Non-Human Moral Status: Problems with Phenomenal Consciousness
Open accessAbstract
Consciousness-based approaches to non-human moral status maintain that consciousness is necessary for (some degree or level of) moral status. While these approaches are intuitive to many, in this paper I argue that the judgment that consciousness is necessary for moral status is not secure enough to guide policy regarding non-humans, that policies responsive to the moral status of non-humans should take seriously the possibility that psychological features independent of consciousness are sufficient for moral status. Further, I illustrate some practical consequences of calling consciousness-based views into question.
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Given high moral stakes, some stakeholders may demand only low degrees of confidence in a measure and/or prioritization of sensitivity over specificity, often defended with reference to the precautionary principle.
“Given the high moral stakes, some stakeholders (e.g., animal rights advocates, AI developers, policy advocates, laypeople) may demand only low degrees of con fi dence in a measure and/or a prioritization of sensitivity over speci fi city, an approach that is often defended with reference to the ' precautionary principle ' [88,94,95].”
From Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond (2024) · cites this paper as [88]
Cites
Dimensions of Animal Consciousness
Birch, J., Schnell, A. K., & Clayton, N. S. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.07.007 · Cited by 406 · see citing works
Animal sentience and the precautionary principle
Birch, J. (2017) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1200 · Cited by 374 · cited 2× · see citing works
“(Birch 2017, 5) I regard a precautionary approach to animal moral status as promising, even if issues remain regarding, for example, the appropriate place for an evidential bar, how to formulate a principle that is neither overnor under-inclusive (Woodruff 2017), and whether and how a precautionary…”
BackgroundThe vegetative state and the science of consciousness
Shea, N., & Bayne, T. (2010) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axp046 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
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Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
“…stakeholders(e.g.,animalrightsadvocates,AI developers,policyadvocates, lay-people) may demand only low degrees of con fi dence in a measure and/or a prioritization of sensitivity over speci fi city, an approach that is often defended with reference to the ‘ precautionary principle ’ [88,94,95].”
BackgroundSelf-citationUnderstanding artificial agency
Dung, L. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae010 · Cited by 69 · see citing works
Sentience, Vulcans, and zombies: the value of phenomenal consciousness
Shepherd, J. (2024) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-023-01835-6 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Self-citation
- Authors
- Shepherd, J.
- Affiliations
- Carleton University (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Shepherd, Joshua
- ORCID
- Shepherd, Joshua
- Venue
- AJOB Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2022-12-07
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 148-157
- ISSN
- 2150-7740 (ISSN-L)
- 2150-7759
- OpenAlex
- W4310965130
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 14
- FWCI
- 55.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- AJOB Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- European Research Council Starting (757698)
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research’s
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Animal Law and Welfare
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- phenomenal consciousness, moral status, animal ethics, psychological characteristics, animal welfare policy, moral consideration of animals
- MeSH terms
- Moral Status, Consciousness, Judgment
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