The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The pure theory of large two-candidate elections
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ledyard, J. O.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 7-41
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W2041692015
- Cited by
- 584
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 19.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.