The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions
Abstract
Understanding the fundamental patterns and determinants of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order in human societies is a challenge across disciplines. The existing empirical evidence for the higher levels of cooperation when altruistic punishment is present versus when it is absent systematically ignores the institutional competition inherent in human societies. Whether punishment would be deliberately adopted and would similarly enhance cooperation when directly competing with nonpunishment institutions is highly controversial in light of recent findings on the detrimental effects of punishment. We show experimentally that a sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a competition with a sanction-free institution. Despite initial aversion, the entire population migrates successively to the sanctioning institution and strongly cooperates, whereas the sanction-free society becomes fully depopulated. The findings demonstrate the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions and exemplify the emergence and manifestation of social order driven by institutional selection.
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In laboratory settings, these solutions have been studied by equipping players with auxiliary signals or actions that allow them to communicate, influence each other or self-organise, which can increase voluntary contributions towards a public good.
“In laboratory settings, these solutions have been studied by equipping players with auxiliary signals or actions that allow them to communicate, influence each other or self-organise, which can increase voluntary contributions towards a public good.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [17]
Participants will often opt-in to games with mechanisms that allow players to ostracise uncooperative group members at personal expense or that permit sanctioning schemes to punish free riders.
“participants will often opt-in to games with mechanisms that allow players to ostracise uncooperative group members at personal expense or that permit sanctioning schemes to punish free riders17,18.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [17]
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- Authors
- Gürerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B.
- Affiliations
- University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser Strasse 63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany.
- University of Erfurt (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Rockenbach, Bettina
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-04-07
- Volume
- 312
- Issue
- 5770
- Pages
- 108-111
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2044185750
- Cited by
- 997
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 39 · 2022: 43 · 2021: 80 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 74 · 2018: 69 · 2017: 54 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 53 · 2014: 63 · 2013: 50 · 2012: 59
- FWCI
- 134.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, sanctioning institutions, institutional competition, human cooperation, social order, institutional selection, evolution of cooperation
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Cultural Evolution, Games, Experimental, Group Processes, Humans, Punishment, Social Behavior, Social Sciences
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