The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Connectionism about human agency: responsible AI and the social lifeworld
Open accessAbstract
This paper analyzes responsible human–machine interaction concerning artificial neural networks (ANNs) and large language models (LLMs) by considering the extension of human agency and autonomy by means of artificial intelligence (AI). Thereby, the paper draws on the sociological concept of “interobjectivity,” first introduced by Bruno Latour, and applies it to technologically situated and interconnected agency. Drawing on Don Ihde’s phenomenology of human-technology relations, this interobjective account of AI allows to understand human–machine interaction as embedded in the social lifeworld. Finally, the paper develops a connectionist account of responsible AI, thereby focusing on patterns such as social goals and actions.
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“AI technologies co-shape human agency within these extended and enactive systems, drawing upon insights from phenomenology, enactivism, and connectionism [49,50].”
From 4E cognition and the coevolution of human–AI interaction (2025) · cites this paper as [50]
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Cites
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Responsible Artificial Intelligence: How to Develop and Use AI in a Responsible Way
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“(Berber 2023, 10) Against conceiving of AI as an object, into which morality needs to be implemented (Verbeek 2011), the AI-extended account of human agency conceives of AI as a deep interrelation between technology and human purposes.”
Universal intelligence: a definition of machine intelligence
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“(Floridi 2015, 2) However, whereas Floridi (2015) and my approach in Noller (2022) mainly focus on the general structure of the digital lifeworld, in this paper I shall focus on the digital lifeworld from an agential point of view, which concentrates on the question of how patterns—Husserl’s “goals…”
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Cited by
4E cognition and the coevolution of human–AI interaction
Noller, J. (2025) · Discover Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1007/s44163-025-00595-0 · Cited by 15
Self-citationEntangled cognition: algorithmic power and the limits of cognitive extension
Gahrn-Andersen, R. (2026) · Journal of Cultural Cognitive Science · doi:10.1007/s41809-026-00202-3 · Cited by 4
Governing AI innovation under EU-style capitalism
Mansell, R. E. (2026) · London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · doi:10.48335/9789189864290-10 · Cited by 1
Hila, A. (2026) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-026-01168-4 · Cited by 3
“Offering a contrasting view, Noller ( 2024) argues that “AI and other technology” are not separate from the analog lifeworld, but rather merge together “with regard to the connection of teleological patterns” into an integrated structure he terms the “digital lifeworld”.”
Responsible design of research focused artificial-intelligence-enabled systems
Sobien, D. (2026) · Assurance and Security for AI-enabled Systems · doi:10.1117/12.3094673
“The other articles which were filtered out include References 7,8,16–23; though they are still relevant for RAI and AI Assurance, they focus little or not at all on Relationality and/or Participation.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Noller, J.
- Affiliations
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Noller, Jörg
- ORCID
- Noller, Jörg
- Venue
- AI & SOCIETY
- Published
- 2024-12-13
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 3881-3890
- ISSN
- 0951-5666 (ISSN-L)
- 1435-5655
- OpenAlex
- W4405383473
- Cited by
- 6
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 1
- FWCI
- 2.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- AI & Society (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (541433337)
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Keywords
- human agency, responsible AI, artificial neural networks, large language models, interobjectivity, Bruno Latour, Don Ihde, human-technology relations, human-machine interaction, connectionism, autonomy, phenomenology of technology
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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