Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Open accessAbstract
We compare a partners condition , where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game, to a strangers condition , where subjects play this game in changing group formations. From the first period onward, subjects in the partners condition contribute significantly more to the public good than subjects in the strangers condition. Strangers' contributions show continual decay, while partners' contributions fluctuate on a high level prior to decreasing in the final periods. We interpret subjects' behaviour in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both future‐oriented and reactive behaviour. JEL classifications: C 91; C 92; H 41
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Most people behave like conditional cooperators, individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so.
“Moreover, it has also been observed that, in repeated public goods games, most people behave like conditional cooperators—individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so—and only a few individuals tend to be altruists (i.e., unconditional cooperators) or free-riders16,17,27,75,76.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [27]
Section IV and the Conclusion interpret typical behavior in the authors’ repeated public-goods experiment as conditional cooperation, including reactions to others’ previous contributions. They do not define it as cooperation triggered when a critical number of others cooperate; the mechanism described is a response to average contributions and anticipated future interaction. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.87)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn repeated public goods games, only a few individuals tend to be altruists or free-riders.
“Moreover, it has also been observed that, in repeated public goods games, most people behave like conditional cooperators—individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so—and only a few individuals tend to be altruists (i.e., unconditional cooperators) or free-riders16,17,27,75,76.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [27]
In Further results (page unavailable), the paper reports only one strong cooperator and relatively few subjects who contributed nothing in every period. But it also classifies 33% of partners and 55% of strangers as weak or strong free riders, so the unqualified claim that only a few individuals are free riders overstates its findings. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredBehavioural experiments on the PGG have shown that most people contribute to the common pool, and only a few individuals free ride.
“However, contrary to the predictions made by standard game theory, behavioural experiments on the PGG have shown that most people contribute to the common pool, and only a few individuals free ride16,16,26,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [27]
The introduction reports substantial voluntary contributions in public-goods experiments, and Further results finds that few subjects contributed nothing in every period. But the broader claim that only a few free ride overlooks subjects who contributed nothing in more than half the periods: 33% in the partners condition and 55% in the strangers condition (Further results; page not provided). (LLM, conf=0.87)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredA few individuals who free ride in the first round trigger further free riding in subsequent rounds.
“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [27]
The Conclusion says first-period group contributions appear decisive for contributions in later periods. Section IV describes participants reducing their contributions in response to lower contributions by others. But the paper does not establish that a few first-round free riders trigger the overall decline; it also attributes the late-round decrease to end-game behavior. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredWhen the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds.
“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [27]
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- Authors
- Keser, C., & Van Winden, F.
- Affiliations
- Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (DE)
- ORCID
- Keser, Claudia
- Venue
- The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-03
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23-39
- ISSN
- 0347-0520 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9442
- OpenAlex
- W2100136304
- Cited by
- 800
- References
- 37
- Citations by year
- 2026: 13 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 29 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 46 · 2017: 34 · 2016: 45 · 2015: 42 · 2014: 34 · 2013: 38 · 2012: 46
- FWCI
- 73.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.tinbergen.nl
- Locations
- Scandinavian Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Policies and Impacts
- Keywords
- public goods, voluntary contributions, conditional cooperation, repeated games, group formation, future orientation, reactive behavior
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