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A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance

Lewis, David·1980·IFS

DOI 10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_14

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Authors: Lewis, D.
Affiliations: Princeton University (US)
Corresponding author: Lewis, David
ORCID: Lewis, David
Venue: IFS
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Published: 1980
Pages: 267-297
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_14
OpenAlex: W1510271585
Cited by: 799
References: 12
Citations by year: 2026: 5 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 42 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 42 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 47 · 2014: 58 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 58
FWCI: 76.27
Type: book chapter
Language: en
Open access: closed
Locations: Springer eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics: Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Literary, Cultural, Historical Analysis
Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
Keywords: objective chance, subjective probability, partial belief, degrees of belief, tritium decay, philosophy of probability, concept of chance

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A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance

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