Cited by 350Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationSocial Power and Status Dynamics

Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment

Seinen, Ingrid, Schram, Arthur·2006·European Economic Review

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.005

Cites

44 of 44 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • If players know that their own score is passed on, they are much more likely to donate than otherwise.

    “Conversely, if players know that their own score is passed on, they are much more likely to donate than otherwise 59,60 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [60]

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

5 of the 49 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Seinen, I., & Schram, A.
Affiliations
University of Amsterdam (NL)
Corresponding author
Schram, Arthur
Venue
European Economic Review
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2006-04
Volume
50
Issue
3
Pages
581-602
ISSN
0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2008783805
Cited by
350
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 24 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 22 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 26 · 2012: 28
FWCI
18.41
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
Keywords
indirect reciprocity, group norms, social status, costly helping, reputation, cooperation, random pairing, third-party punishment, evolution of cooperation

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review