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Decision-making under risk conditions is susceptible to interference by a secondary executive task

Starcke, Katrin, Pawlikowski, Mirko, Wolf, Oliver T., Altstötter-Gleich, Christine, Brand, Matthias·2011·Cognitive Processing
DOI 10.1007/s10339-010-0387-3
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Abstract

Recent research suggests two ways of making decisions: an intuitive and an analytical one. The current study examines whether a secondary executive task interferes with advantageous decision-making in the Game of Dice Task (GDT), a decision-making task with explicit and stable rules that taps executive functioning. One group of participants performed the original GDT solely, two groups performed either the GDT and a 1-back or a 2-back working memory task as a secondary task simultaneously. Results show that the group which performed the GDT and the secondary task with high executive load (2-back) decided less advantageously than the group which did not perform a secondary executive task. These findings give further evidence for the view that decision-making under risky conditions taps into the rational-analytical system which acts in a serial and not parallel way as performance on the GDT is disturbed by a parallel task that also requires executive resources.

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Research works printed but not linked: 27

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Metadata

Authors
Starcke, K., Pawlikowski, M., Wolf, O. T., Altstötter-Gleich, C., & Brand, M.
Venue
Cognitive Processing
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2011-01-06
Volume
12
Issue
2
Pages
177-182
ISSN
  • 1612-4782
  • 1612-4790
DOI
10.1007/s10339-010-0387-3
Cited by
38
References
4
Language
en
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)

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