The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984 · cited 2×
“Most notable here may be the anchoring and insufficient adjustment bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973), which implies that even disregarded cheap talk can subtly influence an individual's decisions.”
BackgroundChakravarti, D., Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1997) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.2307/3151869 · Cited by 7,141
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
RABIN, M. (2011) · Advances in Behavioral Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,705
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
The Handbook of experimental economics
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-1645 · Cited by 3,679
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change.
Riley, M. W., Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., & Kelley, H. H. (1954) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2087772 · Cited by 2,038
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993) · Cited by 1,915
Cited by
Erat, S., & Gneezy, U. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1449 · Cited by 698
The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust
Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/3094850 · Cited by 666
Self-citationAlmost human: Anthropomorphism increases trust resilience in cognitive agents.
de Visser, E. J., Monfort, S. S., McKendrick, R., Smith, M. A. B., McKnight, P. E., Krueger, F., & Parasuraman, R. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied · doi:10.1037/xap0000092 · Cited by 614
Promises and lies: Restoring violated trust
Schweitzer, M. E., Hershey, J. C., & Bradlow, E. T. (2006) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.05.005 · Cited by 529
Trust in Forecast Information Sharing
Özer, Ö., Zheng, Y., & Chen, K.-Y. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1334 · Cited by 421
Metadata
- Authors
- Croson, R., Boles, T., & Murnighan, J. K.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-06
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 143-159
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2014106118
- Cited by
- 252
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 19.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Croson, R., Boles, T., & Murnighan, J. K. (2003). Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00092-6
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.