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Cited by 207

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest

Blume, Andreas, DeJong, Douglas V., Kim, Yong-Gwan, Sprinkle, Geoffrey B. · 2001 · Games and Economic Behavior

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 19

  1. Austen-Smith, 1990, Information Transmission in Debate, Amer. J. Polit. Sci., 34, 124, 10.2307/2111513 · DOI · Paper page
  2. Berg, 1986, Controlling Preferences for Lotteries on Units of Experimental Exchange, Quart. J. Econ., 101, 281, 10.2307/1891116 · DOI · Paper page
  3. Blume, 1996, Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games, Games Econ. Behav., 13, 2, 10.1006/game.1996.0022 · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0022
  4. Blume, 1998, Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games, Am. Econ. Rev., 88, 1323
  5. Blume, 1993, Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication, Games Econ. Behav., 5, 547, 10.1006/game.1993.1031 · doi:10.1006/game.1993.1031
  6. Cho, 1987, Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria, Quart. J. Econ., 102, 179, 10.2307/1885060 · DOI · Paper page
  7. Cooper, 1989, Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game, Rand J. Econ., 20, 568, 10.2307/2555734 · DOI · Paper page
  8. Dickhaut, 1995, An Experimental Study of Strategic Information Transmission, Econ. Theory, 6, 389, 10.1007/BF01211783 · DOI · Paper page
  9. Farrell, 1993, Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games, Games Econ. Behav., 5, 514, 10.1006/game.1993.1029 · DOI · Paper page
  10. Forsythe, 1999, Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence, J. Finan. Stud., 12, 481, 10.1093/rfs/12.3.481 · doi:10.1093/rfs/12.3.481
  11. Grossman, 1981, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality, J. Law Econ., 24, 461, 10.1086/466995 · DOI · Paper page
  12. Kohlberg, 1986, On the Strategic Stability of Equilibrium, Econometrica, 50, 1003, 10.2307/1912320 · DOI · Paper page
  13. Matthews, 1991, Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria, J. Econ. Theory, 55, 247, 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90040-B · DOI
  14. Melumad, 1991, Communication in Settings with No Transfers, Rand J. Econ., 22, 173, 10.2307/2601016 · DOI · Paper page
  15. Newman, 1993, Disclosure Policies with Multiple Users, J. Account. Res., 31, 92, 10.2307/2491043 · DOI · Paper page
  16. Rabin, 1990, Communication Between Rational Agents, J. Econ. Theory, 51, 144, 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90055-O · DOI · Paper page
  17. Rabin, 1996, Deviations, Dynamics and Equilibrium Refinements, J. Econ. Theory, 68, 1, 10.1006/jeth.1996.0001 · DOI
  18. Roth, 1979, Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Bargaining, Psych. Rev., 86, 574, 10.1037/0033-295X.86.6.574 · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.86.6.574 · Paper page
  19. Stein, 1989, Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements, Amer. Econ. Rev., 79, 32

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y.-G., & Sprinkle, G. B.
Venue
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2001-10
Volume
37
Issue
1
Pages
79-120
ISSN
0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1991577073
Cited by
207
References
2
FWCI
11.63
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1006/game.2000.0830
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Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y.-G., & Sprinkle, G. B. (2001). Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest. Games and Economic Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0830

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.