The psychology of volition
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Volition can be studied from two perspectives. From the third-person view, volitional behaviour is internally generated, rather than being determined by the immediate environmental context, and is therefore, to some extent, unpredictable. Such behaviour is not unique to humans, since it is seen in many other species including invertebrates. From the first-person view, our experience of volitional behaviour includes a vivid sense of agency. We feel that, through our intentions, we can cause things to happen and we can choose between different actions. Our experience of agency is not direct. It depends on sub-personal inferences derived from prior expectations and sensations associated with movement. As a result, our experiences and intuitions about volition can be unreliable and uncertain. Nevertheless, our experience of agency is not a mere epiphenomenon. Anticipation of the regret we might feel after making the wrong choice can alter behaviour. Furthermore, the strong sense of responsibility, associated with agency, has a critical role in creating social cohesion and group benefits. We can only study the experience of agency in humans who can describe their experiences. The discussion of the experience of volition, that introspection and communication make possible, can change our experience of volitional actions. As a result, agency, regret and responsibility are cultural phenomena that are unique to humans.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Tapal, A., Oren, E., Dar, R., & Eitam, B. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01552 · Cited by 302
Multiple roles of motor imagery during action observation
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Volitional components of consciousness vary across wakefulness, dreaming and lucid dreaming
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Examining Agency, Expertise, and Roles of AI Systems in AI-Mediated Communication
Mieczkowski, H., & Hancock, J. (2022) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/asnv4 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Frith, C.
- Venue
- Experimental Brain Research
- Published
- 2013-01-25
- Volume
- 229
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 289-299
- ISSN
- 0014-4819 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-1106
- OpenAlex
- W1986748181
- Cited by
- 88
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 4.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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