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Cited by 341Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhenomenology and Existential PhilosophyMental Health and Psychiatry

Phenomenal States

Loar, Brian·1990·Philosophical Perspectives
DOI 10.2307/2214188
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Crossref · 10.2307/2214188

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  • 'Pain' is a direct recognitional term; we do not apply the term, at least in our own case, on the basis of any evidence, sensory, behavioral, or physical, distinct from the experience itself.

    “'Pain' is, as Loar (1990) calls it, a direct recognitional term; we do not apply the term, at least in our own case,31 on the basis of any evidence, sensory, behavioral, or physical, distinct from what the term picks out, that is, distinct from the experience itself.”

    From Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem (1999) · cites this paper as Loar 1990

  • 'Pain' refers to pain directly, or rather, via an essential feature of it, say, painfulness.

    “'Pain' refers to pain directly, or rather, via an essential feature of it, say, painfulness.”

    From Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem (1999) · cites this paper as Loar 1990

  • If conscious subjects are causally efficacious, they must instantiate some non-phenomenal categorical nature that is involved in grounding the subject's causal powers.

    “Therefore, if conscious subjects are causally efficacious, they must instantiate some non-phenomenal categorical nature that is involved in grounding the subject's causal powers.”

    From Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism and the Grounding Relation (2019) · cites this paper as [19]

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Authors
Loar, B.
Corresponding author
Loar, Brian
Venue
Philosophical Perspectives
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1990
Volume
4
Pages
81
ISSN
1520-8583 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/2214188
OpenAlex
W3157348109
Cited by
341
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 39 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 9
FWCI
0.49
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Philosophical Perspectives (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
phenomenal states, phenomenal consciousness, qualia, philosophy of mind

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