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Cited by 618

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Bargaining under Incomplete Information

Chatterjee, Kalyan, Samuelson, William·1983·Operations Research

Abstract

This paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty. Under the bargaining rule proposed, the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price. The Nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent's reservation price. Issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases. Finally, we discuss the appropriateness of the Nash solution concept.

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Metadata

Authors
Chatterjee, K., & Samuelson, W.
Venue
Operations Research
Published
1983-10
Volume
31
Issue
5
Pages
835-851
ISSN
  • 0030-364X (ISSN-L)
  • 1526-5463
OpenAlex
W2098190214
Cited by
618
References
12
FWCI
5.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Bargaining under Incomplete Information. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/opre.31.5.835
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Chatterjee, K., & Samuelson, W. (1983). Bargaining under Incomplete Information. Operations Research. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.31.5.835

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.