The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Bureaucracy and Representative Government
Niskanen, W. A. (1971) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 5,203
The Theory of Committees and Elections.
Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
Niskanen, W. A. (1975) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466829 · Cited by 1,022
An Introduction to Positive Political Theory
Riker, W. H., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1973) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 972
The Theory of Committees and Elections.
Roy, A. D., & Black, D. (1959) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2228021 · Cited by 725
Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking
Edwards, F. R. (1977) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260549 · Cited by 266
The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy
Breton, A., & Wintrobe, R. (1975) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260313 · Cited by 237
Testing political economy’s ‘as if’ proposition: is the median income voter really decisive?
Inman, R. P. (1978) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf03187595 · Cited by 212
Cited by
Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games
Putnam, R. D. (1988) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027697 · Cited by 7,475
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1985) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111172 · Cited by 989
Self-citationSetting the agenda: responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-4315 · Cited by 910
Power and political institutions
Moe, T. M. (2005) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592705050176 · Cited by 550
The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
Weingast, B. R. (1984) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00124821 · Cited by 503
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure
Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T. J. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585484 · Cited by 469
An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance'
Moe, T. M. (1987) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/439745 · Cited by 441
Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy
Wildasin, D. E. (1989) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/0094-1190(89)90034-x · Cited by 414
The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?
Epple, D., & Zelenitz, A. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261029 · Cited by 340
Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them
(2018) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190844073.001.0001 · Cited by 284
Political Economics and Public Finance
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7097 · Cited by 279
(2010) · Cited by 130
Metadata
- Authors
- Romer, T., & Rosenthal, H.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 1978-12
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 27-43
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W2017099368
- Cited by
- 1,160
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 34.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.