The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance
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“This is a mechanism of global “subjective” (here in roughly the sense of “subjective Bayesian”) optimization, which does not always entail “objective” optimality, though it must approximate the latter reliably enough (cf., Lewis, 1980).”
From The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood (2018) · cites this paper as Lewis, 1980
Citations
Cites
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
Quine, W. V. (1969) · doi:10.7312/quin92204 · Cited by 3,593
Jeffrey, R. C. (1965) · Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) · Cited by 1,145
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic
Lewis, D. K. (1968) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024555 · Cited by 1,078
Self-citationThe Two Concepts of Probability: The Problem of Probability
Carnap, R. (1945) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2102817 · Cited by 338
A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation
Railton, P. (1978) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/288797 · Cited by 299
Mellor, D. H. (1971) · Apollo (University of Cambridge) · Cited by 189
APPLICATIONS OF MODEL THEORY TO ALGEBRA, ANALYSIS AND PROBABILITY
Erdélyi, A. (1970) · Bulletin of the London Mathematical Society · doi:10.1112/blms/2.3.367 · Cited by 187
Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity
Skyrms, B. (1977) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025774 · Cited by 99
Jeffrey, R. C. (1970) · Journal of Symbolic Logic · doi:10.2307/2271165 · Cited by 26
Butts, R. E., & Hintikka, J. (1977) · Cited by 9
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Jeffrey, Richard C., ‘Mises Redux’, in Basic Problems in Methodology and Linguistics: Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Part III, ed. by R. Butts and J. Hintikka, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, 1977.
- Lewis, David, Counterfactuals, Blackwell, 1973.
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“Plus, if all c ∈ Rbt obey the Principal Principle, then it will be the case that Rbt (H/F) = { 1 2 } (Lewis 1980).”
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Casper, S. (2020) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2010.05418
“This is acceptable under both frameworks, and a refusal to do so would result in a pathological form of reasoning that is vulnerable to simple Dutch Books [67, 43] and would not meet the subtlety criterion for an Achilles Heel.”
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“Like Lewis (1980)’s Principal Principle and van Fraassen (1984)’s Reflection Principle, it makes our rational credences a matter of deferring to an expert.”
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Pei, K. N., & Chin, C. S. A. (2022) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2022.2134926
“On one influential view that is sometimes called the ‘Principal Principle’, when objective chances are known, an agent’s subjective probabilities should match these chances (Lewis, 1980).”
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Bird, A. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199606658.003.0007
Bird, A. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199606658.003.0005
Bird, A. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199606658.003.0004
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Bird, A. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199606658.003.0009
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Bird, A. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199606658.003.0006
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Jellema, H. (2023) · doi:10.33612/diss.563508244
(2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577439.002.0003
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Davis, W. A. (2023) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onad019
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The Mentaculus: Typicality Versus Humean Chances
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“As Hajek (2012, p. 4) reports, different versions have been proposed by Appiah (1985), Carnap (1963), Edwards et al. (1992), Jackson (1987), Jeffrey (1992), Jeffreys (1998), Kemeny (1955), Lewis (1981), Shimony (1955), Skyrms (1995), and Stalnaker (1970).”
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“Many “basic Bayesians” have added David Lewis’ Principal Principle to their toolkits [34].”
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“The standard justificatory strategies for priors include (1) the washing out of priors relying on the law of large numbers, (2) the use of non-informative priors, and (3) empirical Bayes. or the so-called “Principal Principle” (Lewis, 1980), which calibrates the priors with observed data.”
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“1 More precisely we write Cα := C(α|Pα) = Pα [71].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Lewis, D.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lewis, David
- ORCID
- Lewis, David
- Venue
- IFS
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Published
- 1980
- Pages
- 267-297
- OpenAlex
- W1510271585
- Cited by
- 799
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 42 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 42 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 47 · 2014: 58 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 76.27
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Springer eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Literary, Cultural, Historical Analysis
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
- Keywords
- objective chance, subjective probability, partial belief, degrees of belief, tritium decay, philosophy of probability, concept of chance
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