The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“This is a mechanism of global “subjective” (here in roughly the sense of “subjective Bayesian”) optimization, which does not always entail “objective” optimality, though it must approximate the latter reliably enough (cf., Lewis, 1980).”
From The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood (2018) · cites this paper as Lewis, 1980
Citations
Cites
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
Quine, W. V. (1969) · doi:10.7312/quin92204 · Cited by 3,593
Jeffrey, R. C. (1965) · Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) · Cited by 1,145
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic
Lewis, D. K. (1968) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024555 · Cited by 1,078
Self-citationThe Two Concepts of Probability: The Problem of Probability
Carnap, R. (1945) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2102817 · Cited by 338
A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation
Railton, P. (1978) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/288797 · Cited by 299
Mellor, D. H. (1971) · Apollo (University of Cambridge) · Cited by 189
APPLICATIONS OF MODEL THEORY TO ALGEBRA, ANALYSIS AND PROBABILITY
Erdélyi, A. (1970) · Bulletin of the London Mathematical Society · doi:10.1112/blms/2.3.367 · Cited by 187
Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity
Skyrms, B. (1977) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025774 · Cited by 99
Jeffrey, R. C. (1970) · Journal of Symbolic Logic · doi:10.2307/2271165 · Cited by 26
Butts, R. E., & Hintikka, J. (1977) · Cited by 9
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Jeffrey, Richard C., ‘Mises Redux’, in Basic Problems in Methodology and Linguistics: Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Part III, ed. by R. Butts and J. Hintikka, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, 1977.
- Lewis, David, Counterfactuals, Blackwell, 1973.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 401–500 of 796
Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief
Raleigh, T., & Vindrola, F. (2020) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqaa047 · Cited by 8
Causation, Projection, Inference, and Agency
Beebee, H. (2015) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198723172.003.0002 · Cited by 8
Briggs, R. (2010) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00345.x · Cited by 9
Change rules for hierarchical beliefs
Walliser, B., & Zwirn, D. (2009) · International Journal of Approximate Reasoning · doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2009.11.005 · Cited by 8
“They correspond to what is often labeled as "chance" in the literature (for instance, Lewis, 1980) and probability2 by Carnap (1945).”
InfluentialA subjectivist’s guide to deterministic chance
Gallow, J. D. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02346-y · Cited by 8
Hájek, A. (2016) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-015-1011-y · Cited by 8
Logic and Probabilistic Update
Demey, L., & Kooi, B. P. (2014) · Outstanding contributions to logic · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-06025-5_13 · Cited by 8
“This principle has been widely discussed in Bayesian epistemology and philosophy of science [29, 32, 38, 40, 41].”
BackgroundDo Chances Receive Equal Treatment Under The Laws? Or: Must Chances Be Probabilities?
Lange, M. (2006) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axl005 · Cited by 8
Probabilistic Causal Structure
Korb, K. B. (1999) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1_20 · Cited by 8
Saunders, S. W. (2000) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392849 · Cited by 8
“In any case Lewis has no place for indeterminateness; his theory of probability is just like the one already stated for the consistent histories approach (Lewis 1983).”
BackgroundReply to Lewis: metaphysics versus epistemology
Papineau, D., & Durà-Vilà, V. (2009) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/ann014 · Cited by 8
(Once again) Lewis on the analysis of modality
Divers, J., & Fletcher, J. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1698-7 · Cited by 7
Gallow, J. D. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12443 · Cited by 7
What is a risk? A formal representation of risk of stroke for people with atrial fibrillation
Barton, A., Jansen, L., Rosier, A., & Éthier, J. (2017) · HAL · Cited by 7
Quantum fractionalism: The Born rule as a consequence of the complex Pythagorean theorem
Mandolesi, A. L. G. (2020) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126725 · Cited by 8
Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances
Isaacs, Y., Hájek, A., & Hawthorne, J. T. (2021) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzab031 · Cited by 7
Berkovitz, J. (2011) · The frontiers collection · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-21329-8_16 · Cited by 7
“It is commonly presupposed, albeit implicitly, that a person’s coherent degrees of belief concerning all the propositions she considers are to be represented by a joint probability distribution, which returns these degrees of belief as marginals; for notable examples, see Lewis’s [29] ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Object…”
BackgroundInfluentialCeteris ParibusLaws andMinutis RectisLaws
Fenton‐Glynn, L. (2016) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12277 · Cited by 7
CAUSAL POWERS: A NEO-ARISTOTELIAN METAPHYSIC
Jacobs, J. D. (2007) · Cited by 7
Credence in the Image of Chance
Caie, M. (2015) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/682963 · Cited by 7
“See, e.g., Lewis ð1979Þ and Kaplan ð1989Þ for this line of thought.”
Gandenberger, G. (2016) · Philosopher's Imprint · Cited by 7
Autonomous Chances and the Conflicts Problem
Meacham, C. J. G. (2014) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.003.0002 · Cited by 7
Calibration for Epistemic Causality
Williamson, J. (2019) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00139-w · Cited by 7
“Chance Calibration is closely related to David Lewis’ Principal Principle (Lewis, 1980): Principal Principle.”
BackgroundInfluentialFusco, M. (2020) · Journal of Philosophical Logic · doi:10.1007/s10992-020-09561-w · Cited by 7
Hawthorne, J. (2011) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-51862-0.50010-1 · Cited by 7
Briggs, R. (2015) · Journal of Philosophical Logic · doi:10.1007/s10992-015-9377-3 · Cited by 8
“Furthermore, this requirement is in place only if the rational agents have no better source of information that trumps the chances; information is admissible iff it is ‘the sort of information whose impact on credence about outcomes comes entirely by way of credence about the chances of those outcomes’ [63, 92].”
BackgroundThe propensity theory: a decision-theoretic restatement
Albert, M. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9139-4 · Cited by 7
“In agreement with the tradition of classical statistics and the v. Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory of decision making under risk (or just EU theory for short), no subjective-probability framework is required, in contrast to Lewis (1980) , where information on propensities constrains the choice of subjectiv…”
Everettian theory as pure wave mechanics plus a no-collapse probability postulate
Tappenden, P. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02467-4 · Cited by 11
“…future observations consists in assigning subjective probabilities to those futures and for a stochastic theory which associates objective probabilities with those futures subjective probabilities are assigned on the basis of what David Lewis has called the Principal Principle (Lewis 1980, p. 266).”
BackgroundInfluentialSTUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF EXPLANATORY POWER
Schupbach, J. N. (2011) · D-Scholarship@Pitt (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 7
Objective evidence and absence: comment on Sober
Strevens, M. (2008) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9312-3 · Cited by 7
“…dictating that in normal circumstances, conditional subjective probabilities should be set equal to corresponding physical probabilities (Lewis 1980). most notably in the form of their convergence results, and yet the convergence results make some rather strong assumptions, which may…”
BackgroundQuantum Measurement and the Paulian IdeaPreprint
Fuchs, C. A., & Schack, R. (2014) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1412.4209 · Cited by 7
“This is a world of “objective indeterminism” indeed, but one with no place for “objective chance” in the sense of David Lewis (1986). From within any part, the future is undetermined.”
BackgroundMaximising expected value under axiological uncertainty : an axiomatic approach
Riedener, S. (2015) · Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) · doi:10.5287/ora-8nbb9jdy6 · Cited by 7
Unterhuber, M., & Schurz, G. (2012) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0159-y · Cited by 6
“The name ‘principal principle’ has been coined by Lewis (1980); he suggested this principle not for statistical probabilities, but for objective single case chances.”
BackgroundProbability in many-worlds theories
Short, A. (2023) · Quantum · doi:10.22331/q-2023-04-06-971 · Cited by 6
A Humean Guide to Spielraum Probabilities
Beisbart, C. (2016) · Journal for General Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s10838-015-9316-6 · Cited by 6
“This objection is not very convincing though because our intuitions can be justified using the Principal Principle (Lewis 1980).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialOn the Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle
Bana, G. (2016) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/687932 · Cited by 6
“Lewis’s (1980) work is titled “ASubjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMeasure Theoretic Analysis of Consistency of the Principal Principle
Rédei, M., & Gyenis, Z. (2016) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/687879 · Cited by 6
La ciencia como un punto de vista: algunos desafíos a la objetividad científica
Gensollen, M., & Jiménez‐Rolland, M. (2018) · Daímon · doi:10.6018/daimon/336151 · Cited by 6
“…cognitivas y las teorías de la confirmación es que, en ambos sentidos, los puntos 13 Algunas sugerencias célebres desde la perspectiva bayesiana son que la credibilidad inicial de hipótesis debería estar restringida por ciertos principios; por ejemplo, Lewis (1980), Maher (1993), Williamson (2017).”
BackgroundAn Argument for the Principle of Indifference and Against the Wide Interval View
Wilcox, J. E. (2019) · Journal for General Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s10838-019-09488-0 · Cited by 6
Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference
Sprenger, J. (2019) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/707554 · Cited by 10
Certainly but not certain: The expression of subjective and objective probability
Yatsushiro, K., Trinh, T., Żygis, M., Solt, S., Benz, A., & Krifka, M. (2022) · Glossa a journal of general linguistics · doi:10.16995/glossa.5847 · Cited by 9
Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson
Bradley, D. (2014) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axt042 · Cited by 6
Personal identity, indeterminacy and obligation
Wasserman, R. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139028486.005 · Cited by 6
Hicks, M. T. (2017) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/693967 · Cited by 6
Spencer, J. (2018) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12252 · Cited by 6
“7 Cf. Hall (1994; 2004) and Lewis (1994).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable
Landes, J., Wallmann, C., & Williamson, J. (2021) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-021-00352-x · Cited by 6
“On the basis of a similar questionnaire, David Lewis (1986) put forward the following principle as a constraint on a reasonable initial credence function P , which is taken to be a probability function: Principal Principle.”
BackgroundInfluentialFrom Quantum Physics to Classical Metaphysics
Simpson, W. M. (2021) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003125860-3 · Cited by 6
Sleeping beauty should be imprecise
Singer, D. J. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0429-y · Cited by 6
Transcendental idealism among the Jersey metaphysicians
Belot, G. (2010) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9546-8 · Cited by 6
“According to the second—which provides a clear example of transcendental idealism in our sense—the causal structure of the world is not absolute but rather depends on our cognitive constitution: the causal relations of our world are determined by which counterfactual statements are true (Lewis 1986a); which counterfac…”
BackgroundHumean Supervenience and Multidimensional Semantics
Stefánsson, H. O. (2014) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9607-z · Cited by 6
“We can also derive AT from the MD-semantics without adding centring, if we first add to the semantics a conditional variant of Lewis’ Principal Principle (Lewis 1980).”
MethodAgainst All Odds: When Logic Meets Probability
van Benthem, J. (2017) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-68270-9_12 · Cited by 6
“Carnap created ‘inductive logic’, [4], Hintikka developed numerical confirmation theory, [15], and Lewis moved happily from qualitative theories of conditionals to the principles of probabilistic update over time, [25].”
BackgroundCentering the Principal Principle
Wilhelm, I. (2020) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01515-x · Cited by 6
“1 See Lewis (1980) for a discussion of admissibility.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialMust the Fundamental Laws of Physics be Complete?
Lange, M. (2009) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00246.x · Cited by 6
Should Bayesians Bet Where Frequentists Fear to Tread?
Albert, M. (2005) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/505185 · Cited by 6
XII—Probabilities and Conditionals: Distinctions by Example
Butterfield, J. (1992) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) · doi:10.1093/aristotelian/92.1.251 · Cited by 6
Lewis on Knowledge Ascriptions
Schaffer, J. (2015) · doi:10.1002/9781118398593.ch30 · Cited by 6
Lyon, A. (2010) · doi:10.1002/9781444315578.ch5 · Cited by 6
“23 LPP, as originally formulated by Lewis, is a synchronic norm on an agent’s initial credence function, though LPP is commonly used as synchronic constraint on an agent’s credence function at any point in time. Another synchronic norm is van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle (VFRP) (van Fraassen [1995]).”
BackgroundProbabilities in Statistical Mechanics: What are they?Preprint
Myrvold, W. C. (2012) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 7
Evidentiary inference in evolutionary biology
Justus, J. (2010) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-010-9205-7 · Cited by 6
On the possibility of stable regularities without fundamental laws
Filomeno, A. (2014) · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) · Cited by 6
Gessell, B. (2017) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-017-9601-3 · Cited by 5
A Philosopher’s Guide to Probability
Hájek, A. (2008) · ANU Open Research (Australian National University) · doi:10.4324/9781849773607-16 · Cited by 5
Unsharp Humean Chances in Statistical Physics: A Reply to Beisbart
Dardashti, R., Fenton-Glynn, L., Thébault, K. P. Y., & Frisch, M. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_37 · Cited by 5
“…function associated with the best system for our world would simply be the quantum mechanical probability function: that is, the function that yields all and only the probabilities entailed by quantum mechanics, or whatever fundamental physical theory replaces it (see Lewis 1986, 118; 1994).”
BackgroundJeffrey Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and Adams’s Thesis
Nissan‐Rozen, I. (2013) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axs039 · Cited by 5
Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways
Spohn, W. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1393-0 · Cited by 5
“The Dutch book argument is the standard pragmatic justification. The community is presently thrilled by the options of a non-pragmatic justification, since it promises to derive the laws of probability from the approximation to truth; cf. Rosenkrantz (1992), Joyce (1998), and Pettigrew (2016). There are more arguments…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialInterpretive analogies between quantum and statistical mechanics
McCoy, C. D. (2020) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-019-0268-2 · Cited by 5
On Bayesian Epistemology of Myerson Auction
Deng, X., & Zhu, K. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing · doi:10.1109/tcc.2019.2896225 · Cited by 5
Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem
Pettigrew, R. (2019) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2018.1563798 · Cited by 5
Ought-contextualism and reasoning
Bradley, D. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02918-3 · Cited by 5
“It might be useful to draw an analogy with Lewis’s (1980) Principal Principle.”
MethodElliott, K. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03092-w · Cited by 5
“The Principal Principle (henceforth, PP) implies that if a rational agent (i.e., an agent whose opinions come from a reasonable initial credence function by conditionalizing on her total evidence) is certain that an event’s chance of occurring is n, then her credence (i.e., her degree of expectation) in that event is…”
BackgroundInfluentialThorn, P. D. (2013) · Journal of Philosophical Logic · doi:10.1007/s10992-012-9263-1 · Cited by 5
“The proposal is to encode the prescriptions of direct inference via prior conditional probability statements that are akin to Lewis’s principal principle [23].”
MethodIs the Mentaculus the Best System of Our World?
Hemmo, M., & Shenker, O. (2022) · Jerusalem studies in philosophy and history of science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-96775-8_4 · Cited by 5
Wilhelm, I. (2022) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/723240 · Cited by 5
How Uncertain Do We Need to Be?
Williamson, J. (2013) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9516-6 · Cited by 5
No Interpretation of Probability
Schwarz, W. (2017) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9936-9 · Cited by 5
“For concreteness, let’s assume that 2T states that T is the best systematization of the sequence as measured by Lewis’s [1994] criteria of simplicity, strength, and fit – setting aside the worries raised in the previous section.”
Popper’s Contributions to the Theory of Probability and Its Interpretation
Miller, D. (2016) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cco9781139046503.009 · Cited by 5
Price, H., & Liu, Y. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316847893.009 · Cited by 5
“Lewis (1980) also defends a form of subjectivism.”
BackgroundBoolean-Valued Sets as Vague Sets
Akiba, K. (2014) · Logic, epistemology, and the unity of science · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-7978-5_8 · Cited by 5
Quantum Physical Symbol Systems
Laskey, K. B. (2006) · Journal of Logic Language and Information · doi:10.1007/s10849-005-9009-3 · Cited by 5
“David Lewis (1980) argued that the propensity and subjectivist views of probability can be reconciled, and that subjective probabilities should agree with objective propensities when the propensities are known.”
BackgroundBovens, L., & Rabinowicz, W. (2011) · Episteme · doi:10.3366/epi.2011.0022 · Cited by 5
Bayesian Epistemology and Having Evidence
Dunn, J. (2022) · ScholarWorks@UMassAmherst (University of Massachusetts Amherst) · doi:10.7275/1670070 · Cited by 5
Chalmers on Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics
Byrne, A., & Hall, N. (1999) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392693 · Cited by 5
Bacciagaluppi, G., & Ismael, J. (2014) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/679037 · Cited by 5
Probabilistic Modeling in Physics
Beisbart, C. (2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577439.003.0006 · Cited by 5
Chance, Resiliency, and Humean Supervenience
Dziurosz-Serafinowicz, P. (2017) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9944-9 · Cited by 4
Suspending belief in credal accounts
del Rio, A. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12438 · Cited by 4
The Reliable Route from Nonmoral Evidence to Moral Conclusions
Sinhababu, N. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00631-w · Cited by 4
Bayesianism from a philosophical perspective and its application to medicine
Williamson, J. (2022) · The International Journal of Biostatistics · doi:10.1515/ijb-2022-0043 · Cited by 4
Uniform probability in cosmology
Wenmackers, S. (2023) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.08.009 · Cited by 4
“Yet, this is exactly what seems to happen in FAP theory: 14 Cf. Lewis (1980): “I think these people are making a rounding error: they fail to distinguish zero chance from infinitesimal chance.” to construct a probability function on the powerset of ℕ , one first takes the infinite limit of 𝑛 over functions on the powe…”
BackgroundInfluentialGood Just Isn’t Good Enough: Humean Chances and Boltzmannian Statistical Physics
Beisbart, C. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_36 · Cited by 4
Constraining prior probabilities of phylogenetic trees
Autzen, B. (2011) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-011-9253-7 · Cited by 4
“Examples of this strategy are the principle of indifference (Keynes 1921), the principle of maximum entropy (Jaynes 1983; Williamson 2007), or the Principal Principle ( Lewis 1980 ).”
BackgroundMethodDecision Making in Entrepreneurial Finance: A Behavioral Perspective
Yazdipour, R. (2009) · The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance · doi:10.57229/2373-1761.1021 · Cited by 5
McCarthy, D. M. (2017) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.013.36 · Cited by 4
Explaining (One Aspect of) the Principal Principle without (Much) Metaphysics
Elliott, K. (2016) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/687258 · Cited by 4
Chance, determinism, and unsettledness
Eagle, A. (2018) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1039-1 · Cited by 4
Everett’s Missing Postulate and the Born Rule
Arve, P. (2020) · Foundations of Physics · doi:10.1007/s10701-020-00338-4 · Cited by 4
Stefánsson, H. (2020) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12709 · Cited by 4
“For all practical purposes, we can treat such a probability as a well-defined and objective probability; roughly, a quantity that, were we to come to know it, we should let it guide our subjective probabilities (cf. Lewis 1980).”
BackgroundFrigg, R. (2017) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.013.24 · Cited by 4
“5 This point is often made in the context of statistical mechanics; for instance see Redhead (1995: 27–8). Lyon (2011) extends arguments of this kind to the probabilities we find in biology. 6 For discussion of the compatibility of propensities with determinism see Clark (2001) and Berkovitz (2013).”
InfluentialPossibility, chance and necessity
Mellor, D. H. (2000) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400012349311 · Cited by 4
“Let us assume then, for the sake of argument, that belief can come by degrees with a probability measure [3], degrees which are therefore mostly called 'subjective probabilities' but which I, like Lewis [4], prefer to call credences.”
BackgroundPropensities and conditional probabilities
Drouet, I. (2009) · International Journal of Approximate Reasoning · doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2009.06.009 · Cited by 4
“2[8].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Lewis, D.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lewis, David
- ORCID
- Lewis, David
- Venue
- IFS
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Published
- 1980
- Pages
- 267-297
- OpenAlex
- W1510271585
- Cited by
- 799
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 42 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 42 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 47 · 2014: 58 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 76.27
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Springer eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Literary, Cultural, Historical Analysis
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
- Keywords
- objective chance, subjective probability, partial belief, degrees of belief, tritium decay, philosophy of probability, concept of chance
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
