The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The relative influence of advice from human experts and statistical methods on forecast adjustments
Open accessAbstract
Decision makers and forecasters often receive advice from different sources including human experts and statistical methods. This research examines, in the context of stock price forecasting, how the apparent source of the advice affects the attention that is paid to it when the mode of delivery of the advice is identical for both sources. In Study 1, two groups of participants were given the same advised point and interval forecasts. One group was told that these were the advice of a human expert and the other that they were generated by a statistical forecasting method. The participants were then asked to adjust forecasts they had previously made in light of this advice. While in both cases the advice led to improved point forecast accuracy and better calibration of the prediction intervals, the advice which apparently emanated from a statistical method was discounted much more severely. In Study 2, participants were provided with advice from two sources. When the participants were told that both sources were either human experts or both were statistical methods, the apparent statistical‐based advice had the same influence on the adjusted estimates as the advice that appeared to come from a human expert. However when the apparent sources of advice were different, much greater attention was paid to the advice that apparently came from a human expert. Theories of advice utilization are used to identify why the advice of a human expert is likely to be preferred to advice from a statistical method. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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“more strongly weigh human input than algorithmic input (Önkal, Goodwin, Thomson, Gönül, & Pollock, 2009; Promberger & Baron, 2006)”
From Algorithm aversion: People erroneously avoid algorithms after seeing them err. (2015) · cites this paper as Önkal, Goodwin, Thomson, Gönül, & Pollock, 2009
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Cited by
Algorithm aversion: People erroneously avoid algorithms after seeing them err.
Dietvorst, B. J., Simmons, J. P., & Massey, C. (2015) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000033 · Cited by 3,232
Algorithm appreciation: People prefer algorithmic to human judgment
Logg, J. M., Minson, J. A., & Moore, D. A. (2019) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.12.005 · Cited by 2,061
Resistance to Medical Artificial Intelligence
Longoni, C., Bonezzi, A., & Morewedge, C. K. (2019) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1093/jcr/ucz013 · Cited by 2,015
Task-Dependent Algorithm Aversion
Castelo, N., Bos, M. W., Bos, M. W., Lehmann, D. R., & Lehmann, D. R. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-88067-4_21 · Cited by 1,441
Forecasting: theory and practice
Petropoulos, F., Apiletti, D., Assimakopoulos, V., Babai, M. Z., Barrow, D. K., Ben Taieb, S., Bergmeir, C., Bessa, R. J., Bijak, J., Boylan, J. E., et al. (2022) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2021.11.001 · Cited by 921
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Metadata
- Authors
- Önkal, D., Goodwin, P., Thomson, M., Gönül, S., & Pollock, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-02-09
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 390-409
- ISSN
- 0894-3257 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0771
- OpenAlex
- W2158570360
- Cited by
- 341
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 6.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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