Cited by 997Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEconomic Theory and Institutions

The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions

Gürerk, Özgür, Irlenbusch, Bernd, Rockenbach, Bettina·2006·Science

Abstract

Understanding the fundamental patterns and determinants of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order in human societies is a challenge across disciplines. The existing empirical evidence for the higher levels of cooperation when altruistic punishment is present versus when it is absent systematically ignores the institutional competition inherent in human societies. Whether punishment would be deliberately adopted and would similarly enhance cooperation when directly competing with nonpunishment institutions is highly controversial in light of recent findings on the detrimental effects of punishment. We show experimentally that a sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a competition with a sanction-free institution. Despite initial aversion, the entire population migrates successively to the sanctioning institution and strongly cooperates, whereas the sanction-free society becomes fully depopulated. The findings demonstrate the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions and exemplify the emergence and manifestation of social order driven by institutional selection.

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Crossref · 10.1126/science.1123633

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  • In laboratory settings, these solutions have been studied by equipping players with auxiliary signals or actions that allow them to communicate, influence each other or self-organise, which can increase voluntary contributions towards a public good.

    “In laboratory settings, these solutions have been studied by equipping players with auxiliary signals or actions that allow them to communicate, influence each other or self-organise, which can increase voluntary contributions towards a public good.”
  • Participants will often opt-in to games with mechanisms that allow players to ostracise uncooperative group members at personal expense or that permit sanctioning schemes to punish free riders.

    “participants will often opt-in to games with mechanisms that allow players to ostracise uncooperative group members at personal expense or that permit sanctioning schemes to punish free riders17,18.”

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Authors
Gürerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B.
Affiliations
  • University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser Strasse 63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany.
  • University of Erfurt (DE)
Corresponding author
Rockenbach, Bettina
Venue
Science
Published
2006-04-07
Volume
312
Issue
5770
Pages
108-111
ISSN
  • 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
  • 1095-9203
OpenAlex
W2044185750
Cited by
997
References
32
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 39 · 2022: 43 · 2021: 80 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 74 · 2018: 69 · 2017: 54 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 53 · 2014: 63 · 2013: 50 · 2012: 59
FWCI
134.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Keywords
altruistic punishment, sanctioning institutions, institutional competition, human cooperation, social order, institutional selection, evolution of cooperation
MeSH terms
Cooperative Behavior, Cultural Evolution, Games, Experimental, Group Processes, Humans, Punishment, Social Behavior, Social Sciences

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