The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Algorithmic Mechanism Design
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationLinear programming without the matrix
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Cited by
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Algorithms, games, and the internet
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Metadata
- Authors
- Nisan, N., & Ronen, A.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-04
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 166-196
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2012634103
- Cited by
- 1,331
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 158.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.