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Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Open accessAbstract
This paper investigates cooperative play in prisoner's dilemma games by designing an experiment to evaluate the ability of two leading theories of observed cooperation: reputation building and altruism. We analyze both one-shot and finitely repeated games to gauge the importance of these theories. We conclude that neither altruism nor reputation building alone can explain our observations. The reputation model is inconsistent with play in both one-shots and finitely repeated games while the model with altruism is unable to explain observed play in the finitely repeated games.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C92.
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Cites
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
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Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. W.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-02
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 187-218
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1516464945
- Cited by
- 396
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 15.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. W. (1996). Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games. Games and Economic Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0013
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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