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A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance
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“This is a mechanism of global “subjective” (here in roughly the sense of “subjective Bayesian”) optimization, which does not always entail “objective” optimality, though it must approximate the latter reliably enough (cf., Lewis, 1980).”
From The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood (2018) · cites this paper as Lewis, 1980
Citations
Cites
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APPLICATIONS OF MODEL THEORY TO ALGEBRA, ANALYSIS AND PROBABILITY
Erdélyi, A. (1970) · Bulletin of the London Mathematical Society · doi:10.1112/blms/2.3.367 · Cited by 187
Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity
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Research works printed but not linked: 2
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Correlations and Counterfactuals: The EPR Illusion
Stairs, A. (2012) · The Western Ontario series in philosophy of science · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-2582-9_13 · Cited by 1
“The point here is kin to Lewis’s Principal Principal, (Lewis 1980, 1994 ) which says, more or less, that our subjective probabilities should cleave to the objective chances, if such there be.”
BackgroundDid god know it? God’s relation to a world of chance and randomness
Göcke, B. P. (2015) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-015-9531-4 · Cited by 1
Objectifying Subjective Probabilities: Dutch Book Arguments for Principles of Direct Inference
Childers, T. (2012) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-3030-4_2 · Cited by 1
Schulz, M. (2010) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.668.x · Cited by 1
“According to Lewis (1980), credences as well as objective chances attach primarily to propositions so conceived.”
BackgroundPropensities and Transcendental Assumptions
Bartelborth, T. (2010) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-010-9258-7 · Cited by 1
“David Lewis, in his article on chance ( Lewis 1980, 266), initially claims that his Principal Principle tells us everything there is to know about chance and that perhaps only subjectivists can understand the concept of chance (1980, 264).”
BackgroundTRES PASOS DE LAS FRECUENCIAS A LAS PROPENSIONES
Miller, D. W. (2011) · Praxis Filosófica Nueva Serie · doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i24.3131 · Cited by 1
Probability, Modality and Triviality
Eagle, A. (2005) · Cited by 1
Ramrattan, L., & Szenberg, M. (2004) · The American Economist · doi:10.1177/056943450404800105 · Cited by 1
In Defence of Objective Bayesianism
Ainsworth, P. M. (2012) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/ans123 · Cited by 1
Listwa, D. B. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1348-5 · Cited by 1
“|X) is undefined only if X “is the empty proposition, true at no worlds (Lewis 1980, p. 88).””
Is Kantian Projectivism the Only Hope for Grounding the Principal Principle? (No.)
Lange, M. (2017) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onx019 · Cited by 1
Gibbs, C. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1622-6 · Cited by 1
“12 For example, Lewis (1980) proposed the ‘Principal Principle,’ a claim about how an agent’s credences should line up with chances. these other proposals.”
BackgroundExploring a New Argument for Synchronic Chance
Elliott, K. (2018) · University of Michigan Library Repository · Cited by 1
Is Quantum Mechanics a New Theory of Probability?
Healey, R. (2020) · Jerusalem studies in philosophy and history of science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-34316-3_14 · Cited by 1
“Lewis (1980) disagreed.”
BackgroundLaws of Nature and Individuals
Dosanjh, R. (2020) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819120000297 · Cited by 1
“Lewis (among other Humeans) thinks it’s good not to forbid such laws a priori (Lewis, 1986b), though it’s unlikely that the actual world has them.”
BackgroundStates of ignorance and ignorance of states: Examining the Quantum Principal Principle
Meehan, A. (2021) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.09.013 · Cited by 1
“The last step in this reasoning is an application of Lewis’s Principal Principle, which says (roughly) that if an agent knows the objective chance of a proposition E is x, then she should set her degree of belief in E to x (Lewis, 1980).”
MethodReconciling Meticulous Divine Providence with Objective Chance
Koons, R. C. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-75797-7_11 · Cited by 1
“Pruss’s new solution to the reconciliation problem builds on David Lewis’s best-fit model of objective chance (Lewis 1980, 1994).”
BackgroundRevaluing Laws of Nature in Secularized Science
Lichtenstein, E. I. (2022) · Jerusalem studies in philosophy and history of science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-96775-8_13 · Cited by 1
Typicality and the Metaphysics of Laws
Lazarovici, D. (2023) · New directions in the philosophy of science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-33448-1_16 · Cited by 1
Why Lewisians Should Love Deterministic Chance
Briggs, R. (2015) · doi:10.1002/9781118398593.ch18 · Cited by 1
Quantum Mechanics versus Special Relativity: A forgotten conflictPreprint
Berenguer, R. A. A. (2008) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 1
Essays in the study and modelling of exchange rate volatility
Sucarrat, G. (2006) · DIAL (Catholic University of Leuven) · Cited by 1
Concrete Causation: About the Structures of Causal Knowledge
Poellinger, R. (2012) · Cited by 1
21 Arguments Against Propensity Analyses of ProbabilityPreprint
Eagle, A. (2003) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 1
Szabó, L. E. (2010) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9115-4_26 · Cited by 1
Taking Physical Probability Seriously
Railton, P. (1990) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-0987-8_14 · Cited by 1
All roads lead to violations of countable additivity
Ross, J. J. (2011) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9744-z · Cited by 1
“Hence, to borrow a phrase from Lewis 1980, she will have inadmissible information, and so her credences in the hypotheses in H needn't equal their prior objective chances.”
BackgroundEagle, A. (2004) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2004.08.003 · Cited by 1
“But similar existing accounts (Lewis, 1980; Levi, 1990) have less controversial foundations and make the case for the approach more effectively.”
BackgroundIdealization, Lossy Compression and the Laws of PhysicsPreprint
Wheeler, B. (2015) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 1
What the Humean cannot say about entanglementPreprint
Dewar, N. (2016) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 1
Simon Friederich: Interpreting Quantum Theory: A Therapeutic Approach
Boge, F. J. (2016) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-016-9823-9 · Cited by 1
Epistemic confidence, the Dutch Book and relevant subsetsPreprint
Yudi Pawitan, Y., Lee, H., & Lee, Y. (2021) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2104.14712 · Cited by 1
Riedener, S. (2021) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783110736199-008 · Cited by 1
Hicks, T. A. (2015) · Digital Commons - University of South Florida (University of South Florida)
In Defence of Constructive Empiricism
Hertroys, A. (2014) · Utrecht University Repository (Utrecht University)
¿Probabilidad cuántica o espacio-tiempo relativista?
Berenguer, R. A. A. (2009) · Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia
Rationality, decisions and large worlds
Drechsler, M. (2012) · London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science)
Railton, P. (2015) · doi:10.1002/9781118398593.ch34
p, and I have Absolutely No Justification for Believing that p': The Incoherence of Bayesianism
Williams, J. N., & Hájek, A. (2005)
Henderson, L. (2010) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Partial belief and expert testimony
Briggs, R. (2009) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Some remarks on a book on the philosophy of probability
Kotz, S. (2007) · Statistica · doi:10.6092/issn.1973-2201/496
Network Density and Group Competence in Scientific Communication
Angere, S., & Olsson, E. J. (2015)
Quantum Mechanics for Event Ontologists
Pashby, T. (2014) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh)
How to put self-locating information in its place
Bartha, P. F. A. (2006) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh)
Unlearning What You Have Learned
Titelbaum, M. G. (2007) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh)
Finite Frequentism in a Big World
Tosh, N. (2014) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axu027
Tooley on causation and probabilities
Leeds, S. (2000) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400012349501
“3 Here I rely on David Lewis's classic exposition in [1].”
MethodIntentionality and partial belief
Tang, W. H. (2013) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0336-7
“On some views, the objective chance of a past event happening or of an event happening in a deterministic universe is either 0 or 1 (Lewis 1980).”
BackgroundInfluentialD. H. MELLOR The Matter of Chance
Fenton-Glynn, L. (2011) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axr026
“I have suggested that it is only by virtue of a probabilistic law’s being made true by frequency facts that a probability distribution it entails can constrain reasonable partial belief (see Lewis [1994]).”
BackgroundModerate Monism: reply to Noonan and Mackie
Stone, J. (2009) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/ann015
WHEN ARE CONTEXT-SENSITIVE BELIEFS RELEVANT?
Titelbaum, M. G. (2006)
Causal In∞uence and Controlled Experiment
Gibbard, A. (2008)
Vasudevan, A. (2012) · doi:10.7916/d8k07bdg
Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited
Atkinson, D., & Peijnenburg, J. (2008) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3
“Thus David Lewis’s Principal Principle states that, if the chance that an event e occurs were known to be r, and no other relevant evidence were available, then your credence that e occurs had better be r as well (Lewis, 1980).”
BackgroundSymmetry Is the Very Guide of Life 1
Hájek, A. (2004)
Dealing with ignorance: universal discrimination, learning and quantum correlations
Sentís, G. (2014) · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1407.4690 · Cited by 1
“7The discussion about true or right values for Bayesian probabilities originates with David Lewis’ principal principle, and his notion of objective chance [Lewis, 1980].”
BackgroundA theory of laws of nature, dispositions, and chances
Demarest, H. (2013) · doi:10.7282/t3tq5zkw
The Coevolution, Battles, and Fights of Both Paradigms
Vallverdú, J. (2015) · SpringerBriefs in statistics · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48638-2_5
Internalism and the Generality Problem
Kasaki, M. (2012) · Kagaku tetsugaku · doi:10.4216/jpssj.45.83
When Sleeping Beauty First Awakes
Atkinson, D., & Peijnenburg, J. (2017) · University of Groningen research database (University of Groningen / Centre for Information Technology) · doi:10.2143/lea.238.0.3212069
Hicks, M. T. (2016) · doi:10.7282/t36112b0
11 Indifference principles and quantum mechanics
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0011
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0013
8 The Proper Expansion Principle
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0008
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Dziurosz-Serafinowicz, P. (2014)
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0012
3 The modeling framework and what models represent
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0003
4 Applying CLF models to stories
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0004
10 Alternative updating schemes
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0010
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0002
5 Three common objections to Bayesian frameworks
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.003.0005
Decision Theory and Counter- Factual Evaluation
Orri, H. (2014)
Social Epistemology and the Project of Mapping Science
Posey, K. (2015) · CUNY Academic Works (City University of New York)
BELIEVING IN LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
Leuven, K. (2014)
Cariani, F. (2017) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2016.48
“In this note, I investigate one segment of that frontier: Pettigrew’s attempt to justify a family of principles related to Lewis’s Principal Principle (Lewis 1980).1 These principles constrain the relationship between an agent’s credences about chancy events and her credences in propositions about objective chances.”
BackgroundInfluentialA Principled Analysis of Consistency of an Abstract Principal Principle
Gyenis, Z., & Rédei, M. (2017) · European studies in philosophy of science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-55486-0_1
“Allowing this kind of evidence seems common: Lewis himself regarded admissible all propositions containing information that is “irrelevant” for the chance of A [9][p.”
BackgroundDealing with ignorance: universal discrimination, learning and quantum correlations
Sentís, G. (2014) · TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa)
Biased information and the exchange paradox
Vasudevan, A. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1550-5
“…of Bayesian conditionalization interprets an agent’s conditional probabilities as determining what that agent counts as fair odds on a proposed bet which will be called off in case the conditioning event does not occur (see, e.g., Lewis 1987; Levi 1987). expected value have genuine normative force.”
BackgroundThe Epistemic Structure of Economics Models and the Problem of Confirmation
김진숙 (2017) · Seoul National University Open Repository (Seoul National University)
What Is Bayesian Confirmation for?
Bradley, D. (2017) · International Studies in the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1080/02698595.2018.1463692
Babic, B. (2017) · Deep Blue (University of Michigan)
The logic of uncertainty as a logic of experience and chance and the co~event-based Bayes' theoremPreprint
Vorobyev, O. Y. (2018) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1810.01310
“Axiomatics of the theory of co∼events [1] terminates all the debate between different philosophical interpretations of probabilities: frequentist [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17], propensity [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26], or Bayesian (subjective) [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 11, 12, 38,…”
BackgroundCorrecting credences with chances
Park, I. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02037-0
“The most famous chance– credence norm is what is called the Principal Principle, which is formulated and named by Lewis (1980).”
Interpretive Implications of the Sample SpacePreprint
November, D. D. (2018) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh)
Quantum-Bayesian CoherencePreprint
Fuchs, C. A. (2010)
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Fletcher, J. (2018) · White Rose eTheses Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York)
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Williams, J. R. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198850205.003.0002
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Williams, J. R. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198850205.003.0008
Williams, J. R. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198850205.003.0011
From Mental Representation to Linguistic Representation
Williams, J. R. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198850205.003.0007
Radical Interpretation and the Logical Form of Thoughts
Williams, J. R. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198850205.003.0003
Williams, J. R. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198850205.003.0012
Williams, J. R. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198850205.003.0001
Radical Interpretation and Reference Magnetism
Williams, J. R. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198850205.003.0004
The Basis of Radical Interpretation
Williams, J. R. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198850205.003.0010
Metadata
- Authors
- Lewis, D.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lewis, David
- ORCID
- Lewis, David
- Venue
- IFS
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Published
- 1980
- Pages
- 267-297
- OpenAlex
- W1510271585
- Cited by
- 799
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 42 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 42 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 47 · 2014: 58 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 76.27
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Springer eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Literary, Cultural, Historical Analysis
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
- Keywords
- objective chance, subjective probability, partial belief, degrees of belief, tritium decay, philosophy of probability, concept of chance
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