Bayes' theorem in the trial process: Instructing jurors on the value of statistical evidence.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The use of statistics and probabilities as legal evidence has recently come under increased scrutiny.Judges' and jurors' ability to understand and use this type of evidence has been of special concern.Finkelstein and Fairley (1970) proposed introducing Bayes' theorem into the courtroom to aid the fact-finder evaluate this type of evidence.The present study addressed individuals' ability to use statistical information as well as their ability to understand and use an expert's Bayesian explanation of that evidence.One hundred and eighty continuing education students were presented with a transcript purportedly taken from an actual trial and were asked to make several subjective probabiliy judgments regarding blood-grouping evidence.The results extend to the trial process previous psychological research suggesting that individuals generally underutilize statistical information, as compared to a Bayesian model.In addition, subjects in this study generally ignored the expert's Bayesian explanation of the statistical evidence.
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Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Belief in the law of small numbers.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0031322 · Cited by 3,246 · cited 1×
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Stalking the elusive “vividness” effect
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Intuitive theories of events and the effects of base-rate information on prediction
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Cited by
Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making
MacCoun, R. J. (1989) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.244.4908.1046 · Cited by 117
Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic Evidence?
Kaye, D. H., & Koehler, J. J. (1991) · Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society) · doi:10.2307/2982696 · Cited by 101
Martire, K. A., Kemp, R. I., Sayle, M., & Newell, B. R. (2014) · Forensic Science International · doi:10.1016/j.forsciint.2014.04.005 · Cited by 98
Martire, K. A., Kemp, R. I., Watkins, I., Sayle, M. A., & Newell, B. R. (2013) · Law and Human Behavior · doi:10.1037/lhb0000027 · Cited by 90
Martire, K. A. (2018) · Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences · doi:10.1080/00450618.2018.1439101 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Faigman, D. L., & Baglioni, A. J.
- Venue
- Law and Human Behavior
- Published
- 1988-03
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-17
- ISSN
- 0147-7307 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-661X
- OpenAlex
- W2327522093
- Cited by
- 71
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 21.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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