The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Markov Perfect Equilibrium
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Citations
Cites
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Lectu re Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Beckmann, M. J., & Künzi, H. P. (1975) · Cited by 2,414
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Self-citationMarkov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work
Ericson, R., & Pakes, A. (1995) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297841 · Cited by 2,325
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in GamesPreprint
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2,104
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Recursive Macroeconomic Theory
Ljungqvist, L., & Sargent, T. J. (2000) · Cited by 1,605
Aumann, R. J. (1976) · The Annals of Statistics · doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654 · Cited by 1,573
Bargaining under Incomplete Information
Chatterjee, K., & Samuelson, W. (1983) · Operations Research · doi:10.1287/opre.31.5.835 · Cited by 618
The great fish war: an example using a dynamic Cournot-Nash solution
Levhari, D., & Mirman, L. J. (2020) · Fisheries Economics · doi:10.4324/9780429288500-6 · Cited by 525
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- Ericson, 1992, An Alternative Theory of Firm and Industry Dynamics, Cowles Foundation DP 1041
- Fort, 1950, Essential and non-essential fixed points, Am. J. Math., 72, 315, 10.2307/2372035 · doi:10.2307/2372035
- Karni, 1983, On state dependent preferences and subjective probabilities, Econometrica, 51, 1021, 10.2307/1912049 · doi:10.2307/1912049
- Selten, 1965, Spieltheorethische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit, Z. Ges. Staats., 12, 301
- Wilson, 1971, Computing equilibria of n-person games, SIAM J. Appl. Math., 21, 80, 10.1137/0121011 · doi:10.1137/0121011
- Wu, 1962, Essential equilibrium points of n-person non-cooperative games, Sci. Sinica, 11, 1307
Cited by
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
EGOROV, G., GURIEV, S., & SONIN, K. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990219 · Cited by 546
Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets
Lee, R. S. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.2960 · Cited by 446
Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games
Koller, D., & Milch, B. (2003) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00544-4 · Cited by 409
Great Expectations and the End of the Depression
Eggertsson, G. B. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.4.1476 · Cited by 386
Informed traders and limit order markets
Goettler, R. L., Parlour, C. A., & Rajan, U. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.08.002 · Cited by 316
Metadata
- Authors
- Maskin, E., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-10
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 191-219
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1481965470
- Cited by
- 808
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 31.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Markov Perfect Equilibrium. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1006/jeth.2000.2785
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- Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2001). Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2785
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.