Embodied inference and spatial cognition
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
How much about our interactions with--and experience of--our world can be deduced from basic principles? This paper reviews recent attempts to understand the self-organised behaviour of embodied agents, like ourselves, as satisfying basic imperatives for sustained exchanges with the environment. In brief, one simple driving force appears to explain many aspects of perception, action and the perception of action. This driving force is the minimisation of surprise or prediction error, which--in the context of perception--corresponds to Bayes-optimal predictive coding (that suppresses exteroceptive prediction errors) and--in the context of action--reduces to classical motor reflexes (that suppress proprioceptive prediction errors). In what follows, we look at some of the phenomena that emerge from this single principle, such as the perceptual encoding of spatial trajectories that can both generate movement (of self) and recognise the movements (of others). These emergent behaviours rest upon prior beliefs about itinerant (wandering) states of the world--but where do these beliefs come from? In this paper, we focus on the nature of prior beliefs and how they underwrite the active sampling of a spatially extended sensorium. Put simply, to avoid surprising states of the world, it is necessary to minimise uncertainty about those states. When this minimisation is implemented via prior beliefs--about how we sample the world--the resulting behaviour is remarkably reminiscent of searches seen in foraging or visual searches with saccadic eye movements.
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Cites
Rao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/4580 · Cited by 5,483 · cited 1×
“The first is known as (generalised) predictive coding and has the same form as Bayesian (Kalman-Bucy) filters used in time series analysis; see also (Rao and Ballard 1999).”
MethodComputational modelling of visual attention
Itti, L., & Koch, C. (2001) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/35058500 · Cited by 4,733 · cited 2×
“This imperative—expressed in terms of prior beliefs how the world is sampled—is entirely consistent with the principle of maximum information transfer and formulations of salience in terms of Bayesian surprise (Barlow 1961; Bialek et al. 2001; Grossberg et al. 1997; Humphreys et al. 2009; Itti and Baldi 2009; Itti and…”
BackgroundResultSchmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1998) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.124.2.262 · Cited by 4,180
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000115 · Cited by 3,126 · cited 2×
“…consistent with the principle of maximum information transfer and formulations of salience in terms of Bayesian surprise (Barlow 1961; Bialek et al. 2001; Grossberg et al. 1997; Humphreys et al. 2009; Itti and Baldi 2009; Itti and Koch 2001; Olshausen and Field 1996; Optican and Richmond 1987).”
BackgroundHumphrey, S. E., Nahrgang, J. D., & Morgeson, F. P. (2007) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-9010.92.5.1332 · Cited by 2,303
The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain?
Friston, K. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.005 · Cited by 1,831
Self-citationPredictive coding under the free-energy principle
Friston, K., & Kiebel, S. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0300 · Cited by 1,579
Self-citationAttention, uncertainty, and free-energy
Feldman, H., & Friston, K. J. (2010) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00215 · Cited by 1,365
Self-citationBayesian surprise attracts human attention
Itti, L., & Baldi, P. (2009) · Vision Research · doi:10.1016/j.visres.2008.09.007 · Cited by 1,224
On the computational architecture of the neocortex: II The role of cortico-cortical loops
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Seth, A. K. (2014) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2013.877880 · Cited by 346
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Minimal self-models and the free energy principle.
Limanowski, J., & Blankenburg, F. (2013) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547 · Cited by 263
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Metadata
- Authors
- Friston, K.
- Venue
- Cognitive Processing
- Published
- 2012-07-29
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- S1
- Pages
- 171-177
- ISSN
- 1612-4782 (ISSN-L)
- 1612-4790
- OpenAlex
- W2017424427
- Cited by
- 40
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 0.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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