The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bargaining under Incomplete Information
Abstract
This paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty. Under the bargaining rule proposed, the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price. The Nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent's reservation price. Issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases. Finally, we discuss the appropriateness of the Nash solution concept.
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Cites
Nash, J. F. (1950) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907266 · Cited by 7,840
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 7,672
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0 · Cited by 2,504
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0270 · Cited by 2,127
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Aumann, R. J. (1976) · The Annals of Statistics · doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654 · Cited by 1,573
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
Harsanyi, J. C. (1968) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.5.320 · Cited by 988
Axiomatic Models of Bargaining
Roth, A. E. (1979) · Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-51570-5 · Cited by 801
A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1972) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.18.5.80 · Cited by 580
A Multistage Model of Bargaining
Sobel, J., & Takahashi, I. (1983) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297673 · Cited by 316
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Two-sided markets: A progress report
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x · Cited by 2,994
Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness
Hall, R. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828482 · Cited by 1,439
Business Models for Internet-Based E-Commerce: An Anatomy
Mahadevan, B. (2000) · California Management Review · doi:10.2307/41166053 · Cited by 949
The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions
Bulow, J., & Roberts, J. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261643 · Cited by 591
MARTIN, P., MAYER, T., & THOENIG, M. (2008) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00492.x · Cited by 584
Metadata
- Authors
- Chatterjee, K., & Samuelson, W.
- Venue
- Operations Research
- Published
- 1983-10
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 835-851
- ISSN
- 0030-364X (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5463
- OpenAlex
- W2098190214
- Cited by
- 618
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 5.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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