The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations
Abstract
A combination of calculated, normative, and social motivations as well as awareness of rules and capacity to comply are thought to foster compliance with regulations. Hypotheses about these factors were tested with data concerning Danish farmers' compliance with agro‐environmental regulations. Three key findings emerge: that farmers' awareness of rules plays a critical role; that normative and social motivations are as influential as calculated motivations in enhancing compliance; and that inspectors' enforcement style affects compliance differently from that posited in much of the literature. It was also found that formalism in inspection can be helpful to a point, while coercion by inspectors can backfire. Taken together, these findings counter arguments concerning the harm of legalism and the benefits of flexible enforcement. This study contributes to the understanding of factors that shape compliance with social and environmental regulations. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
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Citations
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Winter, S. C., & May, P. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001-09
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 675-698
- ISSN
- 0276-8739 (ISSN-L)
- 1520-6688
- OpenAlex
- W2136825344
- Cited by
- 575
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 15.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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