Attestation Mechanisms for Trusted Execution Environments Demystified
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Attestation is a fundamental building block to establish trust over software systems. When used in conjunction with trusted execution environments, it guarantees the genuineness of the code executed against powerful attackers and threats, paving the way for adoption in several sensitive application domains. This paper reviews remote attestation principles and explains how the modern and industrially well-established trusted execution environments Intel SGX, Arm TrustZone and AMD SEV, as well as emerging RISC-V solutions, leverage these mechanisms.
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“A third party, besides the user and host, could perform the attestation [26,29].”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [29]
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In the citing paper
“Remote attestation [25,29] enables the user (a.k.a.confidential workload owner) to ascertain the level of trust/integrity of a remote TEE prior to transmitting sensitive data/code.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [29]
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In the citing paper
“It enables the owner to authenticate the hardware, validate the trusted state of a distant TEE, and determine whether the intended program is operating securely within the TEE.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [29]
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Citations
Cites
Demystifying Arm TrustZone: A Comprehensive Survey
Pinto, S., & Santos, N. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3291047 · Cited by 505
SIGMA: The ‘SIGn-and-MAc’ Approach to Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE Protocols
Krawczyk, H. (2003) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_24 · Cited by 382
Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments
Lee, D., Kohlbrenner, D., Shinde, S., Asanović, K., & Song, D. (2020) · Proceedings of the Fifteenth European Conference on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3342195.3387532 · Cited by 379 · cited 2×
“Keystone [33] is a modular framework that provides the building blocks to create trusted execution environments, rather than providing an all-in-one so-lution that is inflexible and is another fixed design point.”
BackgroundPrinciples of remote attestation
Coker, G., Guttman, J., Loscocco, P., Herzog, A., Millen, J., O’Hanlon, B., Ramsdell, J., Segall, A., Sheehy, J., & Sniffen, B. (2011) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-011-0124-7 · Cited by 241 · cited 1×
“Remote attestation allows to establish trust between different devices and provides cryptographic proofs that the executing software is genuine and untampered [18].”
BackgroundPioneer: verifying code integrity and enforcing untampered code execution on legacy systems
Seshadri, A., Luk, M., Shi, E., Perrig, A., van Doorn, L., & Khosla, P. (2005) · Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles · doi:10.1145/1095810.1095812 · Cited by 228
Hardware-Based Trusted Computing Architectures for Isolation and Attestation
Maene, P., Götzfried, J., de Clercq, R., Müller, T., Freiling, F., & Verbauwhede, I. M. R. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Computers · doi:10.1109/tc.2017.2647955 · Cited by 166 · cited 1×
“We complement previous work [36, 37] with an updated analysis of TEEs (e.”
MethodEnhanced privacy id: a direct anonymous attestation scheme with enhanced revocation capabilities
Brickell, E., & Li, J. (2007) · Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society · doi:10.1145/1314333.1314337 · Cited by 152 · cited 1×
“Finally, the verifier examines the signature of the evidence (Fig.3-(cid:200) ) using the Intel attestation service (IAS) [5, 14].”
MethodA Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves
Subramanyan, P., Sinha, R., Lebedev, I., Devadas, S., & Seshia, S. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134098 · Cited by 119 · cited 1×
“While the quoting enclave, the microcode and XuCode are closed-source, recent work analysed the TEE and its attestation mechanism formally [50, 45].”
BackgroundSecTEE: A Software-based Approach to Secure Enclave Architecture Using TEE
Zhao, S., Zhang, Q., Qin, Y., Feng, W., & Feng, D. (2019) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3319535.3363205 · Cited by 103 · cited 1×
“Nevertheless, researchers proposed several variants of one-way remote attestation protocols for Arm TrustZone [56, 34], as well as mutual remote attestation [2, 48], thus extending the built-in capabilities of the architecture for attestation.”
BackgroundTIMBER-V: Tag-Isolated Memory Bringing Fine-grained Enclaves to RISC-V
Weiser, S., Werner, M., Brasser, F., Malenko, M., Mangard, S., & Sadeghi, A. (2019) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2019.23068 · Cited by 99 · cited 2×
“TIMBER-V [54] achieved the isolation of execution on small embedded processors thanks to hardware-assisted memory tagging.”
BackgroundAdAttester: Secure Online Mobile Advertisement Attestation Using TrustZone
Li, W., Li, H., Chen, H., & Xia, Y. (2015) · Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services · doi:10.1145/2742647.2742676 · Cited by 91
Enhanced Privacy ID: A Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme with Enhanced Revocation Capabilities
Brickell, E., & Li, J. (2012) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2011.63 · Cited by 91
OPERA: Open Remote Attestation for Intel's Secure Enclaves
Chen, G., Zhang, Y., & Lai, T. (2019) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3319535.3354220 · Cited by 86 · cited 1×
“Similarly, OPERA [17] proposes a decentralised attestation scheme, unchaining the attesters from the IAS while conducting attestation.”
Background{VRASED}: A Verified Hardware/Software Co-Design for Remote Attestation
Nunes, I. D. O., Eldefrawy, K., Rattanavipanon, N., Steiner, M., & Tsudik, G. (2019) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 84
fTPM: A Software-Only Implementation of a {TPM} Chip
Raj, H., Saroiu, S., Wolman, A., Aigner, R., Cox, J., ENGLAND, P. J., Fenner, C., Kinshumann, K., Loeser, J., Mattoon, D., et al. (2016) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 82
Twine: An Embedded Trusted Runtime for WebAssembly
Ménétrey, J., Pasin, M., Felber, P. A., & Schiavoni, V. (2021) · IEEE International Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE) · doi:10.1109/icde51399.2021.00025 · Cited by 79
Self-citationDIAT: Data Integrity Attestation for Resilient Collaboration of Autonomous Systems
Abera, T., Bahmani, R., Brasser, F., Ibrahim, A., Sadeghi, A., & Schunter, M. (2019) · Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2019.23420 · Cited by 75
SGX-Aware Container Orchestration for Heterogeneous Clusters
Vaucher, S., Pires, R. P., Felber, P. A., Pasin, M., Schiavoni, V., & Fetzer, C. W. (2018) · IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS) · doi:10.1109/icdcs.2018.00076 · Cited by 72
Self-citationOn the TOCTOU Problem in Remote Attestation
Nunes, I. D. O., Jakkamsetti, S., Rattanavipanon, N., & Tsudik, G. (2021) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3460120.3484532 · Cited by 69 · cited 1×
“Hybrid solutions combine hardware devices and software implementations [21], in an attempt to leverage advantages from both sides.”
BackgroundHECTOR-V: A Heterogeneous CPU Architecture for a Secure RISC-V Execution Environment
Nasahl, P., Schilling, R., Werner, M., & Mangard, S. (2021) · ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS) · doi:10.1145/3433210.3453112 · Cited by 62 · cited 1×
“HECTOR-V [39] is a design for developing hardened TEEs with a reduced TCB.”
BackgroundConfidential computing for OpenPOWER
Hunt, G. D. H., Pai, R., Le, M. V., Jamjoom, H. T., Bhattiprolu, S., Boivie, R., Dufour, L., Frey, B. J., Kapur, M., Goldman, K., et al. (2021) · European Conference on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3447786.3456243 · Cited by 58 · cited 1×
“Finally, among the many other technologies in the literature, we omitted the TEEs lacking remote attestation mechanisms (e.g., IBM PEF [26]) as well as the TEEs not supported on currently available CPUs (e.g., Intel TDX [27], Realm [11] from Arm CCA [8]).”
BackgroundSecurity Analysis of Encrypted Virtual Machines
Hetzelt, F., & Buhren, R. (2017) · ACM SIGPLAN/SIGOPS International Conference on Virtual Execution Environments (VEE) · doi:10.1145/3050748.3050763 · Cited by 51 · cited 1×
“The original version of SEV could leak sensitive information during interrupts from guests to the hypervisor through registers [25].”
BackgroundDemystifying Attestation in Intel Trust Domain Extensions via Formal Verification
Sardar, M. U., Musaev, S., & Fetzer, C. W. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3087421 · Cited by 51 · cited 1×
“In particular, it extends the remote attestation mechanisms of Intel SGX to issue claims and evidence, which has been formally verified by researchers [44].”
BackgroundInsecure Until Proven Updated: Analyzing AMD SEV's Remote Attestation
Buhren, R., Werling, C., & Seifert, J. (2019) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3319535.3354216 · Cited by 50 · cited 1×
“However, the remote attestation protocol was recently proven unsecure [15], exposing the system to rollback attacks and allowing a malicious cloud provider with physical access to SEV machines to easily install malicious firmware and be able to read in clear the (otherwise protected) system.”
BackgroundShepherd, C., Akram, R. N., & Markantonakis, K. (2017) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1145/3098954.3098971 · Cited by 49 · cited 2×
“Nevertheless, researchers proposed several variants of one-way remote attestation protocols for Arm TrustZone [56, 34], as well as mutual remote attestation [2, 48], thus extending the built-in capabilities of the architecture for attestation.”
BackgroundMethodInvited Paper: Secure Boot and Remote Attestation in the Sanctum Processor
Lebedev, I., Hogan, K., & Devadas, S. (2018) · IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) · doi:10.1109/csf.2018.00011 · Cited by 42
Remote Attestation with Domain-Based Integrity Model and Policy Analysis
Xu, W., Zhang, X., Hu, H., Ahn, G., & Seifert, J. (2011) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2011.61 · Cited by 36 · cited 3×
“Typically, a root of trust can be implemented using tamper-resistant hardware, such as a trusted platform module (TPM) [55], a physical unclonable function (PUF) that prevents impersonations by using unique hardware marks produced at manufacture [30], or a hardware secret fused in a die (e.”
BackgroundTowards Formalization of Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)-based Remote Attestation in Intel SGX
Sardar, M. U., Quoc, D. L., & Fetzer, C. W. (2020) · Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD) · doi:10.1109/dsd51259.2020.00099 · Cited by 32 · cited 1×
“While the quoting enclave, the microcode and XuCode are closed-source, recent work analysed the TEE and its attestation mechanism formally [50, 45].”
BackgroundLIRA-V: Lightweight Remote Attestation for Constrained RISC-V Devices
Shepherd, C., Markantonakis, K., & Jaloyan, G.-A. (2021) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw53761.2021.00036 · Cited by 31
MAGE: Mutual Attestation for a Group of Enclaves without Trusted Third PartiesPreprint
Chen, G., & Zhang, Y. (2020) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2008.09501 · Cited by 28 · cited 2×
“MAGE [16] further extended the remote attestation scheme of Intel SGX by offering mutual attestation for a group of enclaves without trusted third parties.”
BackgroundDesign and Implementation of Hardware-Based Remote Attestation for a Secure Internet of Things
Ahn, J.-H., Lee, I.-G., & Kim, M. (2020) · Wireless Personal Communications · doi:10.1007/s11277-020-07364-5 · Cited by 26 · cited 1×
“Nevertheless, researchers proposed several variants of one-way remote attestation protocols for Arm TrustZone [56, 34], as well as mutual remote attestation [2, 48], thus extending the built-in capabilities of the architecture for attestation.”
BackgroundDeveloping Secure Services for IoT with OP-TEE: A First Look at Performance and Usability
Göttel, C., Felber, P. A., & Schiavoni, V. (2019) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-22496-7_11 · Cited by 23
Self-citationPUFatt: Embedded platform attestation based on novel processor-based PUFs
Kong, J., Koushanfar, F., Pendyala, P. K., Sadeghi, A., & Wachsmann, C. (2014) · ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC) · doi:10.1109/dac.2014.6881436 · Cited by 22
Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture
Richardson, M., Birkholz, H., Pan, W., Smith, N., & Thaler, D. (2020) · Cited by 16
Propagating trusted execution through mutual attestation
Turan, F., & Verbauwhede, I. M. R. (2019) · Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution (SysTEX) · doi:10.1145/3342559.3365334 · Cited by 6 · cited 1×
“We also report how mutual attestation has also been studied in the context of TEEs [51], as we further detail in Section 3.”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 1
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Cited by
A Holistic Approach for Trustworthy Distributed Systems with WebAssembly and TEEsPreprint
Ménétrey, J., Grüter, A., Yuhala, P., Oeftiger, J., Felber, P. A., Pasin, M., & Schiavoni, V. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.05863 · Cited by 66
Self-citationWaTZ: A Trusted WebAssembly Runtime Environment with Remote Attestation for TrustZone
Ménétrey, J., Pasin, M., Felber, P. A., & Schiavoni, V. (2022) · IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS) · doi:10.1109/icdcs54860.2022.00116 · Cited by 64
“Recent work addresses the remote attestation mechanisms and protocols, including for IoT and edge devices [4], [39]–[44].”
BackgroundSelf-citationSoK: A Systematic Review of TEE Usage for Developing Trusted Applications
Paju, A., Javed, M., Nurmi, J., Savimäki, J., McGillion, B., & Brumley, B. B. (2023) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1145/3600160.3600169 · Cited by 45
“[117] for systemising knowledge of TEE attestation applications.”
BackgroundAdvancing Federated Learning through Verifiable Computations and Homomorphic Encryption
Zhang, B., Lu, G., Qiu, P., Gui, X., & Shi, Y. (2023) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e25111550 · Cited by 36
Atlas: A Framework for ML Lifecycle Provenance & Transparency
Spoczynski, M., Melara, M. S., & Szyller, S. (2025) · IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW) · doi:10.1109/eurospw67616.2025.00058 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Ménétrey, J., Göttel, C., Khurshid, A., Pasin, M., Felber, P., Schiavoni, V., & Raza, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Neuchâtel (CH)
- RISE Research Institutes of Sweden (SE)
- Corresponding author
- Ménétrey, Jämes
- ORCID
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Published
- 2022
- Volume
- LNCS-13272
- Pages
- 95-113
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W4282034673
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 2
- FWCI
- 4.98
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Licence
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
- Locations
- Lecture notes in computer science (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Keywords
- remote attestation, trusted execution environments, Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone, AMD SEV, RISC-V, hardware security, trusted computing
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