Cited by 1,365Visual perception and processing mechanismsEmbodied and Extended CognitionNeural and Behavioral Psychology Studies

Attention, uncertainty, and free-energy

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Feldman, Harriet, Friston, Karl J.·2010·Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

Abstract

We suggested recently that attention can be understood as inferring the level of uncertainty or precision during hierarchical perception. In this paper, we try to substantiate this claim using neuronal simulations of directed spatial attention and biased competition. These simulations assume that neuronal activity encodes a probabilistic representation of the world that optimizes free-energy in a Bayesian fashion. Because free-energy bounds surprise or the (negative) log-evidence for internal models of the world, this optimization can be regarded as evidence accumulation or (generalized) predictive coding. Crucially, both predictions about the state of the world generating sensory data and the precision of those data have to be optimized. Here, we show that if the precision depends on the states, one can explain many aspects of attention. We illustrate this in the context of the Posner paradigm, using the simulations to generate both psychophysical and electrophysiological responses. These simulated responses are consistent with attentional bias or gating, competition for attentional resources, attentional capture and associated speed-accuracy trade-offs. Furthermore, if we present both attended and non-attended stimuli simultaneously, biased competition for neuronal representation emerges as a principled and straightforward property of Bayes-optimal perception.

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Crossref · 10.3389/fnhum.2010.00215

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163 of 163 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The dependency of precisions on expected hidden causes and states mediates attention and action selection in hierarchical processing.

    “We have proposed that this dependency mediates attention and action selection in hierarchical processing (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2012)”

    From The Computational Anatomy of Psychosis (2013) · cites this paper as Feldman and Friston, 2010

    The Methods section states that precisions depend on expected hidden causes and states and proposes that this dependency mediates attentional processing in a hierarchy. The paper does not establish that the same dependency mediates action selection; its discussion of attentional selection is not evidence for action selection. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • In PP, stimulus salience and attention are considered emergent properties of precision-weighting mechanism.

    “In PP, stimulus salience and attention are considered emergent properties of this precision‐weighting mechanism. 9 , 28”

    From Evaluating the neurophysiological evidence for predictive processing as a model of perception (2020) · cites this paper as [28]

    The Discussion (‘Attention, gain and learning’; page unavailable) links attention to inference about precision and changes in synaptic gain. But the Introduction (‘Attention, biased competition and the Posner paradigm’; page unavailable) describes stimulus salience as a property of the stimulus that can attract attention; it does not establish salience itself as an emergent property of precision weighting. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Resistance to devaluation and habitisation illustrates how, in Active Inference, attention modulates the relative precision of the different levels of the hierarchy.

    “Resistance to devaluation and habitisation also illustrates how, in Active Inference, attention modulates the relative precision of the different levels of the hierarchy (Feldman and Friston, 2010).”

    From Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control (2015) · cites this paper as Feldman and Friston, 2010

    The Methods section describes attention as modulating the precision of prediction errors through synaptic gain in a cortical hierarchy. The paper examines perceptual attention in the Posner paradigm; the passages do not connect this mechanism to resistance to devaluation or habitisation. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The salience network tunes the internal model by predicting which prediction errors to pay attention to.

    “I further hypothesize that the salience network tunes the internal model by predicting which prediction errors to pay attention to [i.e. those errors that are likely to be allostatically relevant and therefore worth the cost of encoding and consolidation; called precision signals (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013a,b; Moran et al., 2013; Shipp et al., 2013)].”

    From The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization (2016) · cites this paper as Feldman and Friston, 2010

    The Introduction and Methods sections describe attention as precision-dependent weighting of prediction errors, with expected states modulating the gain of prediction-error units. They do not identify the salience network as performing this function or connect precision to allostatic relevance and the cost of encoding or consolidation. The citing sentence frames the salience-network account as the citing author's hypothesis, while this source supports its underlying precision-weighting mechanism. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • MMN is widely considered a robust marker of psychosis, thought to reflect an attempt to minimize prediction error and capture its disruption.

    “MMN is widely considered to be a robust marker of psychosis15, thought to reflect an attempt to minimize this prediction error and capture its disruption16–19.”

    From Deviations in effective connectivity explain different hallucination subtypes in Parkinson's disease psychosis (2026) · cites this paper as [17]

    In Results > Simulating the posner paradigm (page unavailable), the paper models some event-related potentials as signals of prediction error, supporting the general proposed link. The passages concern P1, N1, and P3 in a spatial-cueing task; they do not establish that MMN specifically reflects prediction-error minimization or captures its disruption. The psychosis-marker assertion has a separate citation in the citing sentence and is not assessed against this source. (LLM, conf=0.75)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Mumford D. (1992). On the computational architecture of the neocortex. II. The role of cortico-cortical loops. Biol. Cybern. 66, 241– 251 10.1007/BF00198477 1540675 · DOI · Paper page

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Authors
Feldman, H., & Friston, K. J.
Affiliations
Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
Corresponding author
Friston, Karl J.
Venue
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Published
2010
Volume
4
Pages
215-215
ISSN
1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2096962395
Cited by
1,365
References
163
Citations by year
2026: 128 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 104 · 2023: 98 · 2022: 98 · 2021: 121 · 2020: 115 · 2019: 122 · 2018: 97 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 68 · 2015: 73 · 2014: 58 · 2013: 50 · 2012: 38
FWCI
18.37
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Wellcome Trust (088130)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
Keywords
free energy principle, Bayesian inference, uncertainty, predictive coding, evidence accumulation, biased competition, Posner paradigm, attentional capture, speed-accuracy trade-off, attentional gating, hierarchical perception, neural simulation

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