The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information
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Citations
Cites
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
(2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.7.i · Cited by 5,406
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7 · Cited by 4,816
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
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Stochastic models for learning.
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Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental StudyPreprint
Roth, A. E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno‐Fujiwara, M., & Zamir, S. (1991) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 568
Güth, W., & Tietz, R. (1990) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/0167-4870(90)90021-z · Cited by 396
Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study
Binmore, K., Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (2007) · Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2478.003.0024 · Cited by 250
Cited by
Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z · Cited by 1,445
Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners
Camerer, C., & Thaler, R. H. (1995) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.9.2.209 · Cited by 1,334
Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7384 · Cited by 1,081
Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis
Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & Van De Kuilen, G. (2004) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1023/b:exec.0000026978.14316.74 · Cited by 828
Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries
Bolton, G. E., Brandts, J., & Ockenfels, A. (2005) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01032.x · Cited by 397
Neural correlates of depth of strategic reasoning in medial prefrontal cortex
Coricelli, G., & Nagel, R. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0807721106 · Cited by 379
Self-citationOn ultimatum bargaining experiments — A personal review
Güth, W. (1995) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(94)00071-l · Cited by 354
The Decision Maker Matters: Individual Versus Group Behaviour in Experimental Beauty‐Contest Games
Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2005) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00966.x · Cited by 298
Information, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study
Güth, W., & van Damme, E. (1998) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1006/jmps.1998.1212 · Cited by 275
Experimental subjects are not different
Exadaktylos, F., Espín, A. M., & Brañas-Garza, P. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01213 · Cited by 257
Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games
Croson, R., Boles, T., & Murnighan, J. K. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00092-6 · Cited by 252
Metadata
- Authors
- Mitzkewitz, M., & Nagel, R.
- Venue
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Published
- 1993-06
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 171-198
- ISSN
- 0020-7276 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1270
- OpenAlex
- W1992466448
- Cited by
- 292
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 17.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.