Attestation Mechanisms for Trusted Execution Environments Demystified
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Abstract
Attestation is a fundamental building block to establish trust over software systems. When used in conjunction with trusted execution environments, it guarantees the genuineness of the code executed against powerful attackers and threats, paving the way for adoption in several sensitive application domains. This paper reviews remote attestation principles and explains how the modern and industrially well-established trusted execution environments Intel SGX, Arm TrustZone and AMD SEV, as well as emerging RISC-V solutions, leverage these mechanisms.
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“A third party, besides the user and host, could perform the attestation [26,29].”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [29]
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In the citing paper
“Remote attestation [25,29] enables the user (a.k.a.confidential workload owner) to ascertain the level of trust/integrity of a remote TEE prior to transmitting sensitive data/code.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [29]
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In the citing paper
“It enables the owner to authenticate the hardware, validate the trusted state of a distant TEE, and determine whether the intended program is operating securely within the TEE.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [29]
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Citations
Cites
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Patel, P. H., Seth, V., Wagle, B., Neupane, R. L., Pandey, A., Subhash, S., Srinivas, S., & Calyam, P. P. (2026) · IEEE International Symposium on Parallel & Distributed Processing, Workshops and Phd Forum · doi:10.1109/ipdpsw71298.2026.00127
“Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. teaches students how to build and manage end-to-end AI-driven scientific workflows using modern Cloud DevOps tooling.”
InfluentialDP-Shapley: Deterministic, Gas-Bounded Shapley Settlement for on-Chain Federated Learning
Saeed, H., Duchesne, M., & Zhang, K. (2026) · IEEE International Conference on Decentralized Applications and Infrastructures (DAPPS) · doi:10.1109/dapps69803.2026.00017
“A key complementary mechanism is remote attestation, which allows a remote party to verify that it is interacting with a genuine enclave running an expected software configuration before releasing sensitive inputs [8].”
HXAI: Hierarchical Privacy-Preserving Explainable AI in Distributed Energy SystemsPreprint
Sengupta, P., Maharjan, S., Eliassen, F., & Zhang, Y. (2026) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2610.02504
“We assume the availability of industry-standard trusted execution environments (TEEs) [12], [31], [36], [37] that provide confidentiality of household data, integrity of executed code, and controlled release of differentially private outputs. g) Zonal Aggregator .”
Confidential Computing with Trusted Execution Environments: Architectures, Attacks and Applications
John, W. M. (2026) · International Journal of Information Technology Research Studies (IJITRS) · doi:10.63090/ijitrs/3139.3209.0036
LEASH: Zero-Trust Containment for AI Agent Swarms
Deochake, S. (2026) · ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (AISec) · doi:10.1145/3847352.3848103
Metadata
- Authors
- Ménétrey, J., Göttel, C., Khurshid, A., Pasin, M., Felber, P., Schiavoni, V., & Raza, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Neuchâtel (CH)
- RISE Research Institutes of Sweden (SE)
- Corresponding author
- Ménétrey, Jämes
- ORCID
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Published
- 2022
- Volume
- LNCS-13272
- Pages
- 95-113
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W4282034673
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 2
- FWCI
- 4.98
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Licence
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
- Locations
- Lecture notes in computer science (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Keywords
- remote attestation, trusted execution environments, Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone, AMD SEV, RISC-V, hardware security, trusted computing
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.