, etc. will not be easy.
- Evident: no direct empirical measurement of Φ in human brains is presented; the simulations are simplified and illustrative; several predictions remain untested.
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Figures
![Figure 1 Effective information, minimum information bipartition, and complexes. a. Effective information. Shown is a single subset S of 4 elements ({1,2,3,4}, blue circle), forming part of a larger system X (black ellipse). This subset is bisected into A and B by a bipartition ({1,3}/{2,4}, indicated by the dotted grey line). Arrows indicate causally effective connections linking A to B and B to A across the bipartition (other connections may link both A and B to the rest of the system X). To measure EI(A→B), maximum entropy Hmax is injected into the outgoing connections from A (corresponding to independent noise sources). The entropy of the states of B that is due to the input from A is then measured. Note that A can affect B directly through connections linking the two subsets, as well as indirectly via X. Applying maximum entropy to B allows one to measure EI(B→A). The effective information for this bipartition is EI(A B) = EI(A→B) + EI(B→A). b. Minimum information bipartition. For subset S = {1,2,3,4}, the horizontal bipartition {1,3}/{2,4} yields a positive value of EI. However, the bipartition {1,2}/{3,4} yields EI = 0 and is a minimum information bipartition (MIB) for this subset. The other bipartitions of subset S = {1,2,3,4} are {1,4}/{2,3}, {1}/{2,3,4}, {2}/{1,3,4}, {3}/{1,2,4}, {4}/{1,2,3}, all with EI>0. c. Analysis of complexes. By considering all subsets of system X one can identify its complexes and rank them by the respective values of Φ – the value of EI for their minimum information bipartition. Assuming that other elements in X are disconnected, it is easy to see that Φ>0 for subset {3,4} and {1,2}, but Φ = 0 for subsets {1,3}, {1,4}, {2,3}, {2,4}, {1,2,3}, {1,2,4}, {1,3,4}, {2,3,4}, and {1,2,3,4}. Subsets {3,4} and {1,2} are not part of a larger subset having higher Φ, and therefore they constitute complexes. This is indicated schematically by having them encircled by a grey oval (darker grey indicates higher Φ). Methodological note. In order to identify complexes and their Φ(S) for systems with many different connection patterns, each system X was implemented as a stationary multidimensional Gaussian process such that values for effective information could be obtained analytically (details in [8]). Briefly, in order to identify complexes and their Φ(S) for systems with many different connection patterns, we implemented numerous model systems X composed of n neural elements with connections CONij specified by a connection matrix CON(X) (no self-connections). In order to compare different architectures, CON(X) was normalized so that the absolute value of the sum of the afferent synaptic weights per element corresponded to a constant value w<1 (here w = 0.5). If the system's dynamics corresponds to a multivariate Gaussian random process, its covariance matrix COV(X) can be derived analytically. As in previous work, we consider the vector X of random variables that represents the activity of the elements of X, subject to independent Gaussian noise R of magnitude c. We have that, when the elements settle under stationary conditions, X = X * CON(X) + cR. By defining Q = (1-CON(X))-1 and averaging over the states produced by successive values of R, we obtain the covariance matrix COV(X) = <X*X> = <Qt * Rt * R * Q> = Qt * Q, where the superscript t refers to the transpose. Under Gaussian assumptions, all deviations from independence among the two complementary parts A and B of a subset S of X are expressed by the covariances among the respective elements. Given these covariances, values for the individual entropies H(A) and H(B), as well as for the joint entropy of the subset H(S) = H(AB) can be obtained as, for example, H(A) = (1/2)ln [(2π e)n|COV(A)|], where |•| denotes the determinant. The mutual information between A and B is then given by MI(A;B) = H(A) + H(B) - H(AB). Note that MI(A:B) is symmetric and positive. To obtain the effective information between A and B within model systems, independent noise sources in A are enforced by setting to zero strength the connections within A and afferent to A. Then the covariance matrix for A is equal to the identity matrix (given independent Gaussian noise), and any statistical dependence between A and B must be due to the causal effects of A on B, mediated by the efferent connections of A. Moreover, all possible outputs from A that could affect B are evaluated. Under these conditions, EI(A→B) = MI(AHmax;B). The independent Gaussian noise R applied to A is multiplied by cp, the perturbation coefficient, while the independent Gaussian noise applied to the rest of the system is given by ci, the intrinsic noise coefficient. Here cp = 1 and ci = 0.00001 in order to emphasize the role of the connectivity and minimize that of noise. To identify complexes and obtain their capacity for information integration, one considers every subset S of X composed of k elements, with k = 2,..., n. For each subset S, we consider all bipartitions and calculate EI(A B) for each of them. We find the minimum information bipartition MIB(S), the bipartition for which the normalized effective information reaches a minimum, and the corresponding value of Φ(S). We then find the complexes of X as those subsets S with Φ>0 that are not included within a subset having higher Φ and rank them based on their Φ(S) value. The complex with the maximum value of Φ(S) is the main complex. MATLAB functions used for calculating effective information and complexes are at .](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/d0c5a1f7aaeb4827a51a4eaae44f65d9/an-information-integration-theory-of-consciousness-figure-1.jpg)

![Figure 3 Information integration for a thalamocortical-like architecture. a. Optimization of information integration for a system that is both functionally specialized and functionally integrated. Shown is the causal interaction diagram for a network whose connection matrix was obtained by optimization for Φ (Φ = 74 bits). Note the heterogeneous arrangement of the incoming and outgoing connections: each element is connected to a different subset of elements, with different weights. Further analysis indicates that this network jointly maximizes functional specialization and functional integration among its 8 elements, thereby resembling the anatomical organization of the thalamocortical system [8]. b. Reduction of information integration through loss of specialization. The same amount of connectivity, distributed homogeneously to eliminate functional specialization, yields a complex with much lower values of Φ (Φ = 20 bits). c. Reduction of information integration through loss of integration. The same amount of connectivity, distributed in such a way as to form four independent modules to eliminate functional integration, yields four separate complexes with much lower values of Φ (Φ = 20 bits).](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/bee0371092a8472c83bf36f4f8004c58/an-information-integration-theory-of-consciousness-figure-3.jpg)


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7 Valid · 4 Not valid · 35 Not checked · 140 Own results and interpretations
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In the paper
“Electrophysiological and imaging studies also indicate that neural activity that correlates with conscious experience is widely distributed over the cortex (e.g [20,26-29]).”
§ An information integration theory of consciousness > Testing the hypothesis > Consciousness, information integration, and the brain
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [20] Rees G, Kreiman G, Koch C: Neural correlates of consciousness in humans. Nat Rev Neurosci. 2002, 3 (4): 261-270. 10.1038/nrn783. source
- Supportedcites [26] Srinivasan R, Russell DP, Edelman GM, Tononi G: Increased synchronization of neuromagnetic responses during conscious perception. J Neurosci. 1999, 19 (13): 5435-5448. source
The Conclusion reports that changes associated with conscious perception are distributed across the brain, extending beyond visual areas to anterior regions, including frontal areas. The Discussion likewise describes changes involving distant occipital, parietal, temporal, and frontal sensor sites. This supports the citing sentence’s broad claim. (LLM, conf=0.90)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [27] McIntosh AR, Rajah MN, Lobaugh NJ: Interactions of prefrontal cortex in relation to awareness in sensory learning. Science. 1999, 284 (5419): 1531-1533. 10.1126/science.284.5419.1531. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [28] Vuilleumier P, Sagiv N, Hazeltine E, Poldrack RA, Swick D, Rafal RD, Gabrieli JD: Neural fate of seen and unseen faces in visuospatial neglect: a combined event-related functional MRI and event-related potential study. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2001, 98 (6): 3495-3500. 10.1073/pnas.051436898. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [29] Cosmelli D, David O, Lachaux JP, Martinerie J, Garnero L, Renault B, Varela F: Waves of consciousness: ongoing cortical patterns during binocular rivalry. Neuroimage. 2004, 23 (1): 128-140. 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.05.008. source
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“the organization of the connections is such that individual patches of cerebellar cortex tend to be activated independently of one another, with little interaction possible between distant patches [41,42].”
§ An information integration theory of consciousness > Testing the hypothesis > Consciousness, information integration, and the brain
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [41] Cohen D, Yarom Y: Patches of synchronized activity in the cerebellar cortex evoked by mossy-fiber stimulation: questioning the role of parallel fibers. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 1998, 95 (25): 15032-15036. 10.1073/pnas.95.25.15032. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results report a localized patch of synchronized activity after white-matter stimulation, and the Discussion says this activity occurs simultaneously across the patch rather than propagating along parallel fibers. That supports localized activation, but the paper does not establish that separate patches activate independently or that little interaction is possible between distant patches. The indexed passages provide no page number. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [42] Bower JM: The organization of cerebellar cortical circuitry revisited: implications for function. Ann N Y Acad Sci. 2002, 978: 135-155. source
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Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Further simulations show that it is possible to construct a large complex of high Φ by joining smaller complexes through reciprocal connections [8].”
§ An information integration theory of consciousness > Testing the hypothesis > Consciousness, information integration, and the brain
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [8] Tononi G, Sporns O: Measuring information integration. BMC Neurosci. 2003, 4 (1): 31-10.1186/1471-2202-4-31. source
The Results section (‘Scaling and joining complexes’) reports that two smaller optimized networks joined by reciprocal connections formed a larger complex with substantially increased Φ. The Discussion (‘Information integration and basic neuroanatomy’) explicitly says high Φ can be achieved by joining smaller complexes through reciprocal connections. The demonstrated construction used two eight-element components; the paper does not establish that the method works at arbitrary scale. (LLM, conf=0.95)
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In the paper
“For example, the ability of a system to integrate information grows as that system incorporates statistical regularities from its environment and learns [14].”
§ An information integration theory of consciousness > Implications of the hypothesis
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [14] Tononi G, Sporns O, Edelman GM: A complexity measure for selective matching of signals by the brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 1996, 93 (8): 3422-3427. 10.1073/pnas.93.8.3422. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The introduction (p. 1) says that neural connectivity tends to match environmental signals more closely through development and experience, and the Discussion (p. 5) links increased mutual information to greater functional integration. But the Results (p. 3) note that matching complexity and neural complexity can sometimes change independently, so the paper does not establish that integration necessarily grows whenever a system learns environmental regularities. (LLM, conf=0.82)
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Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Phenomena such as the attentional blink, where a fixed sensory input may at times make it to consciousness and at times not, may also be due to changes in functional connectivity: access to the main thalamocortical complex may be enabled or not based on dynamics intrinsic to the complex [52].”
§ An information integration theory of consciousness > Testing the hypothesis > Consciousness, information integration, and the brain
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [52] Dehaene S, Sergent C, Changeux JP: A neuronal network model linking subjective reports and objective physiological data during conscious perception. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2003, 100 (14): 8520-8525. 10.1073/pnas.1332574100. source
The Results report that, under the same simulated attentional-blink conditions, spontaneous fluctuations can determine whether activity reaches self-amplifying global access or remains transient and bottom-up. They also report reduced long-distance crosscorrelations when T2 is blinked. This supports the citing sentence’s hedged account of dynamically enabled access, with ‘functional connectivity’ referring to changing coordination rather than a change in the model’s fixed connections. (LLM, conf=0.88)
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“IIT takes an axiomatic approach, grounding itself in five essential properties of consciousness: existence, composition, information, integration, and exclusion (Tononi, 2004; Oizumi et al., 2014).”
From Can "consciousness" be observed from large language model (LLM) internal states? Dissecting LLM representations obtained from Theory of Mind test with Integrated Information Theory and Span Representation analysis (2025) · cites this paper as Tononi, 2004
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Thus, the results confirm the prediction of IIT regarding the causal decomposability of LLMs [12] and ground it empirically via behaviorally interpretable metrics (e.g., perplexity [15]).”
From Why large language models cannot possess consciousness: an integrated information theory perspective (2025) · cites this paper as [12]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The principal theoretical justification for IIT is the conjecture that, in perception, what is absent may be more significant to consciousness than what is present [2,3].”
From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [2]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“It was the first (and arguably may still be the lone) theory that makes precise quantitative predictions about both the contents and level of consciousness (Tononi 2004).”
From Falsification and consciousness (2021) · cites this paper as Tononi 2004
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“from which it is derived that consciousness corresponds to integrated information.”
From Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness (2021) · cites this paper as Tononi, 2004
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Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ An information integration theory of consciousness > Presentation of the hypothesis > The first problem: What determines to what extent a system has conscious experience?
“In summary, to measure EI(B→A), one needs to apply maximum entropy to the outputs from B, and determine the entropy of the responses of B that are induced by inputs from A.”
§ An information integration theory of consciousness > Presentation of the hypothesis > The first problem: What determines to what extent a system has conscious experience?
“One way is to divide S into two complementary parts A and B, and evaluate the responses of B that can be caused by all possible inputs originating from A.”
Citations
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“Conversely, stimulating the reticular formation can arouse a comatose animal and activate the thalamocortical system, making it ready to respond to stimuli [43].”
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Dynamic predictions: Oscillations and synchrony in top–down processing
Engel, A. K., Fries, P., & Singer, W. (2001) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/35094565 · Cited by 3,454 · cited 1×
“On the integration side, the specialized elements of the thalamocortical system are linked by an extended network of intra- and inter-areal connections that permit rapid and effective interactions within and between areas [31-35].”
BackgroundAlexander, G. E., Crutcher, M. D., & DeLong, M. R. (1990) · PubMed · Cited by 2,679
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · cited 1×
“Opinions differ, however, about the contribution of certain cortical areas [1,16-21].”
BackgroundMathematical Theory of Communication
(2009) · Encyclopedia of Communication Theory · doi:10.4135/9781412959384.n229 · Cited by 2,492
The distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recurrent processing
Lamme, V. A. F., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2000) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/s0166-2236(00)01657-x · Cited by 2,338 · cited 1×
“Thus, the firing of the same cortical neurons may correlate with consciousness at certain times, but not at other times [57].”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Zeki S: A vision of the brain. 1993, Oxford; Boston: Blackwell Scientific Publications
- Tononi G: Galileo e il fotodiodo. 2003, Bari: Laterza
Cited by
Alpha-band oscillations, attention, and controlled access to stored information
Klimesch, W. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.10.007 · Cited by 3,310
Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727
Self-citationNichols, D. E. (2016) · Pharmacological Reviews · doi:10.1124/pr.115.011478 · Cited by 1,762
“This view is consistent with the information integration theory of consciousness (Tononi, 2004), which proposes that the thalamus and thalamocortical system play a key role in integrating information and ensuing consciousness.”
ResultConsciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto
Tononi, G. (2008) · The Biological Bulletin · doi:10.2307/25470707 · Cited by 1,529
“This state of affairs is not unlike the one faced by biologists when, knowing a great deal about similarities and differences between species, fossil remains, and breeding practices, they still lacked a theory of how evolution might occur.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialSelf-citationA theoretically based index of consciousness independent of sensory processing and behavior
Casali, A. G., Gosseries, O., Rosanova, M., Boly, M., Sarasso, S., Casali, K. R., Casarotto, S., Bruno, M.-A., Laureys, S., Tononi, G., et al. (2013) · Science Translational Medicine · doi:10.1126/scitranslmed.3006294 · Cited by 1,246
“This complexity should be high when consciousness is present and low whenever consciousness is lost in sleep, anesthesia, or coma (10, 12, 13).”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Tononi, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tononi, Giulio
- ORCID
- Tononi, Giulio
- Venue
- BMC Neuroscience
- Published
- 2004-11-02
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-42
- ISSN
- 1471-2202 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC543470
- OpenAlex
- W2114900706
- Cited by
- 1,958
- References
- 74
- Citations by year
- 2026: 242 · 2025: 230 · 2024: 131 · 2023: 114 · 2022: 95 · 2021: 99 · 2020: 110 · 2019: 97 · 2018: 94 · 2017: 119 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 80 · 2014: 87 · 2013: 85 · 2012: 64
- FWCI
- 91.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/ (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/ (vor)
- Locations
- BMC Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Functional Brain Connectivity Studies
- Keywords
- information integration theory, consciousness, integrated information, phi, subjective experience, unity of consciousness, effective information, thalamocortical system, dreamless sleep, generalized seizures, neural correlates of consciousness
- MeSH terms
- Afferent Pathways, Brain, Consciousness, Humans, Information Theory, Motor Activity, Neurons, Thalamus, Systems Integration
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