Spreading order: religion, cooperative niche construction, and risky coordination problems
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Adaptationists explain the evolution of religion from the cooperative effects of religious commitments, but which cooperation problem does religion evolve to solve? I focus on a class of symmetrical coordination problems for which there are two pure Nash equilibriums: (1) ALL COOPERATE, which is efficient but relies on full cooperation; (2) ALL DEFECT, which is inefficient but pays regardless of what others choose. Formal and experimental studies reveal that for such risky coordination problems, only the defection equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. The following makes sense of otherwise puzzling properties of religious cognition and cultures as features of cooperative designs that evolve to stabilise such risky exchange. The model is interesting because it explains lingering puzzles in the data on religion, and better integrates evolutionary theories of religion with recent, well-motivated models of cooperative niche construction.
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Citations
Cites
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“Assuming randomness for an ordinary Stag Hunt, however, only the risk dominant equilibrium evolves: only defection is stochastically stable (Young 1993).”
BackgroundThe Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms
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The evolution of altruistic punishment
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It's All in the Timing: Interpersonal Synchrony Increases Affiliation
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“How the charismatic model explains puzzles in the data on religious cooperation Religious practices bring opportunity costs, risks, and material expenses, ostensibly with few economic or otherwise practical benefits (Atran and Norenzayan 2004; Irons 2001; Sosis 2003; Sterelny 2007).”
BackgroundThe evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion
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Background
Cited by
Let’s Dance Together: Synchrony, Shared Intentionality and Cooperation
Reddish, P., Fischer, R., & Bulbulia, J. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0071182 · Cited by 556
Self-citationMogan, R., Fischer, R., & Bulbulia, J. A. (2017) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2017.03.009 · Cited by 477
Self-citationSibley, C. G., & Bulbulia, J. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049648 · Cited by 194
Self-citationHow Do Rituals Affect Cooperation?: An Experimental Field Study Comparing Nine Ritual Types
Fischer, R., Callander, R., Reddish, P., & Bulbulia, J. (2013) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-013-9167-y · Cited by 191
Self-citationThe extended religious phenotype and the adaptive coupling of ritual and belief
Purzycki, B. G., & Sosis, R. (2013) · Israel Journal of Ecology and Evolution · doi:10.1080/15659801.2013.825433 · Cited by 110
Metadata
- Authors
- Bulbulia, J.
- Venue
- Biology & Philosophy
- Published
- 2011-10-25
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-27
- ISSN
- 0169-3867 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8404
- OpenAlex
- W2086383382
- Cited by
- 73
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 23.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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