Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
Abstract
Every dictator dislikes free media. Yet, many nondemocratic countries have partially free or almost free media. In this article, we develop a theory of media freedom in dictatorships and provide systematic statistical evidence in support of this theory. In our model, free media allow a dictator to provide incentives to bureaucrats and therefore to improve the quality of government. The importance of this benefit varies with the natural resource endowment. In resource-rich countries, bureaucratic incentives are less important for the dictator; hence, media freedom is less likely to emerge. Using panel data, we show that controlling for country fixed effects, media are less free in oil-rich economies, with the effect especially pronounced in nondemocratic regimes. These results are robust to model specification and the inclusion of various controls, including the level of economic development, democracy, country size, size of government, and others.
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Allowing criticism, as the Chinese leadership does, may legitimize the state and help the regime maintain power.
“By extension, this suggests that allowing criticism, as we found the Chinese leadership does, may legitimize the state and help the regime maintain power.”
From How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression (2013) · cites this paper as Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2009)
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Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 10× · see citing works
“Alastair Smith (2008) tests empirical implications from the selectorate model of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), which relate the survival of dictatorial regimes to the presence of natural resources. The existing evidence does suggest that the trade-off between incentives for bureaucracy and the need to “divide-and-r…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialInformation Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Edmond, C. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt020 · Cited by 433 · see citing works
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- Authors
- EGOROV, G., GURIEV, S., & SONIN, K.
- Affiliations
- Northwestern University (US)
- New Economic School (RU)
- Corresponding author
- EGOROV, GEORGY
- GURIEV, SERGEI
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2009-11
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 645-668
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2109307809
- Cited by
- 546
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 25 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 46 · 2022: 46 · 2021: 47 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 41 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 30 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 40 · 2014: 30 · 2013: 28 · 2012: 14
- FWCI
- 44.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- SPIRE (Sciences Po) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
- Keywords
- freedom of the press, dictatorship, natural resource endowment, oil wealth, bureaucratic incentives, government quality, non-democratic regimes, resource curse
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