Cited by 13Policing Practices and PerceptionsPublic Policy and Administration ResearchCriminal Justice and Penology

Police reform from the top down: experimental evidence on police executive support for civilian oversight

Open access
Adams, Ian T., McCrain, Joshua, Schiff, Daniel S., Schiff, Kaylyn Jackson, Mourtgos, Scott M.·2025·Journal of Policy Analysis and Management

Abstract

The accountability of police to the public is imperative for a functioning democracy. The opinions of police executives—pivotal actors for implementing oversight policies—are an understudied, critical component of successful reform efforts. We use a pre‐registered survey experiment administered to all U.S. municipal police chiefs and county sheriffs to assess whether police executives’ attitudes towards civilian oversight are responsive to 1) state‐level public opinion (drawing on an original n = 16,840 survey) and 2) prior adoption of civilian review boards in large agencies. Results from over 1,300 police executives reveal that law enforcement leaders are responsive to elite peer adoption but much less to public opinion, despite overwhelming public support. Compared to appointed municipal police chiefs, elected sheriffs are less likely to support any civilian oversight. Our findings hold implications for reformers: we find that existing civilian oversight regimes are largely popular, and that it is possible to move police executive opinion towards support for civilian oversight.

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Crossref · 10.1002/pam.22620

Cites

55 of 55 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Large majorities of the US public favor both moderate (68%) and robust (60%) civilian review board structures, and favor CRBs in every US state.

    “large majorities favor both moderate (68%) and robust (60%) CRB structures, and favor CRBs in every US state (5).”

    From Does civilian oversight impact police legitimacy? (2025) · cites this paper as [5]

  • Police executives have long resisted ceding disciplinary authority to outsiders.

    “police executives have long resisted ceding disciplinary authority to outsiders (5, 8)”

    From Does civilian oversight impact police legitimacy? (2025) · cites this paper as [5]

  • The asymmetry helps explain why police leaders, wary of these downside risks, often resist fully embracing civilian oversight.

    “This asymmetry helps explain why police leaders, wary of these downside risks, often resist fully embracing civilian oversight (5, 12).”

    From Does civilian oversight impact police legitimacy? (2025) · cites this paper as [5]

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Authors
Adams, I. T., McCrain, J., Schiff, D. S., Schiff, K. J., & Mourtgos, S. M.
Affiliations
  • University of South Carolina (US)
  • University of Utah (US)
  • Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
Corresponding author
Adams, Ian T.
Venue
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2024-07-02
Volume
44
Issue
2
Pages
403-427
ISSN
  • 0276-8739 (ISSN-L)
  • 1520-6688
OpenAlex
W4400252745
Cited by
13
References
55
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 1
FWCI
20.77
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Policing Practices and Perceptions
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
  • Social Sciences › Law › Criminal Justice and Penology
Keywords
police reform, citizen oversight, police accountability, police executives, Chief of Police, sheriffs, public opinion, peer effects, top-down reform

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